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A B S T R A C T 
Three studies were undertaken to explore cognitive undeipinnings of anger. Study 1 
investigated Beck's Cognitive Content Specificity Hypothesis that specific cognitive 
content is associated with particular emotions in relation to anger (n = 240), and found 
limited specificity for Trait Anger and Depression. Study 2 explored Beck's Primacy 
Hypothesis that cognitions underlie emotions by means of emotion induction 
interventions (n = 127), and showed a slight indication of emotion induction for anger 
and anxiety. Study 3 explored the psychometrics of the Young Parenting Inventory, then 
examined the interrelationship between adverse parenting, and offspring cognitive 
schemas and emotions, and found specific relationships between some adverse parenting 
practices and offspring schemas and emotions (N = 144). Results were discussed in 
terms of the contribution of these studies to understanding trait anger, and implications 
for clinical practice and future research were outlined. 
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ANGER: SPECIFIC COGNITIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL FEATURES 
OVERVIEW 
The Issues 
After a decade in private practice I had much evidence that patients found 
cognitive treatment methods helpful, especially for anxiety and depression. These 
cognitive approaches grew out of the work of Ellis (1962), Beck (1967; 1976) and that of 
later therapists (Kendall & Watson, 1986; Salkovskis, 1996; Young, 1990, 2002), all of 
whom pointed to the importance of thought in emotional and mood disorders. Beck and 
his colleagues went as far as to suggest that specific types of thoughts are associated with 
particular emotions: for example, that depression is associated with thoughts of failure 
and defectiveness, and anxiety with thoughts of future danger (Clark, Beck, & Beck, 
1994). My patients appeared to confirm this. Beck also predicted that, in time, specific 
thoughts would also be found to be associated with emotions such as anger. 
When undertaking a placement with a marginalized group, I found many of my 
clients were very angry. I suspected their anger was linked to earlier trauma, and as a 
result, set out to explore what was known about anger. My findings became the 
foundation for Chapter 1, which reviews current studies of anger, and outlines some of 
the different theories proposed to explain anger. I discovered that there was little 
research that related specifically to cognitions associated with anger, and so decided to 
investigate Beck's prediction that specific thoughts would be found to be associated with 
anger. 
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In trying to explore these cognitions, I looked first at Beck's theory, which 
suggests a link between emotions and thoughts, and then at Young's model, which 
suggests there is a direct link between particular types of adverse cognitions and 
emotional and personality disorders. These issues are explored in Chapter 2. 
Young claimed that particular cognitions can become habits, or, to use his terms, 
that a person develops Early Maladaptive Schemas (EMSs). He also held the view that 
specific types of negative parenting give rise to particular types of maladaptive cognitive 
schemas. For that reason I also decided to explore whether there were particular 
cognitive themes associated with anger, and whether any specific adverse parenting 
experiences were particularly associated with these. 
Both Beck and Young used the term 'schema' (Beck, 1976) or 'maladaptive 
schema' (Young, 1990) to describe cognitive habits which acquire the power to arouse 
emotions such as anger, depression or anxiety. The concept of schema is addressed in 
Chapter 2, focusing mainly on Beck's and Young's explanations of how schemas operate. 
I undertook three studies to explore different aspects of these relationships. 
In Study 1 (Chapter 3) I examine whether there are any cognitive themes 
specifically associated with anger, rather than with depression or anxiety. One of the 
tensions that occurred in Study 1, as well as in the other two studies, was how to present 
the findings about anger when using a comparative approach. Whilst anger was the area 
of major interest, findings also emerged about the depression and anxiety because they 
were used as points of comparison. So, whilst the focus is anger, any findings that 
emerge about anxiety and depression are presented along with any findings made about 
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anger. Whilst this may appear to deflect from the focus on anger, in fact such contrasts 
rather serve to heighten the findings about anger. 
In Study 2 (Chapter 4) I tested Beck's Primacy Hypothesis which states that 
specific thoughts cause particular emotions. This was achieved by means of 'emotion 
induction.' Groups of participants were asked to focus on the schemas found in Study 1 
to discriminate between high and low anger, between high and low depression, or 
between high and low anxiety. These schemas were identified by means of discriminant 
analysis data which showed which schemas discriminated most clearly between 
participants providing high or low scores on the anger, depression and anxiety measures. 
In Study 3 (Chapter 5) I tested Young's contention that specific types of adverse 
parenting are associated with particular cognitive schemas, and hence with offspring 
anger, depression or anxiety. Young's model, by focusing on three levels of variables, 
implied a mediation model, although he did not state this directly. Study 3 used Young's 
Parenting Inventory (YPI) as a retrospective measure of parenting. The YPI presented an 
additional challenge because, although derived from clinical practice, it was untested 
psychometrically. So the first task in Study 3 was to examine some of the psychometric 
qualities of the YPI. Once it was established that the YPI was a reliable and apparently 
valid measure, the other questions could be addressed. Study 3 sought to discover 
whether there was any specific connection between adverse parenting and offspring 
maladaptive schemas; whether there were links between particular types of parenting and 
offspring anger, depression, or anxiety; and whether schemas mediated the effect of 
parenting on offspring emotions. In Chapter 6,1 make an overview of the three studies. 
Next, I discuss how the current studies fit the assumptions of the cognitive model. 
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model. Finally, in Chapter 7,1 assess what the current studies have added to our 
understanding of anger, and how anger related to depression and present a new model of 
anger. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO ANGER 
Overview 
In this chapter there is an outline of current research on anger. Initially, there is a 
definition of anger, then a look at angry behaviour, the functions of anger, and at anger 
triggers. Next, the physiology of anger, the genetic and temperamental influences on 
anger, and the part played by socialization and personality development are examined. 
Then there is a discussion of disordered anger and anger management. Finally, the 
relationship between cognition and anger is discussed. 
Defining Anger 
Anger is one of a range of emotions experienced by humans. Emotions are 
understood to be very ancient features of humans and other animals and relate to survival 
and life regulation. Damazio (1994,1999) described emotions as the "fairly high-level 
component sandwiched between the basic survival kit (e.g., regulation of metabolism; 
simple reflexes; motivations; biology of pain and pleasure) and the devices of high 
reason" (Damazio, 1999, p. 54). Whilst part of a survival system which operates 
automatically in lower animals, in humans, emotions also relate to higher cognitive 
processes (LeDoux, 1996,2000). There appear to be a set of basic survival emotions 
(Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1992; Ekman, 1992), included amongst these are rage and anger 
(Gray, 1982; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). 
Anger is an internal, bodily felt state, ranging from mild annoyance, irritation and 
frustration, to rage or fury (Deffenbacher, 1999). Kassinove and Sudholsky (1995) 
summarized anger thus: 
anger refers to a label given to a constellation of specific uncomfortable subjective 
experiences and associated cognitions (i.e., thoughts, beliefs, images, etc.) that 
have various associated verbal, facial, bodily, and automatic reactions. It is a 
transient state, in that it eventually passes, and it is a social role, in that our culture 
or subculture allows for the display of certain kinds of behaviors associated with 
the internal experience, but punishes others. Thus, anger is felt in people's 
conscious awareness, and is communicated through verbalizations, and bodily 
reactions. Some of the bodily reactions (e.g., flushing of the face, standing up, 
leaning forward, etc.) can be observed by others. Others (e.g., an increased heart 
rate, pupillary changes, sweating, etc.) typically are not (Kassinove & 
Sukhodolsky, 1995, p.l 1). 
Beck defined anger as the emotion associated with a person perceiving that he or she was 
"the object of deliberate physical attack, criticism, coercion, thwarting, rejection, 
deprivation or opposition" (Beck et al., 1979, p.66). Beck contended that where an 
individual encounters "noxious" situations, which he interprets as directly impinging on 
his domain, that is, on himself, his possessions, status, or rights, he is likely to feel anger. 
Whilst these noxious situations present no actual danger, the individual sees them as 
unjustified, unfair, or unreasonable, and often blames some 'offender' for this 'toxic' 
state of affairs. 
Despite the profusion of anger-related words in English, a search of 
psychological literature reveals only a small number of anger concepts. The main 
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references are to anger and hostility (Anderson, Anderson, Dill, & Deyser, 2003; 
Butterfield, Formeris, Feldman, & Beckham, 2000; Carmody, Brumer, & Sachinkp, 
1999). Less frequently there is reference to rage (Morgan & Nickson, 2001). There is 
one reference to resentment, but only in the context of forgiveness (Neto & Mullet, 
2004), and there are none to sulking, grumpiness, or chronic anger. Whilst there is a 
sizeable literature on aggression (Archer, 1988; Moyer, 1968, cited in. Neihoff, 1999), 
and, whilst aggression and anger can overlap, as discussed below, anger and aggression 
are normally seen as different (Spielberger, Johnson, Russell, Crane, Jacobs, & Worden, 
1985). 
Anger is generally described as a transitory emotional state; it can be manifested 
as a brief feeling, lasting a few seconds or minutes. If anger lasts hours or days, it is 
described as a mood, which is a more enduring emotional state. If anger persists for 
months or years it is described as a chronic emotional disorder, and, if it lasts for years, or 
a lifetime, it is described as a personality trait (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). 
Anger has been distinguished from both aggression and hostility (Spielberger et 
al., 1985). Hostility is typically seen as a lasting trait involving a negative attitude toward 
certain individuals or groups. Usually it involves angry feelings, which, in turn, can 
motivate aggressive behaviours, such as the destruction of objects, or injury of persons 
(Spielberger et al., 1985). Aggression involves destructive or punitive behaviour directed 
towards others (Topalli & O'Neal, 2003). Aggression is often, though not inevitably, 
associated with anger (Spielberger et al., 1985). Sometimes aggression occurs without 
anger, as when a vandal scratches an expensive car of an unknown owner. Conversely, 
sometimes anger occurs without aggression, as when an employee is unexpectedly told to 
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work late when the employee has already made other arrangements. Here the employee 
may feel angry but silently comply. 
Moyer (1968) identified eight types of aggression, each found in the presence of 
different stimuli, for example, predatory aggression, found in the presence of prey, and 
'inter-male' aggression, found in the presence of a strange male. Archer (1988), on the 
other hand, suggested mere were only three types of aggression: aggression as a solution 
to a problem; protective aggression when there is a threat to young; and competitive 
aggression, when there is a threat to status or an adequate share of resources. Averill 
(1982), when exploring the relationship between anger and aggression, found that most 
anger episodes were non-aggressive, with sixty percent of angry incidents resulting in 
calming activities, such as talking things over, and with only about 10% of anger 
episodes being accompanied by aggression (Averill, 1982). 
Behaviour associated with anger is often considered problematic because of its 
impact on other people (Deffenbacher, Lynch, Oetting, & Kemper, 1996). Angry 
behaviour can range from sour facial expressions, quiet, internal mumblings, or mild 
protestations, to extremely violent outbursts. Anger incidents include arguments, school-
yard fights, assaults, brawls, domestic violence, or even homicide (Deffenbacher, 
Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996). High anger levels are involved in many homicides, for 
example, in the USA 40% of all women murdered are killed by an angry spouse (Averill, 
1983). In Australia, around 80 women are killed each year as a result of domestic 
disputes (McLennan, 1996; Stott Despoja, 2004; Mazza, Dennerstein, & Ryan, 1996). 
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Functions of Anger 
When people were asked to track their anger in 'anger diaries,' on average they 
became angry 7.3 times per week, and annoyed 23.5 times per week. In 75% of cases 
they became angry with loved ones or people they liked (Averill, 1982). Their motives 
for anger were to assert their authority, to improve their image, or to 'get even' for 
previous wrongs (Averill, 1982). This exemplifies the fact that anger serves a variety of 
adaptive functions. It promotes self-defence and mastery, and regulates social and 
interpersonal behaviour. As part of the response-to-threat system, anger functions as an 
important flight or fight motivator (Novaco, 1976). Children's anger, as a feature of 
attachment, ensures survival (Bowlby, 1973); and anger in infants is associated with 
mastery of new skills (Abe & Izard, 1999). 
Anger's main function is to serve as a signal that something is wrong in the social 
environment, and it motivates individuals to regulate their interpersonal behaviour 
(Lemerise & Dodge, 2000). It also directs interest and attention (Dunn, 1988, cited in 
Abe & Izard, 1999) and prompts persons 'to think about what one can and cannot 
legitimately demand' (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998). Often anger leads to discussion and 
negotiation, which can help angry persons gain a better understanding of social rules, and 
teach them to consider the situation from another's perspective (Dunn, 1988; Nelson & 
Aboud, 1985). Anger also elicits behaviour from others, which can serve to regulate 
interactions, and contribute to problem solving (Lemerise & Dodge, 2000). 
Novaco (1976) outlines a range of other functions of anger. It is energizing, so 
often interferes with cognitive processes, so that reactions become impulsive and is 
disruptive. It has 'expressive,' 'self-promotional' and 'defensive' functions. It functions 
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as the 'guardian of self-esteem,' motivating an individual to stand up for him/herself 
(Novaco, 1996). 
Novaco showed that anger has a potentiating function, that is, it induces a sense of 
potency, of being in charge. It has instigative functions, so can also instigate aggression, 
as described previously. Anger can also bring secondary gains for the angry person 
because others accede to their wishes. This encourages them to use anger in similar 
situations. Because anger can be so rewarding, some people become very attached to it 
(Novaco, 1996a). 
Anger Triggers 
As discussed earlier, anger can be triggered by cognitive sources. For example, 
Novaco thought anger arises from how a person perceives a situation (Novaco, 1975, 
1976,1977,1979). When a person perceives a loss of power, or that their power has 
been challenged, he or she is likely to feel angry. In fact, in 85% of cases anger occurs in 
response to some perceived challenge (Averill, 1982). 
Common cognitive triggers for anger are incidents such as being cut off by 
another car, an out-of-order machine, being in a situation reminiscent of a previously 
anger-provoking one, perceiving that someone has made a 'blameful or shameful' attack 
on oneself (Eckhart & Deffenbacher, 1995), or perceiving disrespect towards oneself 
(Miller, 2001). Beck (1976) included triggers such as being subjected to an unpleasant 
experience which threatens one's safety or self-esteem; perceiving malice; being 
prevented from doing something one wants to do; having one's rights infringed; and not 
being accorded privileges to which one feels entitled. 
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Perceived assaults can be direct, as when there is direct criticism from another, or 
indirect, as when another boasts about their successes (Beck, 1976). Beck thought anger 
could also be triggered by 'hypothetical transgressions,' in situations when a person's 
personal rights are not directly under attack, yet the person disapproves of another's 
behaviour, for instance, when another person eats messily. Even though this does not 
directly infringe the person's rights, or even threaten them, it 'could have,' and even this 
is sufficient to trigger anger. 
Hypothetical threats also occur when a person perceives unfairness or injustice 
towards him or herself or to another, or when a person sees an attack as intentional, sees 
violation of laws they respect, or perceives that another person has breached their 
personal moral code. Such indirect situations can arouse anger as strongly as direct 
infringements (Beck, 1976). From this, it can be seen that anger is not simply an 
automatic, mechanical response, but is strongly mediated by how a person perceives an 
event, and how relevant the event is for him or her. 
Another view is that anger is a more mechanical experience. For example, 
Berkowitz thought that anger was triggered mechanically in response to frustration 
(Berkowitz, 1993). He claimed that anger is a very basic emotion, an almost automatic 
physiological response to any negative experience, and that anger and aggression are 
closely linked as 'natural' responses when a person is frustrated. Although Berkowitz 
acknowledged there were some cognitive components to anger, he thought that anger was 
largely the result of a mechanical overflowing of frustration in aversive situations. First, 
a person feels some negative affect. This gives rise to a low order 'primitive' processing 
and this leads on to 'rudimentary anger' or the 'fight' or 'aggression-related' tendency. 
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Next, a higher level of processing begins, when the person makes attributions and applies 
personal rules. At this point he or she becomes irritated, annoyed, or angry. When anger 
is accompanied by aggression, this comes about because the person remembers previous 
times when he or she was angry (Berkowitz, 1993). 
Anger has also been linked to 'prior mood' (Butler, 1993; Clark, 1986; Keltner, 
Elsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Teasdale, 1988, 1996,1999). For example, Butler (1993) 
found that where a person was already in an angry mood, this affected how they 
responded to new events. For example, 'paranoid thinking' was exacerbated in those 
persons who were already angry when they were asked to make judgments in a simulated 
murder trial. 
Physiological Components of Anger 
LeDoux's (1996) research on the psychophysiology of emotion showed that the 
amygdala, the 'brain's alarm system,' is responsible for the survival responses that occur 
when an individual is under threat. When particular areas of the amygdala were 
stimulated experimentally, depending on the precise location of the stimulation, one of 
three survival responses arose. There were outbursts of rage accompanied by attack; fear 
or panic, accompanied by flight; or a 'warm, floaty feeling' accompanied by 
'appeasement' behaviour, that is, 'excessively friendly behaviour' (LeDoux, 1992). 
These findings clearly showed that anger initially occurs in the primitive, survival part of 
the brain. 
In threat situations, there are two levels of response. First, a direct, automatic 
thalamus-amygdala response, in which sensory stimuli are processed in the sensory 
to the amygdala, to be acted on automatically. This is what LeDoux describes as the 
'quick and dirty,' or Tow road' response. The second level response proceeds from the 
'sensory thalamus' to the 'sensory cortex' (LeDoux, 1992, p. 164). Here any emotional 
stimulus is appraised before feedback is sent to the amygdala, and before any emotional 
response is made. This second process, what LeDoux calls the 'high road' of the cortical 
process, is slower and more complex than the automatic Tow road,' thalamus-amygdala 
response. 
In the first, 'quick-and-dirty' thalamus-amygdala route, the amygdala registers 
external stimuli. If these relate to survival, the amygdala produces an almost 
instantaneous automatic response. Next, a quarter of a second later, the information also 
reaches the frontal cortex, where if is contextualized, and a rational plan of action is 
developed. If the situation concerns survival, the bodily reaction already begun by the 
amygdala is continued; but, if the rational decision is to respond verbally rather than to 
react physically, the cortex damps down the automatic reaction. This decision is 
registered by the hypothalamus, then relayed to the amygdala, and activity there is also 
calmed down. In this way, emotions can be held in check by 'higher' cortical functions 
of the brain. 
These two levels of processing mean that even a very angry person does have the 
ability to calm him or herself. This is because the higher level of processing allows him 
or her, when angry, to appraise a situation before acting, rather than being limited to 
responding automatically. This is particularly advantageous in social settings, because 
cognitive processing adds shades of meaning not available at the automatic level. This 
ability to override automatic survival emotions by means of cortical processes brings a 
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flexibility that is not available through the automatic path (LeDoux, 1992). 
The Effect of Previous Trauma and Stress 
Anger has long been associated with emotional trauma. In fact anger is often seen 
as a characteristic feature of clinical disorders relating to trauma or acute grief (Chemtob, 
Novaco, Hamada, & Gross, 1997). For example, anger is associated with Post-
Traumatic-Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Chemtob, Novaco, Hamada, Gross, & Smith, 1997; 
Lasko, Gurvits, Kuhne, Orr, & Pitman, 1994). High levels of anger have been found in 
female victims of crime (Riggs, Dancu, Gershuny, Greenberg, & Foa, 1992), and in 
veterans with combat-related PTSD (Chemtob, Harnade, Roitblat, & Muroake, 1994). 
Anger is often intrusive in PTSD, and situations perceived as threatening often trigger 
heightened arousal, 'hostile appraisal,' and 'antagonistic behavior' (Chemtob, Novaco, 
Hamada, & Gross, 1997). Anger is also associated with Borderline Personality disorder, 
itself strongly associated with early trauma (Famularo, Kinscherff, & Fenton, 1991; 
Koeningsberg, Kernberg, Stone, Appelbaum, Yeomans, & Diamond, 2000). 
This relationship between anger and trauma has yet to be fully explained. Novaco 
(1996) suggests the links between trauma and anger arise because trauma 'resets' the 
person's 'activation and inhibition patterns' in accordance with perceived threat. This 
serves to shift the person into automatic 'survival mode,' so that when a person encounters 
a situation similar to the previous traumatic one, this gives rise to cognitive distortions, 
which results in anger (Novaco, 1996, p.171). However, this does not explain why a 
person becomes angry rather than afraid. 
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It is known that if a person is already highly stressed, it takes less to trigger the 
cognitive expectancies that are associated with emotions like anger (Novaco, 1977). 
When stress is high, even a remote or trivial stimulus can precipitate anger. Persons who 
experience high stress levels, or who frequently experience negative life events, are more 
likely to react emotionally, for instance, by becoming angry (Kessler, 1997; Novaco, 
1977). 
Uncontrollable Anger 
Sometimes anger appears to be uncontrollable. Two explanations have been 
offered for how emotional control breaks down (Carter, 1998). The first is that signals 
sent back from the cortex to the limbic system are too weak or undirected to override the 
automatic amygdala activity. An example of this is found in infants and children, who, 
because of the relative weakness of their cortical signals, have far more emotional 
outbursts than adults do. One reason for this 'weakness,' is that the axons carrying the 
signals from the prefrontal lobe (where rational processing of emotion takes place) back to 
the amygdala, do not mature fully until adulthood. The amygdala, on the other hand, is 
more or less mature at birth, so is capable of full activity. As a result, a young child's 
brain is essentially unbalanced, and the child's immature cortex is no match for its 
powerful, mature amygdala (Carter, 1998). This is not to suggest that an infant does not 
also have the capacity for prefrontal activity, because many of the incidents that trigger 
temper-outbursts in infants are based on prefrontal activity, such as frustration, or 
'wanting' something, such as a toy, or access to a place, or to touch a forbidden object 
(McLachlan, personal communication, 2005). 
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The second explanation for uncontrollable anger in adults suggests that the 
amygdala can be activated in the absence of any outside stimulus which simultaneously 
arouses the cortex. This can occur when there has been damage to the cortex. Such 
damage prevents the cortex damping down and inhibiting automatic amygdala activity 
(Raine, 2002; Scarpa & Raine, 1997,2000). This effect is illustrated by the fact that some 
people convicted of violent crimes show low cortical activity, which suggests they have 
lost the ability to damp down the amygdala (Raine, Meloy, Bihrle, Stoddard, Lacasse, & 
Buchbaum, 1998). Thirdly, rage and anger have also been associated with even 'minor 
concussions' accompanying damage to the left temporal lobe (Amen, 1998). 
Genetic and Temperamental Factors in Anger 
Emotions like anger have been found to have genetic and temperamental 
foundations (Akiskal, 1996; Cadoret, Leve, & Devor, 1997; Chess, & Thomas, 1996; 
Heusmann, Lefkowitz, & Eron, 1984; Kagan, 1982; Plomin, 1990). Amen (1998) found 
a genetic element in "rageaholic" behaviour, when an individual flares up over 
inconsequential incidents, such as being brushed against. 
Anger can also be transmitted through biological processes, such as contagion, in 
a manner similar to yawning. 'Anger contagion' refers to the phenomenon whereby one 
angry person expresses anger, which appears to set off anger in others (Lewis & Saarni, 
1985). Such 'contagious' behaviour might be explained by the recently discovered 
phenomenon of mirror neurons. Rizzolatti & Craighero (2004) showed that rriirror 
neurons fire in the presence of another individual carrying out a goal directed behaviour 
and might account for some instances in which one person's angry behaviour is copied by 
others. 
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Developmental Features of Anger 
Emergence of anger. Developmental psychologists have looked at emotional 
development, and investigated when various emotions arise (Izard, 1979). Basic 
emotions, which include happiness, interest, surprise, fear, anger, sadness and disgust, are 
thought to be present from the earliest weeks of life (Campos, Caplovitz, Lamb, 
Goldsmith, & Stenberg, 1983). Others have questioned this and Steiner (1979), for 
example, noted that whilst newborns register disgust in response to sour tastes, anger only 
appears at about three months of age. Because emotions in infants and children can only 
be inferred, a number of systems have been developed to examine children's emotions. 
These usually involve infants' facial expressions. One system is the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS), which uses photographs of babies' expressions to catalogue the 
positions of different facial muscles in various emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). With 
this system, it becomes clear that anger occurs earlier than had previously been thought, 
namely at about two months of age (Izard, Hembree, & Huebner, 1987). Two-month old 
babies express anger in response to frustration. For instance, babies who have previously 
been able to turn on music by pulling on strings, show anger when they are no longer able 
to turn on the music (Lewis, Allesandri, & Sullivan, 1990). 
Anger and attachment. When infants' attachment needs are threatened or 
frustrated, they show high emotional arousal, particularly anger (Ainsworth, 1972). 
Sometimes anger is directed at the person preventing the child from gaining proximity to 
the attachment figure, while at other times it is directed at the attachment figure him or 
herself (Ainsworth, 1972). When separated from their mothers, infants show anger as 
well as sadness and distress (Bowlby, 1969,1973; Malatesta, Grigoryev, Lamb, Albin, & 
Culver, 1986). When children perceive their parents are unavailable, as happened in a 
prolonged separation, or even when separations are temporary, anger appears to motivate 
children to overcome obstacles in order to be reunited with their parent figure (Bowlby, 
1973). Often anger appears to be the only way a young child has to communicate 
reproach to the attachment figure, perhaps hoping to discourage him or her from 
becoming unavailable in the future (Bowlby, 1973). 
Bowlby (1973) distinguished two types of anger, functional and dysfunctional 
anger. He saw functional anger as 'the anger of hope,' where anger is a protest reaction 
to 'negative attachment behaviour' of others, as when a parent does not respond to an 
infant's cries. Functional anger is helpful, because it often gets others to stop their 
negative behaviour and to attend to the child. Functional anger also teaches a child how 
to battle to overcome obstacles. When attachment is insecure, another type of anger is 
expressed, dysfunctional anger - 'the anger of despair.' If a child's functional anger does 
not get others to modify their behaviours, or, if the child is threatened with abandonment 
or rejection, the child may express dysfunctional anger, which is manifested in 
overwhelming tantrums, or even in episodes of destructive behaviour. Because parents 
often punish or reject this type of behaviour, dysfunctional anger is counter-productive, 
particularly when a caregiver misreads a child's anger and retaliates with anger, 
punishment, or disengagement. Such dysfunctional anger only serves further to weaken 
the relational bonds between the child and parents (Lyons-Ruth, Alpern, & Repacholi, 
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1993). 
Like children, adults can respond angrily to threats to attachment. For instance, 
when a spouse threatens to leave his or her partner, the insecure partner often displays 
bouts of frightened anger, reminiscent of the protests found in babies and young children, 
when they are threatened with abandonment (Weiss, 1975). 
Adult attachment style affects a person's anger proneness, their anger expression 
and their anger goals. For example, Mikulincer (1998) found that adults classified as 
having 'secure-attachment' cope better with separation, and display mainly functional 
anger by participating in problem-solving, whereas those classified as having 'anxious-
ambivalent-attachment' cope less well with separation. They are prone to intense anger, 
show a more hostile attributional bias, and expect that their significant others will be 
unavailable or insensitive to their needs. They also lack anger control skills and tend to 
ruminate on their angry feelings. Those adults classified as having 'avoidant' attachment 
withdraw after separation and manifest a second form of dysfunctional anger -
'dissociated anger,' in which there is a disjunction between what they report they are 
experiencing and their actual physiological responses. For example, they report that are 
not angry, yet their physiological responses belie this. As well as showing differences 
between behavioural and physiological responses, there are cognitive differences between 
the various attachment groups as to whether they attribute hostile intent to others or not. 
Anger socialization. In discussions of anger, the perennial nature-nurture 
question lies just below the surface (Harkness & Super, 1985; Lewis & Saarni, 1985). 
There is strong evidence that emotions like anger, as well as being hard-wired, are 
affected by learning, and socialization (Harre, 1986; Lewis & Saarni, 1985; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Both anger and aggression have been found to be subject to 
socialization (Eron, Huesmann, & Zelli, 1991; Patterson, Capaldi, & Bank, 1991). 
Families and peers influence children's expressions of anger, and aggressive behaviour, 
either as models, or through direct instruction on how to act in emotional states 
(Debaryshe & Fryxell, 1998). Anger can be socialized directly through didactic teaching, 
for example saying to a child, "Go to your room till you've calmed down!", or anger can 
be socialized indirectly, through contact with an angry model. In these cases, 
socialization occurs through imitation, identification, and social learning (Renk, Phares, 
& Epps, 1999). 
A mother's behaviour influences her children's expression of anger. For 
example, mothers have been found to ignore angry girls but to 'reward' angry boys with 
attention, thus making it likely that boys will use anger on future occasions (Radke-
Yarrow, Ricbters, & Wilson, 1985). How a mother handles an angry child has an 
important effect on what anger-control skills her child develops (El-Sheikh & Cheskes, 
1995). For example, when mothers are calm in the face of their child's anger, their 
children show greater social competence (Denham, 1993). A mother expressing a lot of 
anger seems to interfere with her children's social learning. For example, children of 
angry mothers show more 'difficult' behaviour than do the children of less angry mothers 
(Crockenberg, 1981). Children from coercive, hostile families use more aggression, 
perhaps as means of self-protection (Patterson, 1985). Conversely, mothers who have 
had to defend themselves against physical aggression sometimes want to teach their 
daughters to defend themselves, so deliberately tease their daughters and teach them to 
fight back (Miller & Sperry, 1987). 
Parents can also teach children emotional control. Parents who respond to their 
offspring by talking about their own emotions, who are supportive, and show empathy 
towards their children, produce children with greater anger control skills (Roberts & 
Strayer, 1987). Where parents respond to their children's anger with firmness, and help 
their children deal with the cause of their distress, their offspring develop higher levels of 
social competence than do the children of parents who are 'too responsive to the negative 
emotions' (Roberts & Strayer, 1987). Children's emotional continence, that is, their 
ability to handle their anger, is influenced by how their parents respond to the child's 
emotions, particularly anger (Roberts & Strayer, 1987). When parents of older children 
respond to their child's displays of negative emotion without also giving some direction 
on how to manage anger in socially appropriate ways, this appears to reinforce their 
child's negative displays (Snyer & Patterson, 1986). 
Children who witness anger among family members, or have been exposed to 
frequent parental conflict, show more negative emotional reactions, such as anger, fear, 
shame, and sadness, particularly when the conflict is over the child, or something the 
child has done (Debaryshe & Fryxell, 1998). When parents acquiesce to their children's 
negative behaviours, that is, they 'give in' to their angry child, this has the effect of 
rewarding their child's anger and serves to increase 'coercive' family interactions 
(Debaryshe & Fryxell, 1998; Patterson, 1982). 
Because people from different cultures have different anger levels, this seems to 
indicate that cultural factors also play a part in anger. For example, in Inuit society, 
where parents use an indulgent parenting style with their infants, by age six, their 
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children show hardly any anger (Briggs' study, as cited in Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). 
Likewise, Thai children have few anger based disorders in comparison to USA children 
(Weisz et al., 1987). This suggests that socialization plays some part in anger behaviour, 
because different cultures have different 'display rules' for anger. These regulate to 
whom, where, and when anger, and other emotions, can be expressed (Lemerise & 
Dodge, 2000). When individuals do not follow these rules, this raises problems, even for 
young children. For instance, even very young children tend to dislike those children 
who do not follow their culture's display rules (Casey & Schlossler, 1994). 
There are also cultural differences in levels of anger. For instance, a study 
examining anger proneness in Spanish, Dutch and Japanese people, showed that 'anger 
proneness' was similar in Spanish and Dutch persons, but higher in Japanese persons 
(Ramirez, Fijihara, & Goozen, 2001). This strongly suggested that cultural 'anger' 
patterns are socialized through modelling, or the use of reward and punishment. 
While anger is often punished, it has been noticed that anger and aggression 
increase in children who have suffered severe punishment (Magai & McFadden, 1995). 
Whilst punishment suppresses behaviours such as whining, it does not suppress emotions 
such as anger, and parental use of physical punishment is associated with offspring anger, 
in both boys and girls (Magai, Distel, & Liker, 1995). Pre-school and primary children 
who are frequently punished by caregivers show more aggression than those who are not 
punished often (Lyons-Ruth, Alpern, & Repacholi, 1993; Main & Hesse, 1990). Even 
when parents punish their children in non-physical ways, such as with rejection, anger, 
criticism, disappointment, ridicule, coldness, or withdrawal of parental love, their 
offspring show more angry feelings, more depressed affect, and more 'preoccupied 
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attachment' (Magai, Hunzinker, Mesias, & Clayton Culver, 2000). 
Personality and Anger 
Anger can become a lasting trait. This is because one of the fundamental 
properties of emotions is that they can readily become habits. When habitually 
expressed, emotions are susceptible to "structuralization within the personality" (Magai 
& McFadden, 1995). Once established, such emotional patterns are described as traits or 
personality characteristics. 
These characteristics strongly influence how persons process information, and 
whether they use coping or defensive strategies in a particular situation (Magai & 
McFadden, 1995). One such emotional pattern is trait anger, which is manifest as an 
angry dispositional tendency, irritability, sensitivity to slights, cynicism, and 
argumentativeness (Magai & McFadden, 1995, p.257). For example, 'angry' men and 
'angry' women have been found to behave in uncontrolled ways, responding more 
angrily and intensely than do their non-angry counterparts in similar situations 
(Deffenbacher, 1992). 
Trait anger predisposes an individual to perceive situations in a biased manner. It 
also leads to significantly more long-term negative consequences for these angry persons 
(Deffenbacher, 1992). For instance, persons high on trait anger often manifest significant 
depression, or feel significantly more disgusted, foolish, or ashamed of themselves after 
an angry episode, while those low on trait anger report feeling significantly more relieved 
and more satisfied after an anger incident (Tafrate, Kassinove, & Dundin, 2002). 
Children too have been found to manifest early characteristic personality patterns. 
For example, some children manifest 'shy' patterns, while others show angry or 
'explosive' patterns (Caspi, Elder, & Bern, 1987,1988). Some children showed angry 
personality configurations involving anger-proneness, aggression, and hostility (Magai & 
McFadden 1995). In particular, children assessed as 'insecurely-attached' and those 
assessed as 'aggression-prone' show lower thresholds of anger arousal and express more 
anger than their non-aggressive counterparts (Magai & McFadden, 1995). Some 5-11 
year olds already show behaviour that has a 'driven,' reactive quality, similar to that 
found in adult Type A Behaviour Pattern (TABP). Such behaviour is associated with 
several predisposing factors including a temperamental irritability, having parents who 
modelled TABP, and a critical family climate (Magai & McFadden, 1995). Personality 
traits have also been attributed to persons developing particular sets of cognitions which 
bias their interpretation of situations in favour of anger provocation (Young, 1990). 
Negative Effects of Anger 
For many years, arising from psychoanalysis, there has been an accepted 'truth' 
that not 'venting' or expressing anger overtly results in harmful 'repression' (Freud, 
1920). There is some support for this, as it has been found that persons who do not 
express their anger become more depressed than those who do (Lester, 1989; Robbins & 
Tanck, 1997). Yet, there have also been counter findings. An examination of the 
relationship between anger expression, coping style, and well being, has shown that, 
rather than depression being reduced through anger, the more anger a person expresses, 
the greater is their level of stress and depression, and the lower their wellbeing and 
copmg levels (Doing & Bishop, 1999). Venting anger has also been found to increase 
anger levels, and often leads to unwanted outcomes (DiGuiseppe, 1995). Furthermore, 
trait anger in early adolescents is associated with diminished general well-being, less 
vigour, and less inclination to change (Mahon, Yarcheski, & Yarcheski, 2000). 
Finally, there are numerous studies showing that anger has adverse health 
consequences (Appendix A). In particular, anger is associated with coronary heart 
disease (Chesney, 1985; Chesney &, Rosenthal, 1985; Frasure-Smith, Lesperance, & 
Talajic, 1995; Friedman, 8c Rosenman, 1959; Spielberger, Johnson, Russel, Crane, & 
Worden, 1985; Spielberger, Krasner, & Soloman, 1988). 
Disordered Anger 
Beck (1976) thought it was possible to distinguish 'normal' anger from 
'disturbed,' abnormal or pathological anger. He concluded that there should be 
diagnostic categories for 'clinical' expressions of anger, just as there are for clinical 
expressions of fear (such as phobias), anxiety (such as panic disorder), and depression. 
Beck thought that what distinguishes disordered emotions from normal emotional 
responses, is that there are always cognitive distortions in the disordered responses. 
While in normal emotional responses, cognitive appraisals are 'reasonable,' in disturbed 
emotions, internal, cognitive factors serve to "confound the individual's appraisal of 
reality" (Beck, Butler, Brown, Dahlsgaard, Newman, & Beck, 2001). This theme is 
returned to in Chapter 2. 
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Managing Anger 
Numerous well crafted empirical studies have shown that anger is very amenable 
to modification (Deffenbacher, 1995,1999; Deffenbacher, Thwaites, Wallace, & Oetting, 
1994; Deffenbacher, Lynch, Oetting, & Kemper, 1996; DiGiuseppe, 1995; Digiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2003; Digiuseppe, Tafrate, & Eckhart, 1994; Mayne & Ambrose, 1999; McKay, 
& Rogers, 1996; Moon & Eisler, 1983; Novaco, 1977,1999; Wilson, 1984). Because 
most angry people display cognitive distortions (Eckhardt, Barbour, & Davidson, 1998), 
many anger management programmes focus on these cognitions. Most anger 
management programmes foster skills, such as teaching persons to recognize that they are 
becoming angry, and show steps necessary for staying in control. They teach problem 
solving, and develop assertiveness and stress management skills. A plethora of 
empirically supported CBT self-help books have emerged to teach these skills 
(Deffenbacher & McKay, 2000; Potter-Effron, 1994; McKay & Rogers, 2000). 
Such anger management programmes teach individuals to become aware of their 
thoughts and to question the veracity of these thoughts (Beck, 1976; Beck & Fernandez, 
1998; Chemtob, Novaco, Hamada, & Gross, 1997; Ellis, 1962,1977; Hamberger & Lohr, 
1980). Persons are also trained to recognize signs of anger, which they can then use as 
cues for them to employ coping strategies for resolving conflict (Novaco, 1996). 
Many training programmes have been found to have beneficial effects, even for 
'resistant' and difficult groups. For example, male spouse abusers (Faulkner, 
Stoltenberg, Cogen, Nolder, & Shooter, 1992) and 'psychiatric male adolescents,' after 
anger management training programmes, both showed significantly increased anger-
control (Feindler, Ecton, Kingsley, & Dubey, 1986). Even young children, when 
27 
encouraged to exhibit self-control, became more 'emotionally continent' than those 
allowed to display tantrums (Carter, 1998; Feindler, 1995). 
Through practice, it is possible for persons to learn to control anger (Feindler, 
1995; Garrison & Stolberg, 1983; Ollendick & King, 2000). Possibly this occurs because 
brain cells, such as those which inhibit the amygdala, when regularly stimulated, become 
more responsive and so easier to activate on future occasions (LeDoux, 1992). This 
means mat practice in controlling anger, even for young children, makes anger 
management easier. By such means, anger can be reduced and its unpleasant social 
effects mitigated (Jacobs, 2003). In addition, the negative health consequences are 
decreased. From the success of these cognitively-based programmes it becomes clear just 
how important cognitions are in anger generation and in anger management. 
Cognitive Factors in Anger 
Whilst anger is related to survival, as discussed earlier, it is not simply a reflex. 
As with other emotions, anger reflects the workings of underlying cognitive processes 
such as 'attention, motivation, memory, judgment, decision making, and problem-
solving' (Clore, Ortony, Dienes, & Frijda,. 1993, p.81). This means that, in any negative 
situation, a person has a choice of possible responses. For instance, when a woman has 
been the butt of a joke, she can become angry, take the situation as a joke, or simply 
ignore it. Her response is not simply a reflex reaction but is the result of decision-
making. 
The role of cognitive appraisal in anger was highlighted by Clore et al. (1993). 
They formulated a complex social model to explain anger. Rather than seeing anger as a 
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unitary concept, they differentiated it into several distinctive states, each reflecting 
particular underlying cognitive appraisals. For instance, in the presence of any 
potentially anger-provoking event, an individual appraises the situation in terms of his or 
her own goals, standards, and attitudes. The event is seen as desirable or undesirable, 
praiseworthy or blameworthy, appealing or unappealing. In the light of these appraisals, 
different responses can be triggered: frustration, reproach, resentment, or anger. 
Frustration arises in situations when there is an undesirable outcome, or the person is 
prevented from reaching a goal, but no-one is to blame. An example of this would be 
when a person is trying to read a newspaper, but the wind keeps blowing it off the table. 
Reproach is felt when someone else has violated the person's standards, or the person 
attributes blame to another, for instance, when another person loses a borrowed book. 
Resentment is felt when the person deems someone else to be unworthy in relation to the 
outcomes gained by them, for example, when a person is passed over for promotion and 
the job is awarded to someone less competent. Anger is seen to be a combination of 
frustration and reproach, for example, when a person loses a game to someone who has 
cheated. If the game had been lost simply as the result of a lack of skill, the person might 
have felt disappointment, but not anger. Anger arises when there is a combination of 
disapproval of somebody else's behaviour, an undesirable outcome, and someone to 
blame. 
Anger has been associated with a number of cognitive factors, such as values, 
personal rules, self-schemas, attitudes and goals, all of which determine whether or not a 
person becomes angry (Deffenbacher, 1999). Some studies point to the role of 'locus of 
control,' that is, whether or not an individual believes he or she has any control over a 
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situation, or feels controlled by someone or something (Lester, 1989; Young, 1991). For 
example, T. L. Young (1991) found that both anger and depression are associated with an 
'external locus of control' - the belief that the person is controlled by external factors. 
Other studies have focused on appraisal and expectancy (Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, 
& Brown, 1986), as when an individual finds what he expects to find, such as when an 
individual expects others to behave aggressively (Ellis & Tartrate, 1997; Magai, 1999). 
'Angry' persons show a hostile attributional bias, so tend to view their interpersonal 
interactions negatively (Deffenbacher, 1992). Angry and aggressive children show 
cognitive distortions and biases when encoding social cues (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge 
& Frame, 1982; Dodge & Somberg, 1987). They expect more negative experiences than 
do children who are not angry (Dodge et al., 1986; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). 
Anger has also been associated with unstable high self-esteem (Baumeister, 
Smart, & Boden, 1996; Novaco, 1996), and with feeling that one's self-esteem is 
threatened (Izard, 1977). Anger arises when a person perceives injustice (Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997). It is also associated with thoughts of vengeance against a transgressor 
(Digiuseppe & Froh, 2002; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000). 
How persons perceive situations depends on their expectations. Expectations seem 
to determine whether or not a person becomes angry (Novaco, 1996). Anger can also 
occur in response to stress from cognitive sources, such as when a person perceives that 
environmental demands are disproportionately greater than his or her coping resources 
(Novaco, 1995), or it can reflect how a person felt prior to an incident. These feelings 
influence a person's judgments, and can render his or her perceptions of who was to blame 
somewhat inaccurate, an effect known as the 'reverse-rose-coloured glasses' effect (Clore 
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et al., 1993, p. 82). Such expectational biases can impact even on simple tasks such 
interpreting an ambiguous facial expression (Magai, 1999). 
How individuals come to perceive their world in a particular manner and what 
automatic cognitions they make have also been studied. It appears that these perceptions 
and expectations are influenced by how they were treated when young (Ingram, Kendall, 
Smith, Donnel, & Ronan, 1987; McDermut & Haaga, 1994). From these early 
experiences a child develops a view of what he or she can expect from others in the future. 
Conclusion 
Anger is a complex emotion. It is linked to 'hard-wired,' self-protective, survival 
responses. It appears very early in life and, whilst linked to temperament, it is also 
socialized. It involves physiological responses, cognitions, and behaviour. It can motivate 
a person to overcome obstacles, and defend values. When it is oveiwhelming, chronic, or 
vented in destructive ways, anger becomes a problem. However, it is possible for persons 
to learn to manage their anger. Even though anger is such an important human emotion, a 
perusal of the psychological literature shows that there are far fewer references to anger 
than to depression or anxiety. Consequently, anger has been described as the 
'misunderstood emotion' (Tavris, 1984), or 'the forgotten emotion' (Diguiseppe, Tafrate, 
& Eckjjhart, 1994). While there have been a range of studies of anger, as this review 
shows, there has not been a study of the particular cognitions associated with anger. In the 
following chapter, the theme of cognitions in relation to anger and other emotions is 
further developed. 
CHAPTER 2 
COGNITIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF EMOTIONS 
Overview 
In this thesis, the primary interest is the relationship between specific cognitions 
and anger. However, because there is only a limited amount of information about this, 
this chapter begins with an outline of what is already known about the relationship 
between cognitions and two other emotions, specifically, depression and anxiety. This 
includes two current explanations of these relationships: Beck's Cognitive Content 
Specificity hypothesis and his Primacy hypothesis, which are examined in relation to 
anger in comparison with depression and anxiety; and Young's hypothesis about the 
effects of early negative parenting on offspring schema development. 
Background 
There have been a variety of explanations offered of how affective disorders arise 
and operate (Ellis, 1962; Epps, & Kendall, 1995; Hollon, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; 
Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Leahy, 2003). The explanations highlighted in this 
chapter are Beck's (1972) and Young's (1990). These were chosen because they link 
specific emotional disorders to particular cognitions. Beck and others have claimed that 
depression and anxiety are associated with distorted cognitions, (Beck, Laude, & 
Bonnert, 1974; Beck, 1976; Beck, 1990). Beck also claimed that anger too would be 
found to be associated with specific distorted cognitions. 
Distorted, automatic cognitions are sometimes known as 'maladaptive schemas' 
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(Young, 1990). When present, schemas automatically bias an individual's perceptions, 
and give rise to specific emotions (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Schemas, or as Beck 
describes them, "integrated cognitive-affective motivational programmes," are thought to 
develop as a results of prior experiences (Beck, 1972,1990). They include beliefs, which 
are views that have become fixed as the result of repetition, such as, "I am unlovable"; 
attributions of causality, which refer to how a person explains what happens to him or 
herself, such as "I always mess things up"; and conditional beliefs, such as "If someone is 
cross, then it must be my fault" (Beck, 1990, p. 32). Whilst cognitive schemas can be 
both 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive,' in the main, in clinical settings, and in this thesis, the 
schemas that are of interest are the maladaptive ones, particularly those which relate to 
anxiety, depression, or anger. 
Such cognitive habits produce self-fulfilling prophecy effects. For instance, when 
an individual developed these fixed, automatic expectancies, they lead him to make 
immediate negative attributions. In turn, these attributions trigger emotions like anger, 
depression or anxiety (Beck, 1990). For example, Beck (1976) found evidence that 
depression was specifically associated with certain cognitive content, and anxiety 
specifically with other content. From this, he predicted that anger would be found to be 
associated with yet other specific cognitive content. 
Young thought that dysfunctional, automatic cognitive schemas arise from 
experiencing regular, adverse early experiences, particularly from adverse parenting 
(Young, 1990; 1994). He thought maladaptive schemas mostly arise early in life; they go 
unquestioned, and so become 'truths' for the affected individual (Young, 1990). The 
results of this is that they become fixed, tenacious beliefs that last a life time. In this way, 
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early adverse life events lead to the development of automatic cognitive schemas (Young, 
1990), which, in turn, give rise to later affective and personality disorders (White & 
Widom, 2003; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). Once formed, these long-standing 
automatic cognitive habits influence what an individual perceives and how he construes 
events. In situations reminiscent of those early experiences, the individual automatically 
repeats cognitive patterns that he acquired early in life. In this way, schemas predispose a 
person both to interpret social stimuli in a particular way, and to express or inhibit certain 
kinds of emotion (Magai et al., 2000). Early attachment experiences also become 
incorporated into personality by means of the formation of automatic cognitive schemas 
(Magai et al., 2000). Whilst such acquired automatic cognitive responses might once 
have had survival functions, they can be dysfunctional when they operate in non-life-
threatening situations. 
What are Schemas? 
In the last two decades the term schema has had an increasingly wide usage, and 
the term has acquired a number of slightly different meanings and designations. A 
number of variants of the term have also been used, such as 'scheme,' as well as closely 
related terms such as 'memory structures' (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997), 'internal working models,' (Bowlby, 1988), 'patterning of appraisal,' 'structures 
of knowledge' (Jenkins, Oatley, & Stein 1998), 'cognitive structures' (Clark & Steer, 
1996), 'assumptions' (Leahy, 2003), 'hot' cognitive attributes (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, 
& Pope, 1993), and "enduring latent cognitive structures" (Clark & Steer, 1996). The 
term schema has also been used to describe cognitive processes in which large amounts 
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of information are processed 'quickly and simultaneously, outside awareness' (SWffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). It has been used to explain how complex information that is encoded 
in the memory, and yet is outside of conscious awareness, nonetheless influences how a 
person experiences the world and how he or she behaves (Kihlstrom, 1999). The term 
has also been used to explain how this information is organized into information 
processing units, which, though outside awareness, when activated automatically, "guide 
attention, perception, memory and experience" (Paivio & Greenberg, 1998, p. 230). 
The term schema has been used in both clinical and cognitive psychology. Each 
discipline has sought to explain and encapsulate an individual's idiosyncratic 
interpretation of events, while looking for any common underlying psychological 
mechanisms. Cognitive psychology focuses on the more 'cognitive' elements of 
schemas, and sees schemas as the "scaffolding for the assimilation of information" 
(Anderson, 1984). Schemas determine the orderly manner in which memory encodes and 
retains information, editing and summarizing this information to allow attention to be 
focused on important elements (Anderson, 1984). Schemas are critical components of 
the cognitive mechanisms that allow persons to understand, intuitively, their present 
experiences by referring back to similar past experiences (Williams et al., 1997). 
Cognitive psychologists also use the term schema to describe any consistent internal 
structure which acts as a template for new information (Williams et al., 1997), allowing it 
to be integrated efficiently with existing memories. Such explanations focus more on the 
functions of schemas, but seldom examine the emotional impact of schemas, or look at 
how schemas relate to emotions. That is a topic of more interest to clinical psychology. 
Clinical psychology focuses on the link between cognitions and emotions, as well 
as on the consistent, internal, unconscious, cognitive phenomena which can automatically 
arouse strong emotions. Clinical psychology sees schemas as knowledge structures that 
give rise to a readiness to respond in a particular manner, and to experience one emotion 
rather than another (Jenkins, Oatley, & Stein, 1998; Young et al., 2003). In the clinical 
context, schemas are thought to involve three elements: "the activation of core self-
organizations as well as primary and secondary cognitions and behavioural/action 
systems" (Paivio & Greenberg, 1998, p. 241). The next section explores some of these 
links between cognitions and emotions, and how these cognitive motivators might be 
acquired. 
The Cognition-Emotion Link 
What was not clarified by the previous definitions of schemas was how emotions 
and cognitions are linked, and how this link arises. One way to understand the link is to 
return to the work of LeDoux (1992,1996). He researched one emotion in detail - fear. 
He discerned certain similarities between conscious emotional feelings and conscious 
thoughts. Both involved "the symbolic representations in working memory of 
subsymbolic processes carried out by systems that work unconsciously" (LeDoux, 1992, 
p. 299). He found that emotional feelings differed from thoughts, because they were 
generated by different brain systems. Moreover, because emotions were linked to 
survival, they involved more brain systems and activated many more response systems 
than 'thoughts' did. He found that cortical activity can activate response systems, such as 
motor systems, but only after activating the emotion system in the amygdala. 
36 
LeDoux found that the emotional and cognitive systems, whilst discrete, are 
linked, with each system mediated by separate but interacting brain systems (LeDoux, 
1996, p. 69). This means that persons can recognize the presence of a threat before they 
are able to ascertain what the threat is. This primitive, automatic, emotional appraisal 
system is directly linked to the emotional activation system, so it can automatically 
activate emotional responses. By contrast, the more developed cognitive system is not 
linked automatically to the response system. This feature gives the cognitive system 
greater flexibility than the automatic system, but makes it a little slower. The links 
between the cognitive system and the behavioural response systems occur in systems 
such as the amygdala. Through these links, conscious thoughts are able either to activate 
or override the emotion system (LeDoux, 1996). 
Cognition and Anxiety, Depression and Anger 
This section looks at some of the links between cognitions and emotions. As 
already mentioned, cognitions have been found to be all important in anxiety and 
depression (Beck, 1967). Beck suggested that emotions arise when schemas are triggered 
(Beck, et al, 1990, p. 24). For instance, Beck and his colleagues found that depression 
and sadness are invoked by the perception of loss, deprivation, or defeat, while anxiety is 
marked by perceptions of danger and personal vulnerability. Whilst Beck did not 
formally explore the specific cognitive content associated with anger, on the basis of his 
clinical experience, he predicted that anger would be associated with cognitions that 
concern perceptions of loss of rights or status, and with perceptions of offence and 
injustice (Clark, Beck, & Afford, 1999, p. 77). 
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On the basis of his early research, Beck proposed his Cognitive Content 
Specificity Hypothesis. This stated that particular emotions are associated with specific 
thoughts, and, as a result, it is possible, simply by looking at the cognitions attached to an 
event, to distinguish between emotions like sadness, depression, anger and anxiety. For 
example, when a person is preoccupied with danger, such a person will experience 
anxiety; when a person's focus is on loss, this will be associated with depression; when a 
person's focus is on the unacceptable behaviour of an offender, on injustice or denial of 
rights, this will be associated with anger. 
Young (1990), like Beck, thought disordered emotions, and disordered personality 
patterns, are linked to maladaptive cognitive schemas. Such schemas arise out of 
dysfunctional development experiences. They become activated in situations that are 
similar to those in which they originated, which causes the individual to react emotionally, 
automatically, and without stopping to assess the prudence of their reaction. 
Such processing shortcuts indicate the presence of underlying schemas (Young, 
1990), adaptive or maladaptive. The shortcuts indicate that a person has become 
sensitized to certain emotional situations, probably through exposure to early traumatic 
experiences (Young, 1990; 1994; Young, Weinberger, & Beck, 2001). Such experiences 
give rise to biased cognitive perceptions, "disturbed attitudes, invalid premises, unrealistic 
goals and expectations" (Young et al., 2003, p. 7). 
Young also noticed an association between specific early maladaptive schemas in 
offspring and offspring reporting that they had experienced particular types of adverse 
parenting. For instance, when patients reported that, as children, they had had to suppress 
important aspects of themselves to gain parental love, attention, or approval, Young found 
these patients scored highly on the Subjugation Schema. H e also noticed a link between 
such early adverse parenting experiences of children and anger, expressed directly in 
outbursts of temper or passive aggressive behaviour, or expressed indirectly, as in 
substance abuse (Young et al., 2003). Young claimed that anger is associated with 
Subjugation because subjugation involves an "excessive surrendering of control to others 
because one feels coerced - usually to avoid (others') anger, retaliation, or abandonment" 
(Young, 1990, p. 15). 
While Young's model remains untested, there is other evidence to confirm that 
social information processing is influenced by an individual's early experiences. For 
example, children harshly disciplined by their parents, show higher levels of maladaptive 
social information processing than do children who have been disciplined less harshly 
(Weiss, Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1992). Bowlby found that children's negative 'internal 
working models' (Bowlby's version of cognitive schemas) arose out of early attachment 
difficulties (Bowlby, 1988). Paivio and Greenberg (1998) claimed there was a special 
class of schemas, formed in early attachment relationships. They affect a person's sense 
of self, become the basis for the individual's patterns of thinking, and determine the 
'underlying tone of a person's whole emotional life' (Paivio & Greenberg, 1998, p. 231). 
Such emotional schemas are thought to arise from having had early negative social or 
relational experiences. These experiences impact on a child's neural development, 
particularly on the right-brain development and function, and they affect how an 
individual perceives emotional states of others (Voeller, 1986). Having such experiences 
has been found to compromise an individual's attachment, their empathy development, 
and their affect-regulation (Perry, Pollard, Blakely, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995). 
39 
Not only do schemas become distillations of previous relationship experiences, 
they also become templates for what these individuals expect from others in the future 
(Baldwin, 1992). Even infants develop schemas or expectancies of how to 'be with 
another person' on the basis of early experiences. For example, it has been shown that 
when a baby wants to play with her mother, she becomes animated and tries to elicit a 
response from her mother. When the mother is depressed, she does not respond to the 
child, and the child comes to expect that any attempts he or she makes to instigate play 
will be greeted with rejection. In this way, the child's motive for play becomes 
associated with an expectation of disappointment, and this view of others becomes the 
basis for the child's future relationships (Stern, 1994). 
How Schemas Arise 
Clinical psychologists like Beck and Young took the view that emotional 
disorders reflect the presence of underlying maladaptive schemas (Beck, 1972; 
Young, 1990; Young et al., 2003). Young claimed that maladaptive schemas arise from 
three sources: they arise either from trauma in childhood or later; they arise from not 
having one's emotional needs met; or from being over-indulged as a child (Young, 1990). 
Beck's and Young's models are described next. Each model accounts for how cognition 
and emotion are linked, how schemas develop and operate, and how emotions may 
become chronic. 
Cognitive Content Specificity and Emotions 
Beck's schema model. Thirty years ago Beck (1976) discerned links between 
maladaptive cognitive schemas and affective disorders such as depression or anxiety. As 
a result, he developed a model to explain this link (Beck, 1970,1976,1985). He and his 
colleagues (Beck, Emery, & Greenberger, 1985) deduced that there were three schema 
levels: individual 'cognitive schemas;' groups or constellations of schemas, which they 
also called 'cognitive sets'; and an overriding 'cognitive mode' which operates at a 
higher level and determines which set of schemas operates at any particular time. 
Beck and his colleagues proposed that maladaptive schemas arise from repeated 
exposure to trauma. Such trauma causes an individual to develop schemas 'with a 
dysfunctional or maladaptive orientation.' For example, a person who has had a close 
relative die slowly from a deteriorating illness, may become overly sensitive to any signs 
or symptoms that might be an indication of a similar disease (Clark & Steer, 1996, p. 76). 
Beck and his colleagues asserted that affective states like depression and anxiety, 
and even personality disorders, all arise as a result of faulty information processing 
(Beck, 1967,1976). They saw direct links between emotions and these "integrated 
cognitive-affective-motivational programs" (Beck et al., 1990, p. 28). They suggested 
that all maladaptive emotions are related to cognitive events such as thoughts, 
reminiscences, or images. For example, when confronted with rudeness, a person will 
feel angry if the rudeness and anger are linked by an intervening thought such as, "How 
dare you speak to me like that!" Another person confronted by rudeness might feel 
anxious, particularly if his or her prevailing schema is "I am not competent in this 
situation" (Beck et al., 1990). 
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Beck and his associates hypothesized about the nature of the link between 
cognitions and depression and anxiety, and they proposed that each emotional state is 
associated with specific cognitions, and that 'every psychological disorder has a 
distinctive cognitive profile which is reflected at all levels of cognitive functioning' 
(Clark & Steer, 1996, p. 78). This contention is known as Beck's Cognitive Content 
Specificity hypothesis. 
Although the Cognitive Content Specificity hypothesis predicts that cognitions 
and emotions are linked, it does not indicate precisely how emotions and cognitions are 
related to one another. This question was addressed in Beck's next hypothesis - his 
Primacy hypothesis. This proposed that biased cognitive processing leads to a 
corresponding change in an individual's emotional and behavioural responding. In other 
words, the hypothesis predicted that the relationship is temporal and unidirectional; that 
cognitive processing occurs before the emotion is experienced. 
Specific cognitive stressor (Predominant Schema) —*• Particular emotion 
Beck illustrated his primacy hypothesis with an story about a teacher 
reprimanding two students for talking in class. One student reacts hostilely, contests the 
teacher's comments, and criticizes the teacher. The other student withdraws, appears sad, 
and remains silent. Beck suggested that the first student thought that she had been treated 
in a belittling manner, so she felt angry and retaliated. The second thought the teacher's 
correction showed that the teacher disapproved of her, so she felt ashamed and sad, and 
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she withdrew. While this illustrates how idiosyncratic cognitions can be, it does not fully 
explain how a particular schema becomes dominant or prominent. 
Beck (1976) thought that once sensory information was received, the overall 
schema mode operating at that time activates individual or constellations of schemas. 
The schema mode focuses attention, thereby helping the individual to obtain meaning out 
of any sensory input. For example, a shooting pain in the knee would be focused on 
differently by someone who knew it to be a symptom of a degenerative disease, than it 
would by someone who did not. 
Modes are suggested to be networks of systems which integrate cognitive, 
affective, motivational and behavioural schemata They act in synchrony to produce 
goal-directed strategies (Scott, 2001). When a particular cognitive mode is operating, it 
engages particular cognitive schemas, or constellations; then, by means of internal 
cognitive processes, these schemas involuntarily engage the person's emotions. In this 
way, it is the cognitive processes, not external stressors, that trigger the person's 
emotions. Or, as Beck explained it, an individual's cognitive set is activated by bis or her 
prior dominant mode. Beck illustrated this with an example. He suggested that persons 
in different 'modes' react differently in the same situation. For example, when faced 
with a test, a person operating in a 'depressogenic mode' approaches the test expecting to 
fail, whereas a person whose dominant mode is hostility approaches the test with an 
expectation that teachers have tried to trick the students. 
Any mode currently operating focuses the person's attention on any stimuli that 
support this prevailing mode, and focuses attention away from those stimuli which do 
not. This encourages the person to process data in ways which encourage bias, 
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overgeneralization, and misinterpretation. In this way, the active schema mode not only 
focuses attention, but also 'deactivates' any schemas or schema constellations which do 
not fit the active mode (Beck et al., 1990). 
In normal functioning, systems of'self-evaluations' and 'self-directions' develop 
and "operate more or less automatically" (Beck et al., 1990, p. 36). For example, in a 
depressive mode, thoughts, such as "I am worthless," become automatic or hypervalent, 
and this gives rise to depression. Modes represent, "in energy terms, the shift... away 
from normal cognitive processing by the negative schemas that constitute the depressive 
mode. " (Beck et al., 1990, p. 33). Yet, this explanation does not distinguish how modes 
operate from how schemas operate, nor does it explain how the dominant mode becomes 
dominant at a particular time. 
Testing Beck's Model 
Studies of cognitive content specificity sought to discover whether there was any 
specific, distinctive, discriminating, cognitive content associated with anxiety or 
depression. Specificity studies showed that the content of depressed patients' thought 
included a past-orientation and distinctive and characteristic concerns about failure and 
loss. They also showed that the content of anxious patients' thought has a future 
orientation, and is primarily concerned about present threat and danger, or displays 
concerns about future danger (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Clark, Beck, & Beck, 
1994). The themes associated with depression and anxiety specifically relate to what Beck 
et al. call the 'cognitive triad' of 'self, future, or the world." That is, they reflect how a 
person sees him or herself, what the person expects will happen in the future, and how a 
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person thinks others view him or her. For example, depressed persons cannot imagine 
themselves feeling better in the future, while anxious persons expect the future to be filled 
with threat (Clark, Beck, & Beck, 1994). When anxiety, depression and anger were 
compared, it was found that anxiety was uniquely predicted by thoughts of threat, 
depression by thoughts of loss and threat; and anger by thoughts of transgression and loss 
(Wickless & Kirsch, 1988). Specificity studies revealed that anxious and depressive 
cognitive content in children is significantly correlated with behavioural symptoms; for 
example, anxious cognitive content was associated with nervous behaviour; depressive 
cognitive content with behavioural withdrawal (Jolly, 1993). 
Other specificity studies (Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987; Clark, 
Beck, & Brown, 1989; Greenberg & Beck, 1989; Laurent & Stark, 1993) offered a less 
clear picture. Whilst there was unequivocal support for the content specificity hypothesis 
in relation to depression, there was less support for cognitive content specificity in 
relation to anxiety (Beck et al., 1990; Beck et al., 1992; Beck et al., 1987; Greenberg & 
Beck, 1989; Steer et al. 1994). Even in studies which showed that anxious individuals 
reported more threat and danger cognitions, there was little evidence that there was 
specific cognitive content associated with anxiety (Beck et al., 1987; Burgess & Haaga, 
1994; MacLeod et al. 1986). 
In conclusion, there have been numerous studies examining Beck's cognitive 
content specificity hypothesis (Beck et al., 1990; Beck et al., 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979), but the degree of support for emotions being a function of specific content 
is only moderate. So it appears, that while Beck's model identifies links between 
cognitions and emotions, it does not elaborate on the nature of the links. Neither does it 
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explain how particular schemas develop, nor explain how specific cognitive modes come 
to dominate an individual's thinking, and there is no clear picture given of how specific 
schemas come to acquire their power to trigger particular emotions. Some of these 
matters were taken up by Young. 
Young's model. Young's models draws on Beck's model, as well as drawing on 
psychodynamic, attachment, and Gestalt models. This makes it a rather complex model. 
It includes concepts such as schema formation, schema maintenance, modes, and coping 
styles (Young, 1990; Young et al., 2003). It also details the specific origins of different 
early maladaptive cognitive schemas. In particular, Young (1990) takes up the issue of 
how specific developmental experiences contribute to the development of specific 
schemas. 
Based mainly on his work with individuals with personality disorders, Young 
discerned various patterns of dysfunctional beliefs that his patients held. He named them 
Early Maladaptive Schemas (EMSs). Whilst Young and his colleagues found EMSs 
present in both clinical and nonclinical populations, they asserted that EMSs are more 
extreme in clinical populations. 
Young et al. (2003) deduced that cognitive schemas are mostly formed early in 
life, and that once they are formed, they persist, even after they no longer apply. For 
example, when a parent has been physically overbearing with bis offspring, his offspring, 
even when a fully grown adults, may still feel fear or anxiety in the presence of the 
parent, even in cases where the offspring is stronger or bigger than the parent. Young 
suggested that some schemas develop after a child has acquired language, while others 
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are preverbal, that is, they originate before the child has acquired language. In such 
cases, any cognitive content is presumed to be added later (Young et al., 2003). 
Young and his colleagues (2003) hypothesized that schemas have biological 
origins, that they are the result of "emotions and bodily sensations stored in the amygdala 
system" (p. 26). They hypothesized that specific EMSs arise in response to particular 
'toxic,' negative parenting practices. For example, they arise in response to specific 
experiences of abandonment, abuse, emotional deprivation; from over-identifying and 
becoming enmeshed with significant others; or are a result of being over-indulged and 
feeling entitled to special privileges. Such negative experiences prevent a child meeting 
his or her 'core emotional childhood needs,' such as the need for 'attachment, autonomy, 
freedom to express valid needs, emotions, spontaneity and play, and the need for realistic 
limits' (Young et al., 2003, p. 9). For Young, parenting makes a vitally important 
contribution to offspring developing maladaptive schemas. Such schemas themselves 
become the wellspring of subsequent affective and personality disorders. 
From the information about their early childhood given to him by his patients, 
Young (1990) identified 15 types of negative parenting. He deduced that each type of 
negative parenting related to a particular type of maladaptive schema. For example, he 
contended that an Abandonment schema arises from having parents who have been remote 
or absent; or a Subjugation schema arises from having very demanding parents. Although 
not stated in this form, Young and his colleagues imply that most maladaptive schemas are 
associated with negative parenting practices, and that each specific type of maladaptive 
schema is associated with a particular type of emotional disorder. In Young's model, the 
relationship between personal history, and subsequent emotional disorders can be 
represented in the following manner. 
Adverse History —• Development of Cognitive schema -*• Emotional Disorder 
Once an individual has developed a schema, Young et al. (2003) thought that 
schemas are triggered when the individual "enters environments reminiscent of childhood 
environments that produced them" (p. 61). According to Young, whenever an individual 
finds him or herself in such situations, the amygdala unconsciously activates the emotion 
originally associated with that event. Alternatively, the individual can be aware of these 
events, but, even in such cases, "emotions and bodily sensations are activated more 
rapidly than the cognitions" (Young et al., 2003, p.29). Once developed, schemas "fight 
for survival" in an attempt to preserve cognitive consistency. Even though schemas 
cause suffering, they are 'comfortable' because they are known. The effect of this 
familiarity is to attract the individual towards the very situations that will trigger their 
schemas. This feature then perpetuates the individual's schema thinking. A example of 
this is the person who is attracted to people who treat him or her as his or her parents 
once did. So, having cold, rejecting or withholding parents gives rise to schemas like 
Abandonment, and this attracts the individual to others who are cold, rejecting and 
withholding. Although Young mainly described how schemas develop in relation to 
personality disorders, he also claims that dysfunctional emotions, including depression 
and anxiety, have similar origins to personality disorders (Young et al., 2001). 
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Critique of Young's Model 
Whereas Beck's content specificity hypothesis has been extensively researched, 
Young's model does not seem to have been subjected to an equivalent level of research, 
no doubt, partly because of its comparatively recent development. Even though Young et 
al. (2003) report the wide enthusiasm that has been shown for their way of exploring 
maladaptive schemas on the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ) schemas, and even 
though they enumerate the many languages into which the YSQ has been translated, they 
do not appear to have tested Young's underpinning model. 
When Young et al. (2003) discussed the issue of 'empirical support' for their 
model, they pointed mainly to studies that have investigated the psychometric attributes 
of the YSQ, not to how specific schemas relate to particular types of parenting, nor to 
how particular schemas relate to particular disorders. Instead, the only support they 
offered for their model is circumstantial, by referring to the work of LeDoux (1996) and 
van der Kolk (1987). With this circumstantial support, they claimed that 'emotions and 
body sensations (are) stored in the amygdala' (Young et al., 2003, p. 28). Neither did 
Young et al. seem to have considered that negative cognitive features, such as 
hopelessness or optimism, could instead be the product of mood or anxiety disorders 
rather than the cause of them, if so, that the presence of a disorder would explain poor 
problem-solving, rather than poor-problem solving being responsible for depression 
(Joiner, Vohs, Rudd, Schmidt, & Pettit, 2003). 
Whilst this criticism may appear damning, their model appears worth testing 
given that it has stirred so much interest. Other studies have already shown that there is a 
relationship between early adverse experiences and later cognitive and emotional distress 
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(Persons & Rao, 1989). It would indeed be helpful to have a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between adverse parenting, early maladaptive cognitive schemas, and trait 
anger, depression, and anxiety. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined a range of diverse interpretations of schemas. Whilst it did 
not focus primarily on anger, it gave a fuller background to cognitive schemas - about 
what they might be, and how they might arise. It examined Beck's and Young's models 
of how particular cognitions become linked to specific emotions, and it raised some 
concerns about these models. 
This examination of the literature raised several questions about anger, and some 
of them will be addressed in the present thesis. Firstly, there is the question of whether 
there is any cognitive content that is specifically related to anger, which might distinguish 
it from depression and anxiety? Secondly, there is the question of whether, as Beck 
expected, specific cognitions induce a particular emotion? Next, there is the question of 
whether there are particular types of early parenting experiences that are associated with 
later trait anger, depression or anxiety. Finally, there is the question of whether there is 
an interrelationship between parenting, offspring maladaptive cognitive schemas, and 
trait anger, depression and anxiety? 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1: COGNITIVE SPECIFICITY, ANGER, DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY 
Overview 
Study 1 sought to discover more about the cognitive aspects of anger. It was a 
comparative, correlational study which investigated Beck's Cognitive Content Specificity 
Hypothesis that there are specific cognitive schemas associated with anger which 
distinguish anger from depression and anxiety. In this chapter there is a discussion of 
some of the methodological issues that were faced, followed by a consideration of the 
aims of the study, the hypotheses, the method and results. Finally, there is a discussion of 
the findings and limitations of the study. 
Background 
Undertaking a study of cognitive specificity in relation to anger requires some 
measure of cognition. As with any cognitive specificity study, a number of difficulties 
arise when measuring cognitions (Clark, 1988), mainly because cognitions are abstract 
concepts. However, psychology has traditionally overcome this difficulty by defining 
variables operationally, that is, in terms of predetermined behavioural indicators. For 
example, constructs like cognitive schemas are measured in terms of scores obtained on a 
schema questionnaire, even though this might appear tautological. 
Some cognitive psychologists, arguing that the schemas which underlie emotions 
are not directly available to conscious perception, have attempted to assess schemas 
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indirectly, for example, by using non-cognitive behavioural indicators such as response 
times on Stroop word identification tasks (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). This approach 
was not adopted in Study 1, largely because response times give no information about the 
content of cognitions, and it is precisely this that is the point of interest in this study. 
A number of studies have examined specificity of cognitive content. Most of 
these studies have assumed that cognitive content can be revealed by questionnaires 
(Beck et al. 1987; Clark, 1988; Greenberg & Beck, 1989; Ingram et al., 1997, Platts, 
Mason, & Tyson, 2005), using measures like the Cognition Checklist (CCL) (Beck et al., 
1987), the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) (Weissman & Beck, 1978), and the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (Ingram et al., 1987). However, because the items in 
these scales focus mainly on cognitions associated with depression or anxiety, none of 
them was suitable for tapping cognitions associated with anger. For that reason Study 1 
employed a more recently developed scale, Young's Schema Questionnaire (YSQ), 
because it covers a broader range of cognitions. 
The YSQ was derived from information revealed to Young by bis patients during 
his extensive experience as a clinician. It features 16 schemas that are intended to reflect 
the entire range of cognitions that are associated with normal emotional life. As such the 
YSQ provides a wider range of types of cognitive schemas than are available in the CCL 
or DAS. 
The disadvantage of the YSQ is that, as yet, it is untested in this type of research. 
Furthermore, although psychometric studies of the YSQ have been carried out (e.g., 
Schmidt, Joiner, Young, & Telch, 1995), the extent to which the schemas overlap and the 
manner in which they relate to schemas identified by other measures remain largely 
unknown. Nonetheless, the comprehensive range of schemas - which are discussed later -
allows a fuller investigation of cognitions associated with emotions than has previously 
been available, and it appeared the most suitable tool for a specificity study of this type. 
Comorbidity of Emotions 
Whilst the main focus of Study 1 is to investigate cognitive content specificity in 
relation to anger, it is also expected that, because categories of emotions are not absolute, 
there might be some overlap between emotions. In addition, at times two emotions may 
occur together, for example, both anxiety and depression co-occur in Mixed-Anxiety and 
Depression Disorder (First, Frances, & Pincus, 2004). Such comorbidity would seem to 
suggest that there might be cognitive schemas common to both emotions. It is accepted 
that anxiety and depression co-occur (Brown & Barlow, 1992; Kendell, & Watson, 
1989), but the relationship between anger and the other emotions is not as clear. For 
example, while anger has been named as one of the symptoms of Dysthymia or Major 
Depression (First, Frances, & Pincus, 2004), the nature of the relationship between anger 
and depression has not been elaborated upon. When anger and depression are found 
together, it is not clear whether anger is merely a symptom of depression, or whether this 
co-occurrence reflects comorbidity, nor is it clear whether there are shared cognitive 
elements for anger and depression. For example, Fava, Anderson, and Rosenbaum, 
(1990) found that where anger attacks co-occurred with anxiety and other affective 
disorders, there were poorer treatment outcomes. This seems to suggest that the 
interrelationship between anger, depression and anxiety is more complex than anger 
merely being a symptom of depression. Rather, it suggests that there may be an additive 
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effect when there is comorbidity. 
In addition, if anger was simply a manifestation of depression, it would be present 
in all depressed patients, which it is not. Only about a third of depressed outpatients were 
found to suffer from an 'angry kind of depression,' and these patients, in addition to 
feeling depressed and irritable, had tantrums (Fava, 1998; Rosenbaum, Fava, & Pava, 
1993), suggesting that the 'angry-depressed' patients were a discrete group. When they 
were treated with antidepressants, their depression lifted and their rage subsided. Fava 
(1998) took this as circumstantial evidence for there being some link between anger and 
depression. Fava's model does not explain why two thirds of patients who were 
depressed were not angry. It is possible the effects Fava noticed resulted from a 
comorbidity of anger and depression. 
In addition, no diagnostic system is absolute. Some writers have suggested that 
emotions differ only in degree, not type, and that each emotion is just a different point on 
a continuum (Kendall & Watson, 1989). If this continuum model was correct, there 
would be some point that was shared by two abutting emotions, which might suggest an 
explanation for comorbidity. To guard against blurring of the distinctiveness of each 
emotion, suitable analytic techniques will be deployed to account for possible 'overlap' in 
the emotions. 
Aims of Study 1 
The main aim of Study 1 was to explore cognitive schemas associated with anger, 
depression and anxiety in a non-clinical population. To achieve this it was necessary to 
have a clear idea of the three emotions of interest, as well as the cognitions associated 
with each one. These are discussed next. 
Anger 
Because there is a dearth of empirical studies on the cognitions associated with 
anger, the hypotheses formulated here in regard to anger were mainly based on the 
observations of Beck (1976), Young (1999) and Bowlby (1969,1973,1980). In the light 
of these, it was expected that those YSQ schemas which highlight themes of personal 
exploitation, loss of entitlement, and injustice would be associated with anger. A close 
reading of the YSQ schemas revealed that some appear to reflect these themes. They are: 
Mistrust, Entitlement, Insufficient Self-Control, Subjugation, Abandonment, and 
Punitiveness. 
The themes of Mistrust/Abuse directly relate to exploitation. They reflect 
concerns and expectations that others will intentionally hurt, abuse, humiliate, cheat, lie, 
manipulate, or take advantage of one, for example, Item 2, T feel that I cannot let my 
guard down in the presence of other people, or else they will intentionally hurt me.' 
There is also an expectation that the individual 'always gets the short end of the stick' 
(Young, 1990, p. 57), for example, Item 5, T am usually on the lookout for people's 
ulterior motives.' From this, it was expected that Mistrust/Abuse would be closely 
associated with anger. 
The themes in Entitlement also relate to 'rights.' Some items refer to feeling 
superior to others, or to being entitled to special treatment, or to not being 'bound by the 
rules of reciprocity that guide normal social interaction' (Young, 1990, p. 59). For 
example, Item 69 states, T feel that I shouldn't have to follow the normal rules and 
conventions other people do.' Another schema relating to rights and injustice is 
Punitiveness, as reflected in Item 71, 'People who don't 'pull their own weight' should get 
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punished in some way.' It was expected that Punitiveness would relate more to anger than 
to depression or anxiety. 
The themes in Insufficient Self-Control reflect difficulties in controlling emotions 
and impulses. An example is Item 72, Tf I can't reach a goal, I become easily frustrated 
and give up.' In addition, there is 'an exaggerated emphasis on discomfort avoidance: 
avoiding pain, conflict, confrontation, responsibility, or overexertion at the expense of 
personal fulfilment, commitment, or integrity' (Young, 1990, p. 59). In some ways the 
content of these items can be seen to refer to personal rights, only here, the individual 
seems to have an exaggerated sense of personal rights, so feels exempt from observing 
social rules. Because of this, it was expected that Insufficient Self-Control would also be 
associated with anger. 
Young (1990) discerned a specific connection between Subjugation and anger, so 
this connection was also explored. The items of Subjugation reflect features such as 
being submissive, feeling coerced, giving in to others, and giving others control over 
one's behaviour, emotional expression, and decision making. As Young pointed out, 
subjugation often occurs because persons fear others will get angry or abandon them if 
they express their desires or opinions. Young suggested such persons often feel trapped 
and are angry with those perceived to be in control. So it was expected that the 
Subjugation schema would be specifically associated with Anger. 
Bowlby (1973) found anger was one of the ways in which children responded to 
abandonment. Mikulincer (1998) found that adults with attachment problems reacted in 
the same way. The YSQ includes a schema which addresses this theme. The 
Abandonment schema reflects the view that the world is unreliable and unstable, that one 
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cannot expect support from others because they are unpredictable, angry, will die, or 
abandon one for someone else (Young et al., 2003). Given these previously established 
links between abandonment and anger, this connection was also explored, however, it 
was also noted that some of the expected hallmarks of anger were not present in 
Abandonment items. For example, there were no rights implied in the Abandonment 
items. In addition, Abandonment clearly relates to loss and danger, both of which were 
previously found to be associated with depression and anxiety. So it is possible that there 
might be some cognitive overlap found between emotions related to Abandonment. 
However, because there have been no suggestions by Beck and others that there can or 
will be cognitive overlapping, no specific hypotheses were developed in relation to this 
aspect. 
YSQ Punitiveness was also expected to be associated with anger because of items 
such as Item 84, "I hold grudges, even after someone has apologized" and Item 86, "I get 
angry when people make excuses for themselves, or blame other people for their 
problems." Both directly address the issue of anger. 
These schema themes were incorporated into Hypothesis 1. It was expected that: 
Hypothesis 1. 
The correlation between the following Y S Q schemas and Anger would be high and 
positive: Mistrust/Abuse, Entitlement, Punitiveness, Insufficient Self-Control, 
Abandonment, and Subjugation. 
A subsidiary hypothesis was that this set of schemas would relate more strongly to 
Anger than to Depression or Anxiety. 
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Depression 
Depression, defined as Major Depressive Disorder in the DSM-TV-R, is 
associated with specific behavioural symptoms such as chronic low-level depressed 
mood, poor appetite, insomnia/hypersomnia, low energy or fatigue, social withdrawal, 
decreased activity, reduced effectiveness and productivity (First, Frances, & Pincus, 
2004). It also features specific cognitive elements such as low self-esteem, poor 
concentration, difficulties in decision making, feeling hopeless, being self-critical, seeing 
oneself as uninteresting, incapable, inadequate, and a generalized loss of interest or 
pleasure (First, Frances, & Pincus, 2004). In addition, as mentioned earlier, it includes 
feelings of guilt and brooding about the past, and feeling irritable or excessively angry 
(First, Frances, & Pincus, 2004, p. 377). 
Clark and Beck (1994) characterized depression as the emotion which reflects a 
lack or loss of something important for a person's happiness, such as a lack of 
competence in reaching goals, or a lack of possessions, wealth or status. Depressed 
individuals have been found to hold negative views about self, world, and future, feeling 
they are 'losers,' inferior, or inadequate, and being pessimistic and self-critical. They see 
themselves as deficient in the attributes they need to achieve their goals. Sometimes they 
give up, seeing no point in continuing, and at times are suicidal (Clark & Beck, 1994). 
Some studies have found evidence of cognitive specificity in relation to depression. For 
example, research shows that depressed patients specifically think about failure and 
hopelessness, loss and self-devaluation (Beck et al., 1985; Burns & Eidelson, 1998; Clark 
et al., 1994; Clark, Beck, & Beck, 1994). As Beck described it, a depressed person has "a 
negative conception of the self, a negative interpretation of life's experiences, and a 
nihilistic view of the future" (Beck, 1979, p. 84). 
The YSQ Schemas which appear to mesh with these depression themes include 
Emotional Deprivation, Defectiveness/Shame, Social Isolation, and Self-Sacrifice. 
Emotional Deprivation involves themes of lacking or lack, as demonstrated in Item 1, 
'Most of the time, I haven't had someone to nurture me, share him/herself with me, or 
care deeply about everything that happens to me.' Defectiveness/Shame reflects themes 
of lacking, as shown in Item 21, 'No man/woman I desire could love me once he/she saw 
my faults.' Social Isolation also reflects themes of loss, as shown in Item 20, T always 
feel on the outside of groups.' Self-Sacrifice includes items such as Item 47, "I feel that I 
have no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else they will retaliate or reject 
me in some way." Other losses or lacks are implied. In Enmeshment there is the theme 
of personal deficiency, for example, Item 42, T have not been able to separate myself 
from my parent(s) the way that other people my age seem to.' 
Because Beck and others (Clark et al., 1994) found depression was related to 
cognitions of failure, it was expected that depression would relate to the Failure to 
Achieve, as reflected in Item 22, 'I'm not as intelligent as most people when it comes to 
work (school).' It was also expected that depression would be marked by Unrelenting 
Standards - another schema that raises the issue of failure, as shown in Item 64, T can't 
let myself off the hook easily or make excuses for my mistakes.' Failure is also implied 
in the schema of Functional Dependence, as shown in Item 32, T think of myself as a 
dependent person, when it comes to everyday functioning.' In the light of this, it was 
expected that Depression would be associated with all these schemas. 
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Hypothesis 2 was that: 
The correlation between the following Y S Q schemas and Depression would be 
high and positive: Emotional Deprivation, Defectiveness/Shame, Social isolation, 
Self-sacrifice, Enmeshment, Failure to Achieve, Unrelenting Standards, and 
Dependency/Incompetence. 
In addition, it was expected that this set of schemas would correlate more highly 
with Depression than with Anger or Anxiety. 
Anxiety 
In DSM-IV-R (2004) the term Anxiety incorporates a range of disorders, each 
with specific features, but there is no overall definition of Anxiety. Characteristics of 
anxiety are behavioural, as in panic, or cognitive, as in catastrophic cognitions such as 
fear of losing control or fear of dying. Other cognitive characteristics include concerns 
about catastrophes, injury, particular situations, certain objects, or humiliation, or 
preoccupation with persistent thoughts, as in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. 
Beck (1979) suggested that anxiety is experienced in situations where the 
individual considers him or herself to be in imminent, literal danger, or where there are 
'threats of physical harm, serious illness, economic disaster, or social rejection' (p. 62). 
Anxiety is also associated with the prospect of losing something important, such as social 
approval; or having one's personal weaknesses exposed. At its core, anxiety is associated 
with a sense of vulnerability (Beck et al., 1985). Previous research did show that anxious 
patients had distinctive and characteristic concerns about present and future threat, danger 
to self, future, or world (Beck et al., 1985; Clark et al., 1994). 
In the light of this, it was expected that anxiety would relate in some way to 
danger. Two schemas appear to have themes which relate to danger. One is 
Vulnerability to Harm, for example, Item 38, T worry about being attacked.' The other is 
Emotional Inhibition, which also suggests that it is dangerous to show one's feelings, as 
in Item 59, T control myself so much that people think I am unemotional.' It was 
expected that schemas which feature threat, would be more closely associated with 
Anxiety than with Anger or Depression. 
Hypothesis 3 was that: 
The correlation between the following Y S Q schemas and Anxiety would be high 
and positive: Vulnerability to Harm, and Emotional Inhibition. 
In addition, these two schemas would be more closely linked to Anxiety than to 
Anger and Depression. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Given the extensive set of schemas and the three emotions, the hypotheses outlined 
above contain many variables. To aid comprehension, a summary table is provided in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary of YSQ Schemas Hypothesized to be Associated with each Emotion 
Y S Q Schema Type Anger Depression Anxiety 
Hypothesis 1 
Mistrust/Abuse X 
Entitlement X 
Punitiveness X 
Abandonment X 
Subjugation X 
Insufficient Self-control X 
Hypothesis 2 
Emotional Deprivation 
Defectiveness/Shame 
Failure 
Self-Sacrifice 
Social Isolation 
Unrelenting Standards 
Dependency 
Enmeshment 
Hypothesis 3 
Vulnerability 
Emotional Inhibition 
X = High Positive Association Expected 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were a nonclinical sample drawn from students and the wider 
community in Ballarat, a large, regional, Australian city, with a population of 80,000. 
The sample was sought in non-clinical settings as recommended by Garber and Hollon 
(1991) (See Appendix B for further details). Adults were approached in public and 
educational settings, for example, in canteens, waiting areas, shops, businesses, on the 
street, in hairdressing salons, at a fire station, television network offices, or in libraries. 
Approximately 90% of those approached agreed to take the questionnaire. There was a 
noticeably higher acceptance rate for women, and those who declined were mainly men, 
who, when they heard the topic, made comments such as T don't have any of them' (i.e., 
emotions). However, agreeing to take the questionnaire did not guarantee return of the 
questionnaire. The final sample included 242 adults (18 years old or above), 84 men 
(34.7%), and 158 women (65.3%). The return rate was 60%. Participants were offered a 
$2 "Scratchy" in appreciation of their contribution. 
Demographics 
The age and gender distribution is shown in Table 2. Nearly 80% were 30 years 
or over. The median age was 40 years of age, and the full breakdown of age and gender 
is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Age Distribution of Study 1 Population 
Age Groups N 
3 
45 
69 
62 
63 
242 
Men 
% 
1.2 
17.8 
27.3 
24.5 
26 
100 
N 
0 
13 
28 
21 
22 
84 
Women 
N 
3 
32 
41 
41 
41 
158 
18-19 years 
20 - 29 years 
30 - 39 years 
40 - 49 years 
50 - above 
Total 
Materials 
The questionnaires comprised seven parts: a statement of informed consent 
(Appendix C); Demographics items (Appendix D); Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-
Sl) (Appendix E); the State Trait Anger Scale (STAS) (Appendix F); and the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Appendix G). Six versions of the questionnaire were 
prepared, varying the order in which the scales were presented. All versions commenced 
with the demographic questions, then the other three scales were added, so that each of 
the six possible orders was equally represented. 
Instruments 
Young's Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-S1). The YSQ is a self-report instrument 
specifically developed by Young (1990) to explore and assess cognitive schemas 
(Appendix E). The YSQ-S1 was based on statements which Young encountered in his 
work with personality-disordered patients (as diagnosed on Axis II of DSM-IV). There 
are two forms of the YSQ, the YSQ-L, the long form composed of 250 items and the 
YSQ-S1 (short form) composed of 75 items from the long scale. The short version was 
used in the present studies. 
When the psychometric properties of the YSQ were examined (Lee, Taylor, & 
Dunn, 2000; Schmidt, Joiner, Young, & Telch, 1995; Stein & Young, 1992), the YSQ 
subscales were found to possess adequate test-retest reliability. When convergent and 
discriminant validity were tested, there was significant correlation between the YSQ and 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) - Negative Affect, (PANAS-NA), r = 
.67, and a significant negative correlation with the PANAS - Positive Affect, (PANAS-
PA), r = -.59. The YSQ also correlated significantly with Beck's Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale (DAS), r = .60, (Schmidt, et al., 1995). The YSQ has been found to have 
good internal consistency (Lee, Taylor, & Dunn, 2000). When the long and short 
versions of the YSQ were compared using a clinical group (bulimic patients) and a non-
clinical group, it was found that, whilst the 205-item form gave a level of depth not 
available with the shorter 75-item short form, the psychometric properties of each version 
were very similar (Walter, Meyer, & Ohanian, 2001). 
A factor analysis of the long version of the YSQ revealed 15 factors (Lee et al., 
2000; Schmidt et al. 1995; Stein & Young, 1992). These were Abandonment (ab), 
Mistrust/Abuse (ma), Emotional Deprivation (ed), Functional Dependence (de), 
Vulnerability to Harm (vh), Enmeshment (em), Defectiveness/Shame (ds), Failure to 
Achieve (fa), Subjugation (su), Emotional Inhibition (ei), Self-Sacrifice (ss), Unrelenting 
Standards (us), Entitlement (et), Insufficient Self-Control (is), Social Isolation (si). 
Different numbers of items loaded onto the factors. Young developed a short form of the 
scale, the YSQ-S1, which is factorially 'purer' than the longer 250-item form because it 
is composed of the five highest loading items for each factor. Recently Young (2001) 
revised his YSQ scale, and added a sixteenth subscale consisting of 14 'Punitiveness' 
(pu) items which, at the time that Study 1 was undertaken, were psychometrically 
untested. However, because they had some content relevant to anger (for example, Item 
86, "I get angry when people make excuses for themselves, or blame other people for 
their problems"), they were included. The psychometric examination of the YSQ in the 
present study is described in the Results section. 
Each item was scored on a 6-point Likert scale. These were 1 = Completely 
untrue of me, through to 6 = Describes me perfectly. The overall score range for each 
subscale lay between 5 and 30. 
State Trait Anger Scale. A number of different instruments are available for 
measuring and tapping different aspects of anger. The one selected for these studies was 
the State Trait Anger Scale (STAS) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970, cited in 
Corcoran & Fischer, 2000). The STAS (Appendix E) has been widely used for three 
decades. It is composed of 30 items which differentiate between relatively transient 
emotional responses or 'State Anger' which are reflected in answers to the generic 
question, 'How I feel now,' and the relatively enduring emotional responses, or 'Trait 
Anger,' in answer to the question, 'How I usually feel.' There are 15 items directed to 
State Anger, and 15 for Trait Anger. 
The S T A S has good psychometric properties, and has shown convergence with 
other anger questionnaires such as the Multidimensional Anger Inventory (MAI), and 
Framingham Anger-In (FI) scales (Corcoran, 2002). An inter-correlation matrix has been 
found to support the convergent and discriminant validity of these measures except for 
the Anger-In (Brood) subscale of the MAI and the FO scale (Riley & Treiber, 1989). 
Other research has confirmed the measure's concurrent validity (Spielberger et al, 1985), 
and discriminant validity (Deffenbacher, 1992, 1995). The STAS is rated as having very 
good reliability with excellent internal consistency of 0.87 to 0.91 recorded in a number 
of different populations (Corcoran, 2002). Analysis of reliability in the current study 
found that Cronbach's alpha for the Trait Anger items was .88. 
Items were responded to on a 4 point Likert scale: 1 = Not at all, through to 4 = 
Very much so. The possible Total scores for Anger range from 15-60. Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of Anger. 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS). Whilst there are many scales to assess 
depression and anxiety, the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS) (Appendix G) 
was selected because it covered both emotions, and so avoided the need for two separate 
scales. Additionally, the DASS has been found to be a valid measure, and it is relatively 
brief (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
The DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) was developed to measure depression, 
anxiety, and stress over the previous week. There is a long form of the DASS which has 
42 Items, and a short form DASS-21, with 21 items. The short form was used in this 
study. Items describe how a person felt over the past week. Statements such as T 
couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all' were used to tap depression, and 
statements like T felt close to panic' were used to tap anxiety. The stress items were not 
included. 
Adequate reliability has been demonstrated with a Cronbach's alpha for 
depression of .91; and a Cronbach's Alpha for anxiety of .84 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). When the reliability for depression and anxiety was examined in the current study 
Cronbach's alpha for depression was .88, and for anxiety .80. The scale has also shown 
adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Crawford & Henry, 2003). 
Items were responded to on a 4-point Likert scale: 0 = Did not apply to me at all, 
through to 3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time. Total scores for Depression 
and Anxiety ranged from 0-21, with high scores indicating high depression or anxiety. 
Procedure 
The protection of the welfare and privacy of all participants is of paramount 
concern in any psychological research. All methods, scales and inventories were 
submitted to the University of Ballarat's Ethics Committee in accordance with University 
of Ballarat Ethics Policy. The committee approved the manner in which individuals 
would be approached; the token of appreciation ($2 "Scratchy" Tattslotto lottery ticket); 
how procedures would be explained, and how participants would be given the 
opportunity to change their minds about participating, should they so wish. In addition, 
because there was a small possibility that a longer-lasting mood could be aroused either 
by answering the YSQ, DASS or STAS, a Wellbeing Statement (Appendix H) was 
included for all participants and was retained by them on completion of the 
questionnaires. This gave each participant some empirically supported techniques 
(Barlow, 2001) for overcoming any uncomfortable 'mood' that might be triggered by 
their participation. This Wellbeing Statement also included suggestions of where to seek 
help, should this be necessary, giving relevant telephone numbers. 
Participants were randomly presented with one of six versions of the 'Emotions 
Questionnaire' to complete at a time and place of their choosing. After completing the 
questionnaire, they posted it back to the researcher anonymously in the stamped, 
addressed envelope provided to them. Four hundred questionnaires were distributed, and 
242 were returned, a return rate of 60%. Data were analysed using SPSS 10.00. 
Results 
The results are presented in three parts. First, psychometric data from the 
principal components analyses of the YSQ-S1 and from the Punitiveness items are 
offered, then descriptives for schemas and emotions and, finally, the correlational 
analyses are presented. Occasionally there were missing data. When this occurred, an 
individual's mean score for that subscale was entered. 
Psychometrics of YSQ. 
An exploratory principal components analysis was undertaken on the 75 item 
YSQ - SI scale - excluding the punitiveness items - using Promax with Kaiser 
Normalization rotation. Convergence occurred within 10 iterations. The analysis 
produced 16 components. Thirteen of them precisely mhrored those found by Stein and 
Young (1992) in that the five highest loading items on each component were the five 
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items designated by Young as those making up the subscale. In the remaining three 
components, item loadings were very similar to those found by Stein and Young, but 
there were occasional small differences. For example, in Factor 5 (Defectiveness/ 
Shame), the five anticipated items all displayed the highest loadings but were joined by a 
sixth item that loaded slightly more strongly (0.37) with this factor than it did with its 
designated subscale (0.34). Furthermore the fifth item in this subscale also loaded rather 
more weakly on its corresponding factor (0.45) than most, though it remained the highest 
loading for this item. Given that there was such a close concordance between the factors 
found in Study 1 factor analysis and those of Stein and Young (1992), the original Young 
subscales were used for all analyses. 
A second exploratory principal components analysis included the original 75 
items and tile new punitiveness items. Twenty factors emerged, sixteen of them matching 
those found in the previous analysis with Items 32 and 66 standing out as poor exemplars 
of the designated subscales. The remaining four factors all featured the fourteen 
punitiveness items. The first punitiveness factor comprised six items, the second four 
items, and the remaining two factors, two items each. 
There was no suggestion that the punitiveness items loaded on any other factor. 
Despite the lack of homogeneity in the items, it was thought reasonable to combine these 
items as a sixteenth factor, while acknowledging that further work is required to refine 
this subscale. 
Emotions 
This section explores the scores achieved on the STAS and DASS for Anger, 
Depression and Anxiety. In an attempt to reflect equivalent levels of emotion, the 
70 
measures of depression and anxiety, which measured how a person felt over the last 
week, were matched only with Trait Anger scores, because these referred to longer 
lasting anger, rather than a passing emotion. When reporting results from the STAS and 
DASS emotions, the term Anger is used rather than Trait Anger, and capital letters are 
used to distinguish STAS Trait Anger from anger in general, Depression (DASS 
Depression) from depression in general, and Anxiety (DASS Anxiety) from anxiety in 
general. 
Measures of Spread for STAS and DASS and YSQ. 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for the total scores for Anger, Anxiety, and 
Depression. The possible range for STAS Anger was 15-60, for DASS Depression 0 -
21, and for DASS Anxiety 0-18 (one item was omitted from the DASS scale in error in 
this study). For the YSQ, the possible range was from 89-534. These data are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 
Descriptives for STAS, DASS and Total YSQ 
Total Scores Mean SD 
Anger 25.08 6\63 ~^ 
Anxiety 1.78 2.52 
Depression 3.31 3.71 
Total YSQ 155.71 44.99 
N = 242 
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All measures appeared to be normally distributed with a slight suggestion of a positive 
skew. There appeared no need to transform scores given the size of the departure from 
normality. 
Examining emotions. To explore how anger related to depression and anxiety, the 
Total Anger, Total Anxiety and Total Depression scores were correlated with one another 
(Table 4). 
Table 4 
Correlation of STAS and DASS Scores. 
STAS DASS 
Emotion Total Anger Total Anxiety Total Depression 
Total Anger 1.00 
Total Anxiety .28** 
Total Depression .37** 
N = 242, **p<001 
Whilst the measures assessed discrete emotions, significant correlations were found 
between all emotions. Particularly strong correlations were found between Total Anxiety 
and Total Depression; slightly less strong correlations occurred between Total Anger, 
Total Depression and Total Anxiety. 
1.00 
.52** 1.00 
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How Cognitive Schemas Relate to Emotions 
Because of the significant degree of correlation between emotions, partial 
correlations were undertaken to explore the specific relationships between cognitions and 
each emotion, while controlling for the other two emotions. This allows an examination 
of the relationship between each schema and that aspect of the emotion not shared by the 
other two emotions. Results are shown in Table 5. 
When discussing the various schemas measured on the YSQ, the YSQ schemas 
are designated with a capital letter, for example, Abandonment. 
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Table 5 
Partial Correlations of YSQ Schema Types and Trait Anger, Anxiety and Depression. 
Y S Q Schema Types 
Predicted to be associated 
with: 
Anger (Hypothesis 1) 
Mistrust and Abuse 
Entitlement 
Punitiveness 
Abandonment 
Subjugation 
Insufficient Self-Control 
Depression (Hypothesis 2) 
Emotional Deprivation 
Social Isolation 
Defectiveness/ Shame 
Failure 
Self-Sacrifice 
Unrelenting Standards 
Enmeshment 
Dependency/Incompetence 
Total Anger 
((controlling for 
Depression and Anxiety) 
41*** 
45*** 
2j*** 
.28*** 
.05 
.38*** 
.12* 
.16** 
.17** 
.13* 
-.05 
.19* 
.13* 
.11 
Emotions 
Total Depression 
(Controlling/or 
Anger and Anxiety) 
29*** 
.01 
.21** 
34*** 
.40*** 
31*** 
.33*** 
.40*** 
.36*** 
.18** 
17** 
.18** 
.28*** 
.18** 
Total Anxiety 
((controlling for 
Depression and Anger) 
.14* 
-.07 
.04 
.15* 
.18** 
-.04 
-.00 
.06 
.07 
.05 
.12 
-.09 
.09 
.17** 
Anxiety (Hypothesis 3)) 
Vulnerability/Harm 
Emotional Inhibition 
23*** 
.13 
.33*** 
.36*** 
N = 242, * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Two-tailed 
.35*** 
-.03 
The coefficients for the partial correlations between each schema and the three emotions 
were not compared directly. There is no generally accepted method of comparing partial 
correlations that would parallel Fisher's Z test used for zero-order correlations 
(McNemar, 1962). Furthermore, the schemas are not independent of one another and 
repeated use of any test of difference between partial correlation coefficients would 
require a very conservative alpha level. Instead the general trends in the partial 
correlation coefficients are considered across each set of schemas. 
Anger 
When Anxiety and Depression were controlled for, partial correlations of YSQ 
Schema types and Total Anger showed that the schemas most strongly associated with 
Anger were Entitlement, Mistrust and Abuse, Insufficient Self-Control, and Punitiveness 
(r > 0.30). Whilst Anger was significantly associated with all but four of the other YSQ 
Schema types, the associations were less strong. In summary, of the six schema types 
predicted to be associated with Anger, five were significantly correlated, four were 
correlated more highly with Anger than with Depression or Anxiety, and two were more 
strongly associated with another emotion. 
Depression 
When Anger and Anxiety were controlled for, partial correlations showed, as 
predicted, that Total Depression was most strongly associated with Social Isolation, 
Defectiveness/ Shame, Emotional Deprivation, Enmeshment, Dependency/Incompetence, 
Failure, Self-Sacrifice, Vulnerability/Harm, and Emotional Deprivation. In addition, 
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Subjugation, Emotional Inhibition, and Abandonment were more highly correlated with 
Depression than with Anxiety or Anger. In fact, Depression was significantly associated 
with all YSQ schema types except Entitlement. 
Anxiety 
When Anger and Depression were controlled for, partial correlations of YSQ 
Schema types and Total Anxiety showed that only Vulnerability was most strongly 
associated with Anxiety, and that even Vulnerability was not exclusively associated with 
Anxiety. Anxiety was significantly associated with only five schemas. A summary table 
of the expected and actual outcomes is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Summary of Expected and Actual Associations between Schemas and Emotions 
Y S Q Schema Type Anger Depression Anxiety 
Schemas uniquely associated with one 
emotion 
Entitlement 
Self-Sacrifice 
Schemas shared by two emotions 
Insufficient Self-control 
Punitiveness 
Subjugation 
Unrelenting Standards 
Dependency 
Enmeshment 
Defectiveness/Shame 
Failure 
Social Isolation 
Emotional Deprivation 
Emotional Inhibition 
Schemas associated with three emotions 
Vulnerability 
Abandonment 
Mistrust/Abuse 
X = Predicted to be strongly associated, • = Highest correlation found. 
Significance of correlation * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
X« *** 
x» ** 
Y| *** 
x# *** 
X 
% ** 
* 
** 
* 
* 
** 
*** 
** 
0 *** 
X ** 
x»** 
x« *** 
x» *** 
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Discussion 
The aims of Study 1 were to explore the relationships between cognitive schemas and 
anger, depression and anxiety within a normal, non-clinical, convenience sample. 
The Relationship between Cognitions and Emotion 
Each emotion is discussed in terms of the cognitive themes that were identified 
with it. Next, there is some discussion about whether these themes were the ones 
predicted by Beck to be associated with each emotion. 
Anger 
Because there have not been many studies that examine the specific cognitions that 
are associated with anger, Study 1 tested Beck's predictions. He thought that Anger 
would be associated with the perception of an erosion of one's rights, and a retaliation for 
this loss of rights. 
The schemas that, at the outset, were predicted would be associated with 
Anger were: Mistrust/Abuse, Entitlement, Punitiveness, Insufficient Self-Control, 
Abandonment, and Subjugation, and the subsidiary hypothesis was that this set of schemas 
would relate more strongly to Anger than to Depression or Anxiety. The schemas found 
to be most closely associated with Anger were: Entitlement, Mistrust and Abuse, 
Insufficient Self-Control, Punitiveness, and Unrelenting Standards. 
The only cognitive content exclusively associated with Anger was Entitlement. 
All the other schemas strongly associated with Anger were also significantly associated 
78 
with Depression, or, in the case of the Vulnerability schema, with Depression and 
Anxiety. 
The cognitive components of anger are complex. First, Anger is associated with 
others. It is linked to mistrust of others, and having to defend and protect oneself and 
one's rights. This view sees that others cannot be trusted, which makes one vulnerable. 
Consequently, one has to stand up for oneself, and punish those who have injured one. 
Next, Anger is related to self. The first self-theme relates to self-indulgence. Not only do 
angry people feel that they have to defend themselves, they also demand more rights for 
themselves than they accord to others. They think they are special, and feel entitled to 
special treatment. The second self-theme relates to self-doubt. Anger is also related to 
Defectiveness/Shame schema, to not feeling good enough. It is also related to Unrelenting 
Standards, and having to meet mordinately high standards, perhaps to prove to oneself that 
one is good enough. So, as well as being about defending oneself, Anger is related to poor 
self-esteem, self-criticism, and having to prove oneself. 
The cognitive themes associated with Anger concern caring only for one's self-
not others, not being obligated to others, not being able to trust others because they let one 
down, and feeling punitive towards those who let one down. Yet, in common with 
Depression, Anger is also about self-doubt. 
Given that the hypotheses proposed at the outset of Study 1 about which YSQ 
schemas would be specifically related to Anger were based on themes suggested by Beck 
(1976), it appears that Beck's predictions were largely correct: anger is specifically related 
to the perception of an erosion of one's rights; it is about not being able to trust others. 
There was some overlap found between some cognitions and other emotions however, and 
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the only exclusive cognitive content associated with Anger concerned Entitlement and 
Punitiveness. 
Bowlby's assertion that Anger and Abandonment are linked was supported; 
however Abandonment was more strongly associated with Depression and Anxiety, than 
with Anger. Young's assertion that Subjugation is associated with anger was not 
supported at all. Instead Subjugation was mainly associated with Depression, and to a 
lesser extent with Anxiety. It seems that angry persons are less likely to passively submit 
and more likely to contest when they perceive a loss of their rights. 
Because none of the YSQ items referred to elements such as an interest in fairness 
or social justice, this meant that the findings reported here about the cognitive content 
associated with each emotion, cannot be seen as the full picture. It also means that there is 
yet more to be learnt about anger. 
Depression 
Previous studies had shown that depression was specifically related to themes of 
failure, loss, and defectiveness (Clark, Beck, & Beck, 1994). The YSQ schemas predicted 
to be associated with Depression in this study were those which featured these themes. 
Again, Beck's predictions were borne out. Just as in previous studies, Depression was 
found to be associated with loss, or a Tack' of something. In addition, there was a strong 
theme of isolation, aloneness, and a lack of friends. 
The schemas that were predicted and demonstrated to be specifically associated 
with Depression were: Social Isolation, Defectiveness/Shame, Emotional Deprivation, and 
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Enmeshment, and to a lesser extent Failure, Dependency/Incompetence and Self-Sacrifice. 
The only exclusive cognitive content associated with Depression was Emotional 
Inhibition, and, to a lesser extent, Self-Sacrifice. Apart from these two schemas, all other 
schemas that were associated with Depression were also associated with one or more of 
the other emotions. 
Almost all of the cognitive schemas included in the YSQ were strongly associated 
with Depression. In fact, there were more associated with Depression than with Anger 
and Anxiety combined. It appears that in Depression, the person judges him/herself 
harshly, and feels more socially isolated than Beck and his colleagues noticed in previous 
studies (Clark & Steer, 1996). Whilst previous studies (Beck et al., 1985; Clark et al., 
1994) highlighted the importance of the association between Depression and failure, this 
study found failure was less prominent than the other themes. 
The constellation of cognitive themes associated with Depression were marked by 
isolation, or 'distance from' something, such as isolation from others; isolation from 
success, isolation from love and acceptance or isolation from one's emotions. 
The hypotheses proposed at the outset of the study in relation to Depression were 
upheld. Emotional Deprivation, Defectiveness/Shame, Social isolation, Self-sacrifice, 
Enmeshment, Failure to Achieve, Unrelenting Standards, and Dependency/Incompetence 
were all related to Depression, and more highly related to Depression than to Anger or 
Anxiety. In addition to the original themes that Beck and his associates found to be 
associated with depression, a new range of cognitive themes have been linked with 
Depression. 
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Anxiety 
Previous studies which looked at the cognitive content associated with Anxiety 
were equivocal about what themes related to Anxiety. For example, they either found that 
Anxiety was related to danger (Beck et al., 1985; Clark et al., 1994), or they found no 
specific cognitive themes associated with Anxiety (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989; 
Greenberg & Beck, 1989; Laurent & Stark, 1993). It was therefore anticipated that this 
anomaly might be clarified when using a wider number of schemas, as provided by the 
YSQ. In particular, building on Beck, it was hypothesized that Anxiety would be related 
to: Vulnerability to Harm, and to Emotional Inhibition. 
As in previous studies, Study 1 found that Anxiety was most strongly associated 
with Vulnerability. However, Vulnerability was not exclusively associated with Anxiety, 
but also with Depression and Anger. Anxiety was significantly associated with a number 
of shared cognitive themes, namely, Subjugation, Dependency/Incompetence, 
Abandonment and Mistrust/Abuse, but always at a lower level than were Depression or 
Anger. Emotional Inhibition was related to Depression, not Anxiety. 
The cognitive themes associated with Anxiety suggested that anxious persons feel 
they are victims of fate or of others' actions. They do not feel they are lacking, nor do 
they feel excluded by others. The constellation of cognitive themes associated with 
Anxiety relates to how the world treats one: T am open to attack,' T am vulnerable.' As 
with previous studies, Study 1 showed that Anxiety is less frequently linked to cognitions 
in general than are Depression and Trait Anger. Apart from links to Vulnerability, 
Dependency and Subjugation, Anxiety is not significantly associated with the cognitive 
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schemas presented in the YSQ. This restricted cognitive content associated with Anxiety 
is similar to some of Beck's earlier findings (Beck et al., 1985). 
This dearth of specific cognitions associated with Anxiety may reflect the fact that 
Anxiety is in some way different from anger or depression. It appears that Anxiety is a 
more diffuse state, not especially marked by specific thoughts. This effect may reflect the 
fact that the Anxiety items of the DASS refer to a range of different types of anxiety, such 
as General Anxiety, Phobia, or Panic. It is possible that each type of anxiety relates to 
particular set of distinctive cognitions such as those pertaining to health (Schmidt, Joiner, 
Staab, & Williams, 2003), so that the specific links apply to only one anxiety state and not 
to others. Another possibility is that anxiety is less linked to cognition, that it relates to 
survival and so operates at a more automatic level than Depression or Anger. However, 
this seems unlikely because Anxiety is effectively treated by CBT, which specifically uses 
changes in cognition when managing anxiety (Clark & Fairburn, 1997). 
Relationship between Anger and Depression 
Whilst Depression and Anger have often been found together, and whilst anger is 
listed on the DSM-IV-R as one of the symptoms of depression and PTSD (First, Frances, 
& Pincus, 2004), the exact nature of the relationship between anger and depression is 
unclear. While there were some distinct cognitions associated with Anger, and others 
specifically related to Depression, there were also numbers of cognitive themes shared by 
both Anger and Depression. Both were significantly linked to Mistrust/Abuse and 
Punitiveness, Abandonment, and Insufficient Self-Control. Despite sharing these, there 
were more differences than similarities. This suggests that Anger and Depression are 
distinctive and discrete cognitive experiences. 
Whilst Anger and Depression share some cognitive elements, each was associated 
with a quite different constellation of cognitive schemas. Depression was associated with 
loss, aloneness, and subjugation, and Anger with defending self, demanding special 
rights, and to a lesser extent, with self-doubt. In the light of this, the contention that 
Anger is merely a symptom of depression or dysthymia appears to be incorrect. 
Conclusions 
Beck's cognitive content specificity hypothesis was partially supported. Specific 
maladaptive cognitive content was found in relation to Anger and Depression. As with 
previous studies (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989; Greenberg & Beck, 1989), the 
specific cognitive content associated with Anxiety was less marked. The cognitive 
themes associated with Depression and Anxiety were similar to those that Beck found 
previously. The themes associated with Anger were, in the main, the ones that Beck 
predicted. 
After examining cognitive themes associated with each emotion, it was possible 
to discern constellations of schemas which appeared to characterize each emotion. As 
previously mentioned, Anger was associated with fighting back, protecting rights, and 
demanding special rights for oneself; Depression was associated with feelings of 
isolation, Subjugation, and Emotional Inhibition; Anxiety was associated with 
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Vulnerability, Dependency and Subjugation. Nonetheless, there was also much shared 
cognitive content between the different emotions. Anger and Depression shared some 
elements; and some cognitive themes were common to Anger, Depression and Anxiety. 
Overall, then, whilst there was some support for the Beck's cognitive specificity 
hypothesis, some cognitive content had general emotional valency, as when Vulnerability 
related to all three emotions. These results raise the question of why, or how, a person 
having these cognitions can feel any of three emotions. Perhaps certain constellations of 
cognitions need to occur together before they arouse a specific emotion. 
Limitations 
All measures used in the study relied on self-report, whether for tapping cognitive 
content, or reporting mood. This raises the usual concerns about self-report, such as 
whether people tell the truth, or respond in the manner they think a researcher wants them 
to. In an attempt to overcome some of these concerns, and also to prevent any participant 
feeling pressured, in this study all participants were volunteers. Participants completed 
die questionnaire in private, and returned it anonymously. 
As in any study, the questions that can be investigated are limited by the measures 
that are used. Whilst the YSQ provided a greater range of cognitions than previously 
used in specificity studies, the results could not be seen to give the final or complete 
range of possible cognitions. For example, resentment and hostility were not reflected in 
the YSQ. It therefore remains for future work to confirm the results using different 
instruments. Until then, it must also be acknowledged that by only using the YSQ, the 
findings in relation to the range and overlapping relationships between cognitions and 
emotions could, in part, reflect the properties of this particular measure. 
The anger measure was rather self-oriented, focusing mainly on what annoys me, 
what I do, or feel like doing, when I get frustrated, but it did not tap anger arising from 
concerns about social justice, or about how others are treated. As Clore and Ortony 
(1991) pointed out, anger has a number of other dimensions, not all concerned with self, 
and it can also be more concerned with values and morality (Fransson, Biel, & 
Dahlstrand, 1997). None of these dimensions was tapped by the STAS. 
In addition, it was a measure of trait anger that was used in the analysis, while 
depression and anxiety were assessed using the DASS, which asks for feelings 
experienced over the previous week. The YSQ instrument required participants to 
consider what they generally thought. This would suggest that it might be less reliable in 
exposing the relationships between prevalent modes of thinking and feelings of 
depression and anxiety that had only been experienced over the previous week. Future 
examinations of this area might benefit from measures that tap more consistent 
dispositions of depression and anxiety. 
In a similar vein, it must be recognised that the study used a convenience sample 
drawn from a non-clinical population and that some of the relationships might have been 
clarified had a clinical group been investigated. It is not anticipated that radically 
different results would emerge from a clinical sample but it remains possible that among 
people who experience emotional extremes, the specific set of cognitions associated with 
their prevailing emotional state might have been more distinctive. 
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Future Studies 
Whilst Study 1 showed some association between specific cognitive content and 
particular emotions, and thereby partially confirmed Beck's Cognitive Content 
Specificity Hypothesis, it could not throw light on the nature of the direction of the 
relationship between cognitions and emotions, in other words, whether emotions elicit 
these cognitions, or, as CT would hold, that cognitions elicit emotions. It is important, 
that, as well as discovering which specific cognitions are associated with what particular 
emotions, that there be some test of whether any specific cognitions associated particular 
emotions, actually elicit particular emotions, or whether they simply correlate with 
general states inspired by other events. This question is pursued in Study 2. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2: DO SPECIFIC SCHEMAS ELICIT PARTICULAR EMOTIONS? 
Overview 
Study 2 explored the nature of the link between cognitions and emotions and 
tested whether prior emotions enhanced the effect of cognitions on emotion. There were 
three emotion induction conditions, each using the cognitions found in Study 1 to 
discriminate between high and low levels of anger, depression, or anxiety. Initially, there 
is some discussion of issues associated with emotion induction, then the method and 
results are presented, and the findings are discussed. 
Background 
Whilst LeDoux (1996) showed that emotions are survival responses under the 
direction of the amygdala, he also showed that emotions can be damped down and 
overridden by activity in the prefrontal cortex. LeDoux showed that the cortex can also 
stimulate arousal systems - a finding which seems to accord with one of the founding 
assumptions of Cognitive Therapy, namely, that thoughts lead to emotions (Beck, 1976; 
Beck et al., 1985; Beck et al., 1990). 
Cognitive therapy appears to have moved on from the tentative questions raised 
by its founders. It seems that now these foundational points are no longer questioned 
(Beck, 1996; Follette, Ruzek, & Auberg, 1998; Leahy, 2003; Simos, 2002). For example, 
the assumption that 'thoughts create feelings' has become a self-evident 'truth' in 
cognitive therapy as demonstrated in a recent practitioners' guide to cognitive therapy: 
Leahy (2003) states, "the fundamental assumption guiding cognitive therapy is the 
individual's interpretation of an event determines how he or she feels and behaves" (p. 8). 
To this he added "two foundational points ... worth considering: (1) Thoughts and 
feelings are distinct phenomena. (2) Thoughts create feelings (and behaviour)" (p. 9). 
Because Cognitive Therapy (CT) has grown so popular in recent years, as attested 
to by the raft of publications that propound and expound CT (Beck, 1995; Barlow, 2001; 
Follette, Ruzek, & Auberg, 1998; Leahy, 2003), it is important constantly to ensure that 
its development is grounded in research. To this end, Study 2 has returned to the 
foundations of CT. 
While Study 1 indicated some association between specific YSQ schemas and 
particular emotions, it could not indicate the direction of this relationship. That is, it 
could not indicate whether cognitions elicited emotions, or whether, on the contrary, the 
emotion elicited the cognition. So two explanations of how cognitions relate to emotion, 
Beck's and Teasdale's, are the focus of Study 2. 
Beck held the view that cognition 'mediates affect and behaviour' (Beck, 1987, 
p.77). This view is encapsulated in his Primacy Hypothesis which proposed that biased 
cognitive processing leads to a corresponding change in the individual's emotional and 
behavioural responding. This hypothesis clearly indicates the direction of the emotion-
generation process: emotions are triggered by specific cognitions. Recently, Leahy 
(2003), when elaborating on Beck's model, listed a series of thoughts and the feelings 
that the thoughts would induce. For example, he claimed that the thought "I'll never be 
happy again" triggers hopelessness. Likewise, the thought "life is not worth living" 
makes a person suicidal; and the thought "I should give myself credit for trying" makes a 
person proud and happy. This degree of certainty appears to indicate that this model has 
already been clearly and unequivocally demonstrated, so from Beck's Primacy Model, it 
would be expected that angry thoughts would induce anger, depressed thoughts 
depression and so on, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
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Figure 1. Beck's Primacy Model of the relationship between cognition and emotion. 
Whilst this Primacy Hypothesis is a founding assumption in Cognitive Therapy, a 
Uterature search showed that few, if any, studies have tested it formally. The question 
that remains is whether a passing thought is really a sufficient stimulus to trigger an 
emotion. 
Several writers (Butler, 1993; Ingram, & Ritter, 2000; Keltner et al., 1993; 
Teasdale, 1988. 1996,1999) have suggested that for emotions to be elicited by thoughts, 
other pre-conditions are necessary. For example, Teasdale (1998) suggested that the idea 
that mere thought can trigger an emotion oversimplifies the relationship, and suggested 
that it is the mood a person is in prior to the thought, that determines what effect the 
thought has. 
Prior M o o d —*• Particular Cognitions —• Emotion 
Prior mood, in this case, is defined as a generalized predisposition or as a prevailing 
emotional state. Butler (1993) found prior mood played a part in determining how a 
person responded. For example, when a person was in an angry mood prior to an 
incident, he or she was likely to respond angrily to any new event. This view is 
encapsulated in Teasdale's model as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Teasdale's model of the relationship between cognition and emotion. 
Aims 
Study 2 aimed to test both Beck's and Teasdale's models using cognitions derived 
from the YSQ to induce emotions. First, it aimed to discover whether, when participants 
focused on the YSQ schemas associated with anger, they experienced angry feelings; 
whether participants focusing on schemas associated with depression, experienced 
depressed feelings; and whether those focusing on schemas associated with anxiety, 
experienced anxious feelings. Second, it aimed to discover whether a person's prior 
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emotional condition enhanced the effect of emotion induction; that is, whether 
participants who were angry prior to anger induction experienced more angry feelings 
after anger induction than those participants who were less angry; whether participants 
who were more depressed before depression induction showed more depression after 
depression induction than those who were less depressed initially, and so on. Because the 
DASS and STAS both refer to emotional states during the past week, they were employed 
as measures of prior emotions. 
Issues of Emotion Induction 
When seeking to test whether emotions were induced by specific thoughts, it 
seemed important to select 'thoughts' that had previously been associated with each 
emotion. It was decided that the best way to approach this was to identify which schemas 
in Study 1 best distinguished persons high on anger, depression or anxiety from persons 
who were low on these emotions, and to use these cognitions as the basis for mood 
induction. 
To induce emotions in Study 2 participants were required to read those items 
specifically associated with either anger, depression or anxiety. They were then asked to 
think of instances in their own lives when they had experienced situations similar to those 
outlined in the schema items, and to write briefly about these. It was hoped that this 
would activate the associated schema, and induce the emotion associated with the 
schema. 
One difficulty that arises in this type of study, is how to name the affective product 
achieved after induction. This process of producing an affective state has traditionally 
been called 'mood induction.' However, because, in the first chapter of this thesis, 
'emotion' was distinguished from 'mood' - with mood being defined as a long-lasting 
emotional state. It is therefore important to note that when the terms 'mood induction' or 
'induced mood' are used in the context of Study 2, they describe any change in affect that 
occurs after an induction activity, rather than suggesting the induction of a lasting 
emotion. 
Hypotheses 
In summary, Beck (1987) asserted that specific cognitions arouse particular 
emotions; and that biased cognitive processing leads to a corresponding change in the 
individual's emotional responses. Given this, it was expected that participants, when 
exposed to the schemas shown in Study 1 to distinguish between high and low levels of 
anger, depression, or anxiety, would show correspondingly greater changes in the 
targeted emotion. 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that: 
In comparison with their post-induction scores for Feeling Anxious or Feeling 
Depressed, participants completing Anger -Induction would show significantly 
higher positive rating on 'Feeling Angry.' 
Likewise, Depression Induction participants would show significantly higher 
ratings of Depressed Feeling; and after Anxiety Induction, participants would 
show higher Anxious Feelings. 
Given that there was also evidence that prior emotional state can influence a 
person's subsequent emotional state, (Butler, 1993,1999; Keltner et al., 1993; Teasdale, 
1982,1988,1996), this relationship was also explored. 
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Hypothesis 2 proposed that 
In comparison with those providing low prior-anger scores, those providing high 
prior anger scorers would show significantly more angry affect after anger 
induction. 
Likewise, those high on prior depression would show significantly more 
depressed affect after depression induction; and those high on prior anxiety, 
significantly more anxious affect after anxiety induction. 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were non-clinical volunteers. All were adult tertiary students. 
There were 127 participants, 23 men and 104 women, all aged 18 years or over. Their 
details are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Age and Gender Distribution for Study 2 
Age Groups 
In years 
n % Men Women 
18-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50 - above 
Total 
80 
39 
6 
1 
1 
127 
63 
30 
4 
1 
1 
100 
9 
11 
4 
0 
0 
23 
70 
28 
3 
2 
1 
104 
Forty eight participants (38%) completed the Anxiety Induction condition, 44 (35%) 
completed Depression Induction, and 35 (28%) completed Anger Induction. 
Materials 
State Trait Anger Scale. The State Trait Anger Scale (STAS) (Appendix F), was 
used to measure prior Anger (Spielberger et al., 1970). This scale, and details about its 
psychometrics, and the manner of scoring were described in Study 1. 
Depression and Anxiety Stress Scale. The Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale 
(DASS) (Appendix G) was used to provide a measure of prior Anxiety and Depression 
Scores. Details of the DASS, its psychometrics and manner of scoring were described in 
Study 1. 
Emotion Inducing Schemas. The selection of the YSQ schemas for emotion 
induction was based on an additional analysis of the results of Study 1. A discriminant 
analysis was undertaken to identify which particular YSQ schemas predicted high and 
low Anger, Depression and Anxiety. The discriminant analysis does not take into 
account the relationship between the emotions and the set of discriminating schemas that 
emerge are slightly different from those revealed by the partial correlation analysis. It 
was considered more important in this study to select the schemas that most effectively 
distinguished those high and low in each different emotion, than those schemas which 
were uniquely linked to each emotion. The schemas used for the induction of each 
emotion, anger, depression and anxiety, are described next. 
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Anger induction. The Y S Q schemas which discriminated most clearly between 
high and low levels of Anger were: Mistrust/Abuse and Entitlement. So the 10 items 
making up these schemas were used for Anger Induction. Mistrust/Abuse items reflected 
themes of exploitation, and concerns and expectations that others would intentionally 
hurt, abuse, humiliate, cheat, lie, manipulate, or take advantage of one. Entitlement items 
reflected the view that a person was entitled to special treatment (Appendix I). 
Depression induction. Those YSQ schemas which discriminated between high 
and low levels of Depression were: Mistrust/Abuse and Social Isolation. They were used 
for Depression Induction. Mistrust/Abuse reflected a picture of an nasty, hurtful, unkind 
world. Social Isolation reflected the view that the individual was alone and did not fit in 
(Appendix J). 
Anxiety induction. Those YSQ schemas which discriminated between high and 
low levels of Anxiety were: Subjugation and Vulnerability. Subjugation reflected the 
view that one should submit to others; Vulnerability reflected the view that the world is a 
dangerous place (Appendix K). 
Measure of 'Feeling' After Emotion Induction. A short measure was needed to 
assess participants' feelings or emotions after the emotion induction intervention. It was 
decided that participants would simply be asked to indicate their present level of feeling 
angry, anxious, or depressed For this reason a brief "Feelings" measure was constructed 
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to assess induced emotions. The measure was called the 'Feelings Indicator;' and was 
based on a similar measure devised by Muran, Gorman, Safran, Twining, and Winston 
(1995) to measure 'In-session change.' Their scale included items of the type: 'Right 
now I feel angry,' or 'Right now I feel depressed (or anxious),' with one question for 
each emotion. Although there were only three target emotions for Study 2, namely, 
Feeling Anxious, Feeling Depressed, Feeling Angry, they were embedded in a range of 7 
other emotions. A copy of the 'Feelings Indicator' is included in Appendix L. 
Participants were instructed to "indicate how you are feeling now by circling the 
number that fits your feeling/s at this moment." The responses to 'Feelings Indicator' 
were made on a five-point Likert scale: from 1 (Strongly agree), through to 5 (Strongly 
disagree). Scoring was recoded so that higher scores indicated higher levels of the 
emotion. 
Procedure 
Ethics permission was sought from the University of Ballarat's Ethics Committee. 
Once approval was granted, three versions of the questionnaire were prepared. One 
version was concerned with anger induction, one with depression induction, one with 
anxiety induction. These were shuffled to ensure that participants were randomly 
assigned to the three intervention groups. 
A non-clinical, convenience sample was recruited in two ways: either participants 
were approached individually, or were involved as part of a group experience. Those 
who completed the 'Emotions Questionnaire' individually returned the questionnaire by 
mail in the self-addressed envelope provided to them by the researcher. Those who 
volunteered in the group setting were asked to complete the questionnaire independently 
in the classroom and then to place their completed questionnaires in a collection box. All 
participants, as acknowledgement of their contribution to the study, were offered a $2 
voucher for a bucket of chips or a hot dog. 
All participants, regardless of the induction condition, were required to complete 
the demographics questions (Appendix D), the STAS (Appendix E), and the DASS 
(Appendix G), before undertaking their particular induction activity. 
Induction procedure. Once participants had completed the YSQ items relevant 
for their induction group, they were given the following instructions, "Please read 
through the items again and think about each item that you have just rated, and write 
down an example of a time or an incident when this thought occurred to you. You may 
use the same episode for more than one statement. In fact it is possible that the one 
episode will do for all the items but think about each one anyway in case it gets you 
thinking about another time or incident." Then they were given the ten situations to 
apply to themselves. For example, the instruction for the Anxiety group was: "Think 
about a time when you felt that something bad was about to happen," then to write briefly 
about the incident. Other examples were: "Think about a time that you felt that a disaster 
(natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could strike at any moment;" "Think about a 
time when you were worried about being attacked." The same procedure was used for 
each induction group. The three induction activities are included in Appendix, M, N, 
andO. 
Because there was no way to ensure that participants would experience only a 
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short-term feeling as a result of this activity, they were directed to the Wellbeing 
Statement (Appendix H) that included some self-calming approaches that they could 
employ, should they need them to overcome a longer lasting mood triggered by the 
exercise. Data were analyzed with SPSS. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for STAS and DASS 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for the total scores for Anger, Anxiety, and 
Depression are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Means and SDs for Trait Anger, Depression and Anxiety 
Total Scores Mean SD. 
Trait Anger (STAS) 24.48 6.61 
Anxiety (DASS) 3.83 3.60 
Depression (DASS) 4.55 6.61 
_ _ _____ _ _ ^ — 
All measures appeared to be normally distributed with evidence of a slight positive skew. 
Feelings Indicator 
The descriptives for post-intervention Feelings Indicators are shown in Table 9. 
The possible range for each of the Feelings was 1-5. 
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Table 9 
Means an SDs for Feelings Indicator for Whole Group 
Post-induction Feeling Mean SD 
Feeling Angry 1.54 .90 
Feeling Depressed 2.13 1.25 
Feeling Anxious 2.43 1.31 
_____ ~ 
Effects of Emotion induction 
In order to explore the differences in group responses after the different emotion 
induction conditions, means and standard deviations were calculated for the three groups 
as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Means, Standard Deviation (SDs) for Post-induction Feelings for the Anger, Depression 
and Anxiety Induction Groups. 
Post-Induction Feeling 
Anger Induction 
(" = 35) 
Mean (SD) 
Induction Group 
Depression Induction 
(n = 44) 
Mean (SD) 
Anxiety Induction 
(n = 48) 
Mean (SD) 
Feeling Angry 1.69 (1.40) 1.66 (0.99) 1.33 (0.63) 
Feeling Depressed 2.40 (1.40) 2.14 (1.03) 1.92 (1.03) 
Feeling Anxious 2.26 (.90) 2.43 (1.19) 2.54 (1.37) 
The mean scores for Feeling Anxious, Feeling Depressed, and Feeling Angry 
were compared for participants in the different emotion-induction groups. The highest 
anger and depression scores were recorded in the Anger induction group. The highest 
anxiety scores were recorded for the Anxiety induction group. 
Planned Comparisons for Post-induction Feelings 
Three planned comparisons were undertaken, one for each measure. These 
compared the participants in the salient emotion induction condition with those in the 
other two conditions for the relevant feeling measure. Each emotion manipulation is 
reported versus the other two, namely, i) Feeling Angry versus Feeling Depressed and 
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Anxious, ii) Feeling Depressed versus Feeling Angry and Anxious, iii) Feeling Anxious 
versus Feeling Angry and Depressed. 
After the Anger manipulation, the Anger group did not differ significantly from 
the other two: Feeling Angry - Angry Induction versus Anxious and Depressed 
Inductions, t (125) = .99,p= .33. After the manipulations the Depressed induction group 
felt slightly less depressed than participants in the Anger and Anxiety induction 
conditions: - Depressed Induction versus Anxious and Angry Inductions, t (125) = - .07, 
p = .95. Finally, participants in the Anxiety induction condition felt slightly but not 
significantly more anxious than those who had experienced the anger and depression 
inductions: - Anxious Induction versus Angry and Depressed Inductions, t (125) = 0.78, 
p = M. 
Prior Emotional Condition 
To examine whether prior emotions interacted with the induction process, the 
highest and lowest scoring participants were selected, based on tercile splits of each of 
the three emotion measures, Anger (STAS), Depression and Anxiety (DASS), taken prior 
to the induction procedure. There were approximately 40 in the high groups, and 40 in 
the low groups. The precise size of the top and bottom tercile varied within each emotion 
depending on the distribution of the participants across the scoring range. Following 
division into the high and low groups, each feeling indicator (Angry, Depressed and 
Anxious) was subjected to a 2 x 2 ANOVA - Emotional Level (High versus Low) by 
Induction Condition (Salient versus Others). The means for the four groups, for each 
induction type, are shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for High and Low Emotional Level Groups for Salient 
and Other Emotion Induction Conditions 
Prior Emotional Induction Feeling Feeling Feeling 
Level Condition Angry Depressed Anxious 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
High Salient Emotion 2.31 (1.25) 3.23 (.59) 3.85 (.90) 
Other Emotions 1.65 (.75) 3.11 (1.19) 2.92 (1.29) 
Low Salient Emotion 1.17 (.39) 1.80 (1.23) 2.07 (1.28) 
Other Emotions 1.36 (.87) 1.35 (.65) 1.79 (1.06) 
These analyses revealed the following. In all cases there was a main effect of 
prior emotional level. While there was no main effect of anger induction on angry 
feelings, there was a significant interaction, F(l,75) = 4.17: p = .05. A post hoc analysis 
revealed that anger induction produced significantly higher levels of Feeling Angry than 
the other two conditions, but only for those who were initially high on Trait Anger 
(Critical Difference = .64: p = .05). The depression induction condition failed to produce 
any changes in depressed feelings, F(\, 69) = .98,/? = 33. There was no interaction 
between induction and prior emotional level, F(l,69)= .33,p= .57. Finally, there was a 
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main effect of induction condition for feeling anxious, F(\, 73) = 4.75, p = .03. The 
Anxiety Induction produced significantly higher anxious feelings (M= 2.96) than the 
other two conditions (M = 2.36); however, there was no interaction between prior level of 
anxiety and induction condition, F(l,73) = 1.40,/? = .24. 
The main effect of induction on anxious feelings of those in the top and bottom 
terciles of initially anxious participants was unexpected given the failure of the induction 
to elicit more anxiety in the sample as a whole. A subsidiary analysis was performed on 
the those in the middle of the distribution. The analysis confirmed that initially 
moderately Anxious participants (the middle tercile) became less anxious after the 
Anxiety induction than similar participants exposed to the Anger and Depression 
inductions (2.05 vs. 2.33), r(48) = .80, ns. 
To summarize, there was evidence that the anxiety induction produced 
significantly higher levels of Anxious Feelings among those high and low in initial 
anxiety, while the anger induction did have some impact but only on those who had 
higher Trait Anger scores prior to induction. The depression induction failed to elicit 
depressed feelings among any group. 
Discussion 
Study 2 built on the results of Study 1. In Study 1 it was noticed that Anxiety was 
mostly associated with cognitions concerning vulnerability, Depression was cognitively 
richer than Anxiety, being strongly and specifically associated with many more 
cognitions, and Anger, while specifically associated with a number of cognitions, was not 
as cognitively rich as Depression. Study 1 also showed that, regardless of the numbers of 
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cognitive schemas associated with each emotion, particular sets of schemas were 
associated with persons who were high or low on these emotions. On the basis of these 
findings two sets of discriminating schemas were used to induce angry, depressed and 
anxious feelings in Study 2. 
Do Thoughts Induce Emotion? 
The results of Study 2 showed that, while certain schemas had been reliably 
associated with high and low levels of Anger, Depression, and Anxiety in Study 1, they 
were not sufficient to trigger those emotions. Only the anxiety-related schemas operated 
across the majority of the sample, triggering small increases in anxious feelings amongst 
those who were initially high and low in anxiety. Anger related schemas elicited some 
increase in anger among those were initially angry but depressed schemas produced no 
reliable increases in depression at all. Study 2's results therefore suggested that if Beck's 
Primacy Hypothesis applies to any emotions it does so to Anxiety. 
Teasdale thought that a person's emotional reaction to their cognitions was 
mediated by the mood the person was currently in. There is some evidence from Study 2 
to support Teasdale's prior-mood-hypotheses but it is not consistent. Only in the Anger 
induction condition was it found that those who were high in Trait Anger before 
undertaking the induction responded maximally to the schemas. A similar effect was 
found in the Anxiety condition among those high in initial anxiety but the effect was 
complicated by a similar tendency among those low in initial anxiety and the reverse 
among those in the middle range. Exposure to cognitions associated with Depression did 
not induce depressed feelings, even for those high on prior depression. 
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Explaining the Effects of Study 2 
It is not easy to offer an explanation of these effects given the apparent interaction 
between emotion, initial level and induction. One possible form of explanation may 
reflect the relative cognitive 'richness' of the three emotions. This cognitive richness 
explanation requires a mechanism that inverts the general relationships identified in 
Study 1. In that study, Depression was closely related to 15 schemas, ten of these 
relationships being the closest of the three emotions. Anger was less closely linked to 13 
schemas, six of the associations being closer with Anger than the other two emotions. 
Finally anxiety was related to only five schemas and only one of these was higher than 
the other emotions. Perhaps Depression, being based on an elaborated cognitive state is 
relatively impervious to externally presented thoughts. Anxiety, on the other hand, might 
be regarded as a relatively non-elaborated state, and is consequently more open to 
manipulation by external cues. Thus, externally presented cognitions relating to Anxiety 
have a noticeable impact on eliciting Anxiety. Anger falls between the two and only 
those initially angry or predisposed towards anger react to the sets of schemas. 
Unfortunately, the idea that Anxiety is more responsive to external cues does not 
accord with internal experiences such as stage-fright and performance anxiety which 
point to the presence of internal cognitive processes. Both conditions are interior 
experiences par excellence, being responses to the anticipation of disaster or humiliation, 
rather than responses to actual external danger cues (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Kendrick, 
Craig, Lawson, & Davidson, 1982; Steptoe & Fidler, 1987). These forms of anxiety do 
not appear to lack cognitive components. 
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The total failure to induce higher levels of Depression, the partial failure in Anger, 
and the incomplete success in Anxiety is also surprising given the success of other forms 
of mood induction. For instance, previous studies have shown that it was possible to 
induce depression in the majority of their participants, when using a self-referent 
procedure (Velten's mood induction), (Miranda, Gross, Persons, & Hahnm, 998; Richell 
& Anderson, 2004) or by using films (Gross & Levenson,1995); and that persons who 
bad previously been treated for depression responded strongly to depression induction 
(Ingram & Ritter, 2000). These results beg the question of whether the particular 
technique was sufficiently powerful. It could be that asking participants to consider and 
recall situations in which the schemas were relevant is generally not enough to elicit more 
extreme feelings, even for those who are higher in that emotion initially. 
However, if the technique was inadequate, why was there a definite suggestion of 
movement among higher anger and lower and higher anxiety participants? These 
inconsistencies also indicate that it was not the choice of schemas, especially as 
depression was the emotion most readily linked to most schemas and yet proved the least 
tractable. Again this raises the possibility that it is the relative cognitive complexity of an 
emotion that may render it less prone to change using small scale cognitive techniques. 
Another partial explanation may be the relative acceptability of an emotion in 
society. Depression as a stigmatized emotion is not one participants readily subscribe to, 
while anger can be acceptable in the right context ("righteous anger") and anxiety is a 
commonly experienced and recognised emotion. This could also explain the relative 
shifts produced by the schema induction technique. 
The results clearly raise questions about both Beck's and Teasdale's models with 
only limited support for both models, in that neither cognitions alone, nor prior mood 
were necessarily linked to subsequent emotions. Other than the factors discussed above, 
active influences could include the presence of early maladaptive schemas (Young, 1990); 
or the operation of a cognitive mode, which is when a "primitive, egocentric cognitive 
system ... is activated and remains hyperactive" (Beck et al., 1985). Or, it may be that 
additional external stressors such as physical ones like heat, or social ones such as being 
bullied (Novaco, 1975), are required for emotions to become involved. Even 
temperament could play a part, so that a more sensitive person may be inclined to express 
anxiety; a person who is quicker to fire up may be more inclined to express anger; and a 
more timid person to withdraw into depression (LeDoux, 1996). It is possible that the 
presence of any of these influences is necessary as a catalyst for induced emotions to be 
engaged. 
Limitations 
There were a number of possible explanations for the relative failure of Study 2. 
These have already been touched on but require further consideration. First, it is possible 
that the results could reflect the fact that the participants were not in high states of 
emotion at the time they completed the questionnaires, and so the interventions did not 
elicit any strong response. The measures of emotional predisposition that were 
employed in Study 2 were based on the emotional tone that participants had experienced 
over the previous week, in the case of depression and anxiety, and more generally, in the 
case of trait anger. It could be argued that none of the measures was a good index of 
emotional state immediately prior to the mood induction. Thus, the results obtained in 
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the secondary analyses involving the tercile splits might be underestimates of the 
interaction between the mood manipulation and initial state. The clear implication is that 
measures of initial emotional state must be carefully selected. 
Another problem with the design that has already been discussed briefly was the 
nature of the manipulation. In that a primary aim of the study was to examine whether a 
restricted set of cognitions alone could affect emotional state in a selective manner, this 
was not a major limitation, but clearly there is scope for future research to clarify what 
impact cognitions might have within a more powerful manipulation that could also 
involve music or extensive autobiographical recollections (Ingram & Ritter, 2000). It has 
to be acknowledged that the final, post manipulation, feeling ratings were very 
"middling", confirming that any effects cognitions had were slight. Again the scope for 
incorporating cognitions within a more potent manipulation seems large. 
Implications 
With Beck's Primacy Hypothesis being such a strong tenet of Cognitive Therapy, 
it was expected at the outset of Study 2 that there would be a marked effect from any and 
all of the different emotion-induction conditions. Leahy's confident assertion that 
cognition induces emotional states was also grounds for optimism, yet the results were at 
best inconsistent. This inconsistency suggests that it takes more than exposure to the 
cognitions associated with each emotion to induce an emotion at all, let alone at a clinical 
level. 
Even though Beck assumed that all emotions would operate similarly, Study 2 
indicates that it is not possible to generalize about emotions. There are subtle differences 
between anger, depression, and anxiety. Understanding these differences could possibly 
enhance the development of particular therapeutic approaches for each type of emotion. 
For example, perhaps the treatment of anxiety should focus less on elaborate cognitive 
processes than should the treatment of depression. 
Conclusions 
A number of experimental factors could have contributed to the lack of strong 
effects of the emotion induction in Study 2. The means by which manipulation occurred 
could have contributed to the differential effects from anxiety, depression and anger 
induction. Even though such cognitive elaboration has previously been accepted as an 
adequate means of emotion induction (Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 1980), simply 
recalling past incidents that were associated with emotional arousal may not have been 
sufficient to engage emotions. 
Even though the mood inductions were linked to personal memories and so could 
have been expected to prime an emotion, this did not seem to have been as effective as 
the less individualized Velten technique has sometimes been found to be (Ingram & 
Ritter, 2000). However, because the focus of the study was Young's model, it seemed 
appropriate to use his schemas rather than the Velten material. 
The participant group, selected because of its availability, may not have been 
typical. Selecting a non-clinical group meant that they were not clinically anxious, 
depressed or angry before induction. It is possible that with a clinical group the results 
could have been less equivocal, because, by definition, they would have had clinical 
levels of these emotions prior to induction. 
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With only one item to assess each post-induction feeling, the post-induction 
Feeling Measure may have been too bald. Had the measure comprised more items for 
each emotion, this might have given a stronger measure of any post-induction feeling. 
Alternatively, had the DASS and STAS items been completed again after the emotion 
induction activity, this might have provided a clearer picture of any change that occurred 
as a result of induction, but at the cost of a noticeably longer questionnaire, and the carry-
over effects of practice. 
While the schemas selected for mood induction were those that discriminated 
between participants who provided low and high Anger, Anxiety and Depression scores 
in Study 1, there was evidence that schemas often related to more than one emotion. The 
decision to use only two schemas in each induction condition might have contributed to 
the low induction effects, particularly, because the same schema, namely, 
Mistrust/Abuse, distinguished between those high or low on Trait Anger and high and 
low on Depression. It is possible that if four to five schemas had been used to induce 
each emotion, this would have produced a stronger effect. Because depression related to 
such a vast set of cognitions, it is possible that the particular items used in depression 
induction did not necessarily tap individuals' more upsetting schemas. 
Ill 
Future Studies 
First, to eliminate the possibility that the lack of conclusive results was due to 
inadequate measures, it would be helpful if the study were to be repeated using different 
measures of emotional tendencies and feelings. 
If the relationship between cognition and emotion is to be tested effectively, it 
seems that the other possible catalysts should also be studied. For example, one feature 
not tested in this study was whether a person's schema scores before induction played 
any part in whether they responded to induction or not. A study to assess whether or not 
participants had prior high schema scores on schemas associated with particular emotions 
could address this. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 3: HOW PARENTING AFFECTS OFFSPRING 
MALADAPTIVE SCHEMAS AND EMOTIONS 
Overview 
Study 3 is based on Young's (1990) contention that DSM-IV-R Axis I and II 
disorders, such as depression or personality disorders, are the product of specific adverse 
types of parenting experienced during childhood. This chapter gives some background 
on studies that have investigated the relationships between early adverse parenting, early 
trauma, and later behavioural, emotional and cognitive disorders. Following that, the 
hypotheses for the study are outlined and the method and results are presented and 
discussed. 
Background 
In Chapter 1 a range of possible explanations were offered for problem anger in 
adults. Amongst them were suggestions that anger is a survival reflex, that it relates to 
temperament, that it is the product of socialization, or that it is the product of previous 
trauma. Added to that, Study 1 showed that some cognitive schemas, such as Insufficient 
Self-Control, Punitiveness and Entitlement, were specifically associated with Trait 
Anger. 
While Beck et al., (1985) and Young (1990) agreed that personality and emotional 
disorders are linked to specific maladaptive cognitive schemas, Young and his colleagues 
believed that these maladaptive schemas arose from "toxic childhood experiences," and 
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"from an interaction of the child's innate temperament with dysfunctional developmental 
experiences with family members or caregivers" (Young, Weinburger, & Beck, 2001, 
p.270). Young and his colleagues claimed that, once acquired, such early maladaptive 
schemas (EMSs) gave rise to affective and personality disorders (Young, Weinburger, & 
Beck, 2001, p.269), so that there is a chain of circumstances. 
Young's model comprises three elements: adverse parenting, offspring 
maladaptive cognitions, and lasting psychological effects (Young, 1990), with adverse 
parenting causally antecedent to offspring schemas. Young surmised that each type of 
EMS arose from a particular type of adverse parenting. 
Adverse Offspring Offspring Personality 
Parenting Maladaptive " Disordered Disorders 
Schemas Emotions 
For example, it was suggested that children of critical parents became overly 
sensitive to failure; that children of rejecting parents became overly sensitive to 
abandonment; that children of perfectionistic parents developed unrelenting standards, and 
so on (Young, 1990). Young also claimed that early maladaptive schemas are related to 
depression and personality disorders, however, he did not elaborate on this. As a result, 
the nature of the inter-relationship between parenting, offspring schemas, and disorders is 
not clear. He seemed to imply that the relationship between parenting and offspring 
emotional disorders was mediated by offspring schemas. 
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Effects of Childhood 
Young's model about the origins of offspring EMSs and anxiety and depression, 
was extrapolated from bis clinical observations, rather than tested by research. While bis 
observations may well be perspicacious, his model is more implied than formally 
elaborated. Fortunately, other researchers have explored some of these inferactions; such 
as the relation between early stressful events and later mental disorders (Beck, 1983); how 
early adverse events impact in later life (Dix, 1991; Laidlaw & Davidson, 2001; Platts, 
Tyson, & Mason, 2002; Schore, 2003). Schore, a psychoneurobiologist, concluded that 
"early social environment, mediated by the primary caregiver, directly influences the final 
wiring of the circuits in the infant brain that are responsible for the future social and 
emotional coping capacities of the individual' (Schore, 2003, p. 271). Some of these 
physiological, social, and emotional effects of early adverse parenting are examined next. 
Physiological effects of early stress. There is ample evidence that early stress 
produces immediate effects. For example, attachment studies showed that in the 'Strange 
Situation,' when infants were left with a stranger while their parents left the room, their 
Cortisol levels increased after even a short exposure to a stranger (Hertsgaard, Gunnar, 
Erikson, & Nachmias, 1995). Infant stress levels also increased in the presence of 
'frightening maternal behaviour,' even when the mother's behaviour was not overtly 
abusive (Schuengel, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Uzendoorn, 1999). 
Hyperarousal, such as that arising from exposure to abuse, has been found to leave 
a legacy of 'sensitized neurobiology' (Perry, Pollard, Blakely, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995) 
which contributes to the affected individual becoming more reactive to environmental 
115 
events. For example, abused toddlers with a history of insecure attachment exhibited 
higher levels of Cortisol than did toddlers with other attachment classifications (Hertsgaard 
et al., 1995), so that early experiences may literally shape a child's developing brain. 
Childhood stress also appears to have long-term physiological effects. For 
example, early traumatic environments have been associated with atypical patterns of 
neural activity, compromised attachment, empathy development, affect regulation 
(Graham, Heim, Goodman, Miller, & Nemeroff, 1999; Perry, Pollard, Blakely, Baker, & 
Vigilante, 1995), and psychosis (Mason & Beavan-Pearson, 2005). Early trauma can 
lead to 'severe parcellation,' or pruning of neurons, during which the subcortical circuits 
in the 'senior executive' area of the orbitofrontal cortex are permanently destroyed 
(Bemtson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991; Schore, 2001). 
It has also been found that adverse parenting, even when not overly abusive, 
produced chronic stress and had long-term neurological and psychological effects in 
offspring (Elliot, 1997). It reduced an individual's ability to regulate negative states such 
as fear or aggression (Schore, 2003; van der Kolk & Fisler, 1994). In addition, offspring 
exposed to such parenting were vulnerable to developing post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Rauch et al., 1996). For example, children who witnessed domestic violence or 
experienced physical assault, manifested a higher incidence of post-traumatic stress, 
affective distress, anger and depression, than those who had not (Elliot, 1997; 
Moghaddam, Bolinao, Stein-Behrens, & Sapolsky, 1994). Adverse parenting was also 
associated with later anxiety, depression, and phobia in affected offspring (Heim & 
Nemeroff, 2001; LeDoux, 1995; Schore, 2001; van der Kolk, McFarlane, & 
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Weisaeth,1996). When relationships between parents and child were disrupted, offspring 
experienced more depression (Ingram, 2003; Perris, 1994; Schore, 1996,1997). 
Social effects of early stress and trauma. As well as having physiological effects, 
there were social effects from early stressful events and trauma Early trauma, such as 
trauma through exposure to violence, not only affected a child's brain development, but 
changed how the child processed socioemotional information (Schore, 2003). For 
example, neglect and abuse in the first years of life critically disrupted social bonding and 
attachment (Kling & Steklis, 1976; Perry, Pollard, Blakely, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995; 
Platts, Mason, & Tyson, 2005). Early neglect also left a permanent deficit in a person's 
ability to read others' facial expressions (Carnras, Grow, & Ribordy, 1983). Experiencing 
domestic violence or chronic abuse also disrupted social development (Barnett, Hill-
Hunter, Butler, McCaskill, Kaplan-Estrin, & Pipp-Siegal, 1999; Schore,2003). For 
instance, congenitally healthy children living under chronically stressful conditions, such 
as when little comfort was offered to them, showed more aggression, thought to be due to 
neurological damage to the right-brain system that regulates aggressive affective states 
(Schore, 2003, p.295). It is argued that such damage switches off the prefrontal structures 
that regulate behaviour, and instead behaviour is regulated by more automatic subcortical 
structures, and, as a result, the behaviour of such children is often more socially 
unacceptable (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 2000). 
Effects of parenting. Parenting is important, not only for offspring survival, but 
also because the developing brain, mind, and body need particular types of experience to 
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facilitate optimal development. When these are missing, offspring are disadvantaged. 
The type of parenting a child receives has long term effects that continue into adulthood, 
and so adverse parenting appears to contribute to offspring depression and personality 
disorders. 
Thirty years ago, Baumrind (1971) examined how parents related to their children 
and how children reacted to four different types of parenting: authoritarian, permissive, 
authoritative, and uninvolved. Authoritarian parents valued obedience and absolute 
standards; they forcefully curbed their children, valued order, hard work and respect for 
authority. The effect of authoritarian parenting on children was that children tended to be 
anxious, withdrawn, unfriendly, and unhappy. When frustrated, boys of authoritarian 
parents tended to become hostile, and girls to give up. More recently, authoritarian 
parenting has been associated with shame in young girls (Mills, 2003). As adolescents, 
the offspring of authoritarian parents showed lower pro-social behaviour, less ego 
development, and poorer results on cognitive tasks (Baumrind, 1991). 
Permissive parents, in contrast, tended to make few demands on their children. 
They allowed their children to regulate their own activities, and did not encourage them 
to obey externally defined standards. Their children tended to be moody, dependent, 
have low social skills, poor self-control and emotion-regulation, and were rebellious and 
defiant when challenged. These children tended to show low persistence during 
challenging tasks and were often antisocial. 
Authoritative parents directed their children's activities, but in a rational way. 
They encouraged verbal give and take and valued both autonomous self-will and 
disciplined conformity. Their children tended to be independent, friendly, self-confident, 
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were able to master tasks, and had well developed social skills. 
Finally, uninvolved parents, also named rejecting/neglecting parents, demanded 
little of their children and responded minimally to them - to the point of neglect. Their 
children felt unloved and were emotionally detached (Baumrind, 1971, 1989). As 
adolescents, offspring of rejecting/neglecting parents were less mature, lacked self-
regulation, showed more externalizing problems and abused drug and alcohol more 
(Baumrind, 1991). Other studies showed links between lax, erratic, and harsh parenting 
and children's antisocial behaviour (Patterson, Debaryshe, & Ramsey, 1989; Patterson, 
Reid, & Dishion, 1992) and between adverse parenting by fathers and increased offspring 
aggression, academic failure, and rejection by peers (Stover & Berkowitz, 2005). 
Adolescents of 'uninvolved fathers' displayed more 'neurotic tendencies' than 
adolescents whose fathers gave them more time and attention (Hirayama & Ochanomizu, 
2001). 
Other studies confirmed how important parenting was in promoting offspring 
emotional wellbeing (Cole, Michel, & O'Donnell Tetti, 1994). One study showed that 
the father was "critically involved in the development of the toddlers' regulation of 
aggression" (Schore, 2003, p 276); another showed that attachment to the mother 
predicted less long term psychological distress, and attachment to father predicted better 
long term social adjustment (Hannum, 2004). 
The effects of parenting on offspring extends beyond childhood and adolescence 
into adulthood. For example, in comparison to the offspring of other parenting types, the 
adult offspring of authoritative parents displayed more psychosocial maturity and 
achieved greater academic success (Steinberg, Elmen, & Mounts, 1989); they showed 
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better mental adjustment, were more independent and self-controlled, as well as being 
more empathic and caring for others (Gersho, 1999). As adults, offspring of authoritative 
parenting had better quality marital relationships. They showed less anger, aggression, 
possessiveness or jealousy towards their partners. They were also more nurturing of their 
partners than were the offspring of authoritarian or permissive parents, who showed 
poorer marital adjustment (Gersho, 1999). 
Whilst some of the long term effects of parenting were physiological (Schore, 
2003), or emotional (Hannum, 2004), Young claimed that these early experiences also 
have cognitive outcomes and give rise to maladaptive schemas. As yet, the role of these 
cognitive outcomes and their interaction with the other elements of Young's model of 
psychopathogenesis, namely, parenting and offspring emotions, have not been 
investigated together. 
Interaction Effects between Parenting, Offspring Schemas and Emotions Studies have 
looked at the relationship between parenting and offspring emotions (Baumrind, 1971, 
1989; Neuharth, 1998) or have demonstrated links between cognitions and depression 
(Beck, 1976; Cole, Jacquez, & Maschman, 2001; Gerlsma, Emmelkamp, & Arrindell, 
1990; Golin, Sweeny, & Schaeffer, 1981; Ingram & Ritter, 2000; Mason & Hargreaves, 
2001). Other studies have shown links between childhood experiences and adult 
depression or anxiety (Beck, 1976; Gerlsma et al., 1990; Ingram & Ritter, 2000; Persons 
& Rao, 1985) or have demonstrated links between childhood trauma and later depression 
(Novaco & Chemtob, 1998,2002; Riggs et al, 1992; Koeningsberg, et al., 2000). Such 
studies focused on the schema-emotion link (Beck et al., 1985; Clark et al., 1994), on the 
parenting-emotion link (Novaco & Chemtob, 1998,2002; Riggs et al., 1992; 
Koeningsberg, et al., 2000; Schore, 1994); or the link between attachment and schemas 
(Platts, Tyson, & Mason, 2002). None explored the interrelationships between all three 
variables: parenting, offspring schemas, and offspring emotions. 
A fuller picture of these interrelationships is needed if the effects of adverse early 
parenting on the development of offspring cognitive schemas (EMSs) are to be better 
understood; and if the relationships between parenting and offspring later depression, 
anxiety, and trait anger are to be explained. This was the task undertaken in Study 3. 
Aims 
Study 3 used Young's model about the interrelationships between the specific 
types of adverse early parenting, specific offspring EMSs, and later anger, depression or 
anxiety, and had four main aims. The first was to explore the psychometric properties of 
the untested Young Parenting Inventory in order to discover whether the fifteen factor 
types found in the YSQ would be found in the YPI, together with two additional types, as 
Young expected. The second aim was to discover whether what a person reports of how 
he or she was parented relates to maladaptive cognitive schemas in adult offspring, and 
whether, as Young claimed, specific types of parenting relate to particular offspring 
schemas. The third aim was to explore any relationships between specific parenting 
practices as remembered by offspring, and offspring anger, depression or anxiety. The 
final aim was to explore any interrelationship between remembered parenting practices, 
offspring schemas, and offspring anger, depression and anxiety. The hypotheses that 
flowed from these aims are presented next. 
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Hypotheses 
Given that Young et al. (2003) claimed that there are 17 types of adverse parenting, 
it was expected: 
Hypothesis 1: 
That an exploratory principal components analysis would show 17 YPI Parenting 
Types, and these would accord with those designated by Young (1990) (such as 
Emotional Deprivation, Abandonment, Mistrust and Abuse, and so on) and two 
additional types. 
Given that Young et al. (2003) expected that each type of adverse parenting would be 
linked to a specific type of offspring schema, it was expected: 
Hypothesis 2. 
That there would be significant, positive, correlations between scores for 
offspring Y S Q Schema types and the equivalent YPI parenting types, and that 
these would be generally higher than the correlation between YPI parenting types 
and other schemas. For example, YPI Subjugation would correlate with Y S Q 
Subjugation schema scores; YPI Failure with Y S Q Failure, and so on. 
Partial correlation analyses of Study 1 data showed that particular offspring Y S Q 
schemas were closely associated with particular emotions, for instance, that YSQ 
Entitlement related to Anger, and that YSQ Subjugation related to Depression. 
Subsequent discriminant analyses identified a second set of schemas that could be 
combined as independent factors to distinguish between those high and low on each 
emotion. As the current study was aimed at generally establishing if there was any 
evidence that schemas could mediate the relationship between experiences of parenting 
and current emotion, it was thought better to rely on those schemas that in combination 
had proved capable of predicting emotional level. Consequently, it was decided to select 
those YPI factors that mirrored the schemas which had shown themselves, in combination, 
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able to predict high and low emotion from the discriminant analyses, rather than those that 
mirrored the schemas that had been demonstrated to be most highly correlated with each 
emotion. It was expected that, providing the YPI factors emerged from the YPI scale as 
Young et al. had predicted, those YPI factors that corresponded to the schemas identified 
in Study 1 could be combined to discriminate between high and low offspring emotions in 
the same manner as had the YSQ schemas. In detail it was expected 
Hypothesis 3 
that the following YPI parenting factors - Mistrust / Abuse, Insufficient Self-
Control, Entitlement, Subjugation and Failure - would, in combination, be good 
predictors of Trait Anger. 
Corresponding hypotheses were that YPI Social Isolation, Dependency / 
Incompetence, Subjugation, Mistrust & Abuse, and Abandonment would predict 
offspring Depression, and that YPI Entitlement, Vulnerability, Subjugation, 
Defectiveness / Shame and Self sacrifice would predict offspring Anxiety. 
It should be recognised that using the YPI parenting factors based on the schemes found in 
Study 1 was a reasonably conservative test of the hypotheses as the best set of schemas to 
predict each emotion in the current study was unlikely to be exactly the same. The 
expected relationships between parenting and offspring emotions are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Expected Relationships between Parenting and Offspring Emotions. 
Rationale for Hypothesis 4. 
The final hypothesis combines Beck's cognitive specificity model with Young's 
model. Whereas Beck saw the connection between offspring schema and depression and 
anxiety, Young (1990) saw a connection between offspring schemas and earlier adverse 
parenting experiences. This seems to suggest that adverse parenting gives rise to 
offspring schemas, which in turn give rise to emotional disorders. In this way, the effect 
of adverse parenting on offspring emotions is mediated through offspring schemas. 
Given that Study 1 revealed that particular sets of offspring maladaptive schemas 
could, in combination, predict offspring Trait Anger, Depression an Anxiety, and given 
that Young et al. claim that particular types of parenting are specifically related to 
particular maladaptive schemas, the following hypothesis was developed. 
Hypothesis 4 
It was expected that offspring cognitive schemas (EMSs) would mediate the 
relationship between parenting type and offspring Anger, Depression and 
Anxiety. 
Figure 4 shows the expected mediation of the parenting-offspring emotion relationship 
by offspring schemas. 
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Abandonment 
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Figure 4. Expected relationships between parenting, offspring schemas and emotions. 
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Method 
Participants 
There were 146 non-clinical adult participants, 36 men (25%) and 110 women 
(75%). Participants were approached individually in public settings: shops, libraries, 
canteens, offices, workplaces, tertiary institutions, and in a soup kitchen. Their ages 
ranged from 18-50 and over, with a median age of 40 years. Details are provided in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 
Age and Gender Distribution 
Age Groups n % Men Women 
18-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50 - above 
Total 
16 
24 
24 
35 
47 
148 
11% 
17% 
16% 
24% 
32% 
100% 
5 
1 
7 
6 
17 
37 
11 
23 
17 
29 
30 
111 
Measures of Emotions 
State Trait Anger Scale (STAS). As described in Study 1, the STAS was used to 
assess level of Trait Anger. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS), as described in 
Study 1, was used to assess levels of Depression and Anxiety over the last seven days. 
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Measures of Cognitive Schemas 
Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-S1). Cognitive schemas were assessed using 
the YSQ as described in Study 1. 
Instrument to Tap Recalled Parenting 
Young Parenting Inventory (YPI). The YPI is a 72 item scale (Appendix Q). 
Young (1990) identified 17 types of negative parenting. In the present study, these 
categories of adverse parenting are referred to as parenting types. Young gave each 
parenting type the same name as the YSQ schema to which it was thought to relate. For 
example, Young thought that if parents abandoned a child, either by not being available, 
or by leaving home, the child would be likely to develop an 'Abandonment Schema.' 
When Young formulated the YPI, he included two additional parenting types not found in 
the YSQ-S1: Negativity, and Approval Seeking. The YPI Parenting types are described 
in Table 13. 
Participants were given the instructions: "Listed below are statements that you 
might use to describe your parents. Please read each statement and decide how well it 
describes your parents. Choose the highest rating from 1 to 6 that describes your mother, 
then your father, when you were a child, and write the number in the spaces beside each 
statement. If someone substituted as your mother or father, please rate the scale for that 
person. If you did not have a mother or father, leave the appropriate column blank." 
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Table 13 
Young's Parenting Types, Descriptions and Exemplar Items 
YPI Type Description 
1 Emotional 
Deprivation 
Parents treated child as someone 
special. 
2 Abandonment 
3 Mistrust /Abuse Parent betrayed child's trust. 
Parent was moody, 
unpredictable or an alcoholic. 
Vulnerability / 
H a r m 
Dependence / 
Incompetence 
Defectiveness / 
Shame 
Failure 
8 Subjugation 
9 Self-Sacrifice 
10 Unrelenting 
Standards 
11 Entitlement 
12 Insufficient Self-
Control 
13 Enmeshment 
14 Emotional 
Inhibition 
15. Punitiveness 
16 Negativity 
Parent overprotected the child. 
Parent did not foster child's 
independence. 
Parent was very critical. 
Parent indicated that s/he 
expected child to be a failure in 
life. 
Parent did what s/he wanted 
regardless of the child's needs. 
Parent sacrificed him/herself for 
others and was unhappy. 
Parent was a perfectionist in 
many areas. 
Parent spoiled and overindulged 
the child. 
Parent was undisciplined and 
gave child little structure. 
Parent did not allow child to 
have a separate identity. 
Parent was uncomfortable 
expressing affection or 
vulnerability. 
Parent was punitive. 
Parent was negative. 
Exemplar 
17 Approval Seeking Parent placed an emphasis on 
what others thought. 
He/She listened to me, understood me, 
shared feelings with me.*(Reverse 
scored) 
S/he withdrew or left m e alone for 
extended periods. 
S/he lied to me, deceived me, or 
betrayed me. 
S/he worried excessively that I would 
get hurt. 
S/he made me feel I couldn't rely on 
m y decisions or judgements. 
S/he criticized me a lot 
S/he treated m e as if was stupid or 
untalented. 
S/he controlled my life so that I had 
little freedom of choice. 
S/he was unhappy a lot and relied on 
m e for support and understanding. 
S/he made me feel that almost nothing I 
did was quite good enough. 
S/he didn't teach me that I had 
responsibilities to other people. 
Provided very little discipline or 
structure for me. 
We were so close that we understood 
each other perfectly. 
S/he rarely expressed anger. 
S/he blamed people when things went 
wrong. 
S/he focused on the negative aspects of 
life or things going wrong. 
S/he was concerned with social status 
and appearance. 
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Each YPI item was answered for both parents. Items were responded to on a six -
point Likert Scale Rating Scale, 1 = Completely untrue, through to 6 = Describes him/her 
perfectly. Scores range from 72 - 432. Higher scores indicate higher levels of negative 
parenting. Because the first five items were phrased in a positive manner e.g., "Loved 
me, treated me as someone special," they were reverse coded. 
Where there were missing data on DASS or STAS, an individual's mean score for 
that subscale was substituted. With the YPI, if no scores were completed for mother or 
father (indicating parent was absent or had died), the missing scores were not replaced. 
One participant did not return scores for Mother, and four participants did not return 
scores for fathers, so they were excluded from any analysis involving behaviour of that 
parent. 
The psychometric properties and factor structures of the YPI had not been 
examined previously, so the first task in Study 3 was to explore the factor structure of the 
YPI to ascertain whether any identified factors conformed to the parenting types expected 
by Young (1990). 
Procedure 
Ethics permission was sought from the University of Ballarat Ethics Committee. 
Once granted, participants were approached individually, and if they agreed to consider 
completing the questionnaire, they were handed a copy to complete in private and to 
return by post anonymously to the researcher in a stamped, pre-addressed envelope. 
Questionnaires were composed of the Demographics Survey, DASS, STAS; YSQ-S, and 
YPI. Two versions of the questionnaire were prepared. In the first version, the 
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demographics questions and the DASS and STAS were presented, then the YSQ-S 1, 
followed by the YPI. In the second version the demographics question, DASS and STAS 
were presented as before, but the YPI preceded the YSQ-S 1. The copies of two versions 
were shuffled before being distributed to participants, thereby ensuring a random 
distribution of questionnaires. All participants received a $2 'Scratchy' lottery ticket in 
recognition of the time they contributed to the study. Data were analyzed using SPSS 
10.0 and AMOS-4 (Byrne, 1991). 
Results 
Descriptives of YPI 
The mean and standard deviation of the YPI are given for Total Father and Total 
Mother scores. This is shown in Table 14. The possible range for each parent was 72 -
432. 
Table 14 
Descriptives for Total YPI Scores for Mothers and Fathers. 
Total YPI Scores 
Total Father 
Total Mother 
N 
142 
145 
Mean 
151.54 
148.61 
SD 
55.08 
31.51 
Principal components analysis of YPI. Initially, a principal components analysis 
was made of all responses for both parents together, using Varimax rotation with Kaiser 
Normalization (Eigen values > 1). Rotation of YPI scores for both parents converged in 
26 iterations, producing 15 factors. The spread of the 144 items across factors was 
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uneven, ranging from 40-41 items, for Factors 1 and 2, to only one item for Factors 10 
and 14. Fifty percent of the variance was explained by the first six components. The 
other nine components explained only 20% of the variance. The scree test indicated that 
most items loaded on the first five factors. The first two major factors were composed 
either of all mother items or all father items. 
When identifying components in a principal components analysis, it is advisable 
that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy be at least 0.6 or 
higher (Coakes 8c Steed, 1999). The KMO for mothers' and fathers' YPI scores together, 
was 0.19, which was very low, and indicated that factors should not be sought. 
Given that the first two factors contained only mother items or father items, and 
that mother and father parenting styles are often distinctive, it was decided to analyze 
mothers' and fathers' parenting styles separately. When these additional separate 
principal components factor analyses were run for each parent, again using Varimax 
rotation with Kaiser Normalization, mothers' and fathers' factors both converged in three 
iterations. The KMO sampling adequacy for mothers' scores alone was 0.87; and for 
fathers' scores alone 0.89, both considered 'meritorious' levels of sampling adequacy 
(Coakes & Steed, 1999). Both mothers' and fathers' parenting provided 15 factors. As 
before, most items loaded onto the first five factors, and numerous lower-order factors 
comprised just one item. While there were nests of items that reflected Young's expected 
parenting types, they did not emerge as distinctive factors, either for mothers or for 
fathers, as had occurred with YSQ items. 
At this point a choice had to be made about how to proceed. The choices were 
either to examine the scree plot and cut off the number of factors at the elbow, or simply 
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to seek roughly equal factors which accounted for the most variability. Whilst the scree 
option provided five factors each for mothers' and five for fathers' parenting, in each case 
most items loaded onto the first two factors, with the lower level factors having only a 
small number of items on them. On balance, it was decided that, in this initial analysis, 
because the participant group was small, it would be better to retain only the two 
principal factors for each parent, even though some of the data on specificity would be 
lost (Harvey, personal communication, August, 2005). 
Before undertaking a second PCA on the Mothers' and Fathers' responses, it was 
decided that all items with extraction scores of less than 0.40 would be removed to 
enhance factorability. The amended scales and the removed items are shown in 
Appendix R. Eighteen items were removed for mother's parenting; this gave a KMO of 
0.92. Fifteen items were removed for fathers, the resulting KMO index being 0.93. 
When the two new principal components analyses were undertaken, one each for 
mothers' and fathers' parenting, again using Varimax rotation, each analysis sought two 
factors. Table 15 provides a summary of the Mothers' and Fathers' Factors. It provides 
details of all items that loaded onto each component; a description of each factor, and 
examples of the types of items associated with each factor. Full details of the content of 
all items that loaded onto the two father factors and two mother factors are shown in 
Appendix Q. 
The two mothers' factors were labelled Rejecting Mother, and Controlling 
Mother. Similarly, the father factors were Rejecting Father, and Controlling Father. 
Although items included in the mothers' and fathers' factors were not identical, there was 
sufficient overlap not to make it worthwhile selecting different names for the factors. For 
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example, all of the 24 items of Rejecting Mothers were also found among the 33 
Rejecting Father items; and 16 of the 24 Controlling Mother items were found among the 
21 Controlling Father items. For this reason, the shared themes are acknowledged in the 
names of factors. There are subtle differences, however. Rejecting Mothers tend to see 
their offspring as defective, whereas Rejecting Fathers were unloving. Controlling 
Mothers seemed more negative, while Controlling Fathers were more anxious and 
judgmental. These common elements and differences are shown in Appendix Q. 
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Table 15 
Summary of Parenting Factors, Description of Factor and Exemplar Items 
Parenting Type Description 
Mother Factors 
1. Rejecting Mother 
(24 items: M22, M24, Ml, 
M23,M28,M11,M67,M2, 
M27, M9, M3, M13, M4, 
M29, M30, M21, Ml 1, M12, 
M25,M5,M8.M68,M52, 
M7) 
2. Controlling Mother 
(24 items: M60, M43, M39, 
M54, M42, M71, M46, M20, 
M41, M53, Ml 8, M17, M57, 
M19, M31, M32, M40, M65, 
M59, M62, M70, M58, M69, 
M16) 
Mother was 
rejecting and 
abusive. 
Mother was 
demanding and 
controlling. 
Exemplars 
22. Made m e feel unloved or rejected. 
24. Made m e ashamed of myself in important 
details. 
1. Loved me, treated m e as someone special. 
(Reverse scored) 
23. Treated m e as if there was something wrong 
with m e 
28. Expected me to be a failure in life. 
11. Abused m e physically, emotionally, or 
sexually. 
60. Had to have everything under control. 
43. Placed more importance on doing things 
well than on having fun or relaxing. 
39. Was a perfectionist in many areas; things 
had to be 'just so.' 
54.1 felt that I didn't have m y own sense of 
direction while I was growing up. 
Father Factors 
1. Rejecting Father 
(33 Items: F22, FI, F3, F30, 
F4, F2, F29, F28, F67, F25, 
F9,F26,F23,F21,F48,F24, 
F5,F7,F47,F27,F11,F68, 
F57, F10, F49, F52, F40, 
F51,F13,F8,F12,F59,F38, 
F54)., 
Father did not 
show love to 
child or rejected 
his child. 
22. Made m e feel unloved or rejected. 
1. Loved me, treated m e as someone special. 
Reverse scored) 
3. Gave m e helpful guidance and direction. 
(Reverse scored) 
30. Did what he/she wanted, regardless of m y 
needs. 
4. Listened to me, understood me, shared 
feelings with me. Reverse scored) 
2. Spent time with m e and paid attention to me. 
^Reverse scored) 
2 Controlling Father 
(21 Items: F41,F60,F43, 
F39,F31,F42,F18,F17, 
F65,F32.F20,F46,F71, 
F70,F15,F66,F69,F19, 
F14,F72,F53) 
Father was 
strict and 
controlling and 
impatient and 
task oriented. 
41. Had strict, rigid rules of right and wrong. 
60. Had to have everything under control. 
43. Placed more importance on doing things 
well than on having fun or relaxing. 
39. Was a perfectionist in many areas; 
things had to be 'just so.' 
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Introduction to Final Stage of Analysis 
The relationships between parenting factors, offspring schemas and offspring 
emotions were explored with path analyses, using AMOS-4. It was recognised that the 
sample size was comparatively small for the models tested but the main aims were to 
obtain some insight into the extent to which parenting types and schemas, in combination, 
could predict emotion, and whether the schemas mediated any effect of parenting on 
emotion. 
Three path analyses were performed using three recursive models, one for each 
emotion, Anxiety, Depression, and Trait Anger. Each model had four exogenous 
variables, comprising the two mother and father factors that were identified in the 
principal components analysis of the YPI. These replaced the seventeen parenting types 
that were anticipated in the original hypotheses. Only four linkages were possible 
between the four exogenous variables, because the two mother factors were orthogonal to 
each other, as were the two father factors, so these relationships were excluded from the 
analyses. 
For each analysis, the five schemas identified in Study 1 as being the best set able 
to discriminate between those high and low on the emotion were selected as potentially 
endogenous / mediating variables. The three predicted models are shown in Figures 5, 6, 
and 7. 
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Rejecting Mother 
Controlling Mother 
Rejecting Father 
Controlling Father 
Offspring 
Mistrust/Abuse 
Offspring 
Trait Anger 
Figure 5. Path model of the predicted relationship between parenting, offspring schemas, 
and anger. 
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Figure 6. Path model of the predicted relationship between parenting, offspring schemas, 
and depression. 
137 
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Controlling Mother 
Rejecting Father 
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Total 
Anxiety 
Figure 7. Path model of the predicted relationship between parenting, offspring schemas, 
and anxiety. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Descriptives for scores for Total Anger, Anxiety, and Depression are shown in 
Table 16. The possible range for Total Anger was 15 - 60, while the possible range for 
Total Anxiety and Total Depression was 0 - 21. 
Table 16 
Mean and SDs for Total Anger, Total Depression, and Total Anxiety 
Total Scores Mean SD 
Total Trait Anger 23.38 5.78 
Total Depression 3.22 3.42 
Total Anxiety 2.08 2.43 
N=144 ~~ 
Whilst Controlling and Rejecting Father were orthogonal factors, as were 
Controlling and Rejecting Mothers, there was a significant correlation between 
Controlling Fathers factors scores and Controlling Mothers factor scores (r = .44), and 
between Rejecting Fathers and Rejecting Mothers (r = .67). 
The three path analyses (AMOS-4) undertaken to explore the models proposed are 
shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7. Predictor variables were Mothers' Parenting and Fathers' 
Parenting types, and offspring maladaptive schemas, and the criterion variables in each 
model were Offspring Trait Anger, Depression, and Anxiety. Standardized parenting 
factor scores were used in all path analyses. As originally planned, the schemas used in 
each path analysis were those found in Study 1 to discriminate between those high and 
low on each emotion. The discriminant function coefficients were used to identify the 
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five schemas which loaded most highly on the discriminant function which successfully 
distinguished between those high and low on each emotion based on a median split. 
Effects of Adverse Parenting 
The path analyses of the various parenting/offspring-schema/offspring-emotion 
models are now considered. The total effect of parenting on offspring emotions is the 
sum of direct effects of parenting plus any indirect effects mediated by the five schemas 
included in the model. The total effects of parenting and schemas together accounted for 
22% of the variance of Trait Anger; 26% of the variance of Depression; and 39% of the 
variance of Anxiety. The following sections describe the effects of the parenting types on 
both schemas and emotions, the impact of the schemas on emotions and the relative 
contributions of both parenting and schemas to the scores on the three emotions scales. 
Effects of Parenting on Schemas 
The direct effects of parenting on offspring schemas, as determined by the path 
analysis, are shown in Table 17. It should be noted that several schemas featured in more 
than one model. The effects of parenting on these schemas in Table 17 is therefore 
repeated in a number of instances. All parenting types directly affected at least some of 
the schemas associated with each offspring emotion. The strongest direct effects were: 
Rejecting Mothers on offspring Mistrust and Abuse, Subjugation, and Abandonment. 
Controlling Mothers contributed significantly to offspring Subjugation, Social Isolation, 
Self-sacrifice and Vulnerability. Rejecting Fathers contributed significantly to five 
offspring schemas, Social Isolation, Vulnerability, Defectiveness and Shame, Failure, 
and Mistrust and Abuse, while Controlling Father contributed to offspring Entitlement 
and Mistrust and Abuse. Given that the variables were measured on different scales, 
standardized coefficients are reported in order to make units comparable (Klem, 1995), 
however, the tests of significance are performed on the unstandardized regression 
weights. 
Table 17 
Direct Effects of Parenting on Offspring Schemas: Standardized Regression Weights 
Y S Q Schemas 
Related to: 
Offspring Trait Anger 
Mistrust and Abuse 
Insufficient 
Self-Control 
Entitlement 
Subjugation 
Failure 
Offspring Depression 
Social Isolation 
Rejecting 
Mother 
.28** 
.17 
.14 
.26** 
.15 
.06 
Controlling 
Mother 
.06 
.08 
.06 
.30*** 
.10 
.22** 
Rejecting 
Father 
.22* 
.15 
.06 
.15 
.28** 
.41*** 
Controlling 
Father 
.16* 
.02 
.20* 
.02 
.02 
.00 
Dependency / Incompetence 
Subjugation 
Mistrust and Abuse 
Abandonment 
Offspring Anxiety 
Entitlement 
Vulnerability 
Subjugation 
Defectiveness / Shame 
Self-sacrifice 
.09 
.26 ** 
** 
.28 
.24* 
 
.06 
.30*** 
.06 
.10 
.17 
.15 
.22* 
.18 
.00 
.02 
.16* 
.09 
.14 
.03 
.26** 
.18 
.11 
.06 
.19* 
.30*** 
.14 
.24** 
.06 
42*** 
.15 
.27** 
.16 
.20* 
-.06 
.02 
.11 
.16 
N=142; *p<05, **p<01, ***p<001 
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How Parenting related to Specific Offspring Emotions 
The next issue was to examine whether parenting related in any way to specific 
offspring emotions. Analysis using AMOS-4 allows the identification of indirect and 
direct relationships between variables. The direct relationships between the two mothers' 
and two fathers' adverse parenting types and offspring emotions (Anger, Depression, and 
Anxiety) are summarised in Table 18. 
Only two types of parenting were directly linked to specific offspring emotions. 
Rejecting Fathers predicted offspring Anger (p = .23 ) and Controlling Mothers predicted 
both offspring Depression (p = .17 ) and Anxiety, (p = .25). 
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Table 18 
Direct Effects of Mothers' and Fathers' Parenting on Offspring Trait Anger, Depression, 
and Anxiety 
Mother and Father YPI Factors 
Rejecting Mother 
Controlling Mother 
Rejecting Father 
Controlling Father 
Rejecting Mother 
Controlling Mother 
Rejecting Father 
Controlling Father 
Rejecting Mother 
Controlling Mother 
Rejecting Father 
Controlling Father 
B 
Offspring 
-.88 
-.17 
1.29 
.12 
Offspring 
-.34 
.53 
.32 
-.36 
SEB 
Trait Anger 
.60 
.49 
.59 
.47 
Depression 
.33 
.27 
.34 
.26 
Offspring Anxiety 
.18 
.60 
-.10 
-.32 
.22 
.19 
.23 
.18 
P 
-.14 
-.03 
.23* 
.02 
-.11 
.17* 
.11 
-.12 
.08 
.25** 
-.04 
-.14 
N=146; *p<05, **p<.01, ***p<001 
Effects of Schemas on Offspring Emotions 
The schemas had been chosen because each set, in combination, had been shown 
capable of discriminating between those high and low in each emotion in Study 1. The 
results of a path analysis pertaining to the effects of offspring schemas on offspring 
emotions are presented in Table 19. 
The schemas that significantly predicted Trait Anger were Entitlement and 
Insufficient Self Control, while Social Isolation and Dependency predicted Depression, 
and Vulnerability predicted Anxiety. Given that these schemas had been selected on the 
basis that each set could predict high and low levels of each emotion these were weak 
results. To establish the extent to which their contribution had been reduced by the 
inclusion of the parenting types it is necessary to look at the direct and indirect effects of 
the latter variables on the three emotions. 
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Table 19 
Effect of Offspring Schemas on Offspring Anger, Depression and Anxiety; Standardized 
Regression Weights 
Y S Q Schema 
Mistrust and Abuse 
Insufficient Self-Control 
Entitlement 
Subjugation 
Failure 
Social Isolation 
Dependency / Incompetence 
Subjugation 
Mistrust and Abuse 
Abandonment 
Entitlement 
Vulnerability 
Subjugation 
Defectiveness / Shame 
Self-sacrifice 
Trait Anger 
.15 
.17* 
.23** 
-.03 
.13 
-.03 
.15 
.23** 
-.03 
Depression 
.00 
.11 
.26** 
.23** 
.11 
.00 
.14 
.// 
Anxiety 
-.04 
.00 
.00 
-.04 
A A*** 
.00 
.14* 
.12 
N=142; *p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Effects of Parenting, on Offspring Emotions 
The various associations between parenting types and offspring Total Trait Anger, 
Total Depression, and Total Anxiety are shown in Table 20. The direct, indirect or 
mediated effects, and total effects of parenting on offspring Trait Anger, Total 
Depression and Total Anxiety are all displayed. 
Table 20 
Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Parenting on Offspring Emotions 
Exogenous Trait Anger Depression Anxiety 
Variables 
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect 
.12 .08 .05 
.39** .25** .13 
.20 -.04 .24** 
.14 -.14 .00 
N=142; *p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001 
To ascertain whether schemas had a mediating effect, as Young implied they 
would, the total effect of both parenting and schemas was compared to the direct effect of 
parenting. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that when the total effect is significant and 
the direct effect is also significant, this indicates limited mediation. Where the direct 
effect is reduced to zero, or close to zero, this is evidence of mediation (Baron & Kenny, 
V??f*"g "-03 "-14 -12 -.01 -.11 .10 
Mother 
Controlling
 m _m Q4 28s|c* 1?* n 
Mother 
Rejecting
 M** ^ 1Q 2g^ 1Q 19+ 
Father 
Controlling Q9 .02 .07 -.10 -.12 .02 
Father 
1986). Where the direct effect is reduced but not eliminated there is a suggestion of 
partial mediation. 
From the above table it can be seen that the effect of a Rejecting Father on Anger 
was largely direct, with little evidence of mediation by the schemas employed in the 
analysis. In contrast, the effect of Rejecting Father on Depression and Anxiety was 
largely mediated by the schemas. Controlling Mother had a significant direct and 
unmediated impact on Depression and Anxiety. 
Given the small sample size and the complexity of the models any conclusions 
must be carefully drawn. Overall it appears that there was evidence of direct and 
mediated effects of parenting ratings. Of the 12 possible paths between parenting and 
emotions (four types and three emotions) only five showed evidence of significant 
effects. Of these, three were largely direct and two were mediated. Furthermore, there 
was evidence of parenting influencing schemas that were not strongly linked to any 
emotions (e.g., mistrust and abuse, self-sacrifice), as well as schemas that were associated 
with emotions that were not predicted by parenting (e.g., dependency & incompetence). 
It is clear that the linkages between parenting, schemas and emotion are more complex 
than Young envisaged. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 are discussed in two parts. First, there is some discussion 
about the qualities of the YPI scale, next the types of parenting discerned by the YPI are 
examined. Then, there is some discussion about how parenting appears to relate to 
offspring schemas; how parenting affects offspring emotions; and what the inter-
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relationships between parenting, offspring emotions and offspring cognitions are. 
Finally, there is some discussion of Young's overall model. 
Young's Parenting Inventory 
As a whole, the YPI was reliable. While Young (1990) assumed that it was 
composed of 17 parenting types, each matching one of his YSQ schema types and the 
two additional ones, no such neat YPI groupings were found. The clearest finding was 
that participants distinguished between mothers' parenting and fathers' parenting, which 
did not fit Young's model. 
When Young's expected parenting types did not emerge, two main components 
were obtained for each of mothers' and fathers' parenting. These emerged as Rejecting 
Mother, Rejecting Father, Controlling Mother, and Controlling Father. The themes found 
for fathers' and mothers' parenting were essentially similar, with some subtle, but 
important, differences. On the basis of items associated with each factor, the 
characteristics of each parenting types are summarized in Table 21. First, the specific 
features of each parenting type, then the rejecting or controlling themes, then themes 
common to all groups are shown are listed. To aid the reader, common cognitive themes 
are presented in red; cognitive themes associated with rejecting parents are presented in 
blue; cognitive themes associated with controlling parents in pink. Those themes 
associated uniquely with one parenting type are presented in orange, turquoise, green and 
olive green. 
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Table 21 
Characteristics of Rejecting and Controlling Parents 
REJECTING PARENTS CHARACTERISTICS CONTROLLING PARENTS CHARACTERISTICS 
Mother Father Mother Father 
ExclusiveThemes ExclusiveThemes Exclusive Themes Exclusive Themes 
Cold 
Hurtful 
Seif-ahs orbed 
Neglectful 
Unsupportive 
Undisciplined 
Remote 
Exploitative 
Conservative 
Pessimistic 
Conditional Love 
Enmeshed 
Angry-
Punitive 
Rejecting Themes Common to Both Parents Controlling Themes Common to Both Parents 
Rejecting 
Abusive 
Cruel 
Judgmental 
Unhelpful 
Lax 
Blaming 
Untruthful 
Unloving 
Moody 
Unaffectionate 
Dismissive 
Unpredictable 
Demanding 
Controlling 
Overprotective 
Status Seeking 
Impatient 
Fearful 
Undermining 
Competitive 
Rigid 
Perfectionist 
Patronizing / Overprotective 
Themes Common to All Parenting Types 
Critical 
Selfish 
Themes Common to Controlling Mothers and Rejecting Fathers 
Negative 
Overpowering 
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Characteristics of Rejecting and Controlling Parenting Types 
A general feature of all the adverse YPI parenting types was that these parents 
were seen by their offspring as critical, selfish, and perfectionist. The particular 
characteristics of the two main parenting types, Rejecting and Controlling parents, are 
discussed next. 
Rejecting Parents. Rejecting parents, both mothers and fathers, as well as being 
rejecting, tended to be viewed by their offspring as being abusive, cruel, blaming, and 
judgmental towards their offspring. They were unhelpful, lax, dismissive, and unloving. 
They tended not to be interested in their offspring, and did not want to spend time with 
them. They were moody and unpredictable towards their offspring, and did not provide 
structure and boundaries for them. From this, it appears that Rejecting parents were less 
concerned about their offspring's wellbeing, and more caught up in their own emotions. 
In addition, Rejecting Mothers and Rejecting Fathers each had particular characteristics. 
Rejecting Fathers were unsupportive, remote, exploitative, and undisciplined. Rejecting 
Mothers were hurtful, self-absorbed, neglectful, and cold. 
Because Rejecting parents were low on warmth, responsiveness, and control, they 
appear to be similar to Baumrind's category of uninvolved or 'Neglecting/Rejecting' 
parents. Both groups tended to leave their children to their own devices, did not 
structure, supervise, organize, discipline, or attend to their children, and may have even 
actively rejected their children (Baumrind, 1989). 
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Controlling parents. The specific features of Controlling parents, both fathers and 
mothers, were that they were demanding, controlling, and impatient towards their 
offspring. As well, they were undermining, fearful, competitive, and status-seeking. In 
addition to these generally controlling features, Controlling Fathers and Controlling 
Mothers each displayed some specific characteristics. Controlling Fathers were angry, 
impatient, punitive, and enmeshed. Controlling Mothers were overpowering, pessimistic, 
and conservative. Both types shared some of the characteristics of Baumrind's 
Authoritarian parents. 
When examining the items that loaded onto the two Controlling parents factors, it 
was clear that these parents were also somewhat anxious and fearful. This characteristic 
may, in part, explain their strong need for control. For instance, Controlling Fathers were 
overprotective of their offspring, perhaps because they feared that their offspring could 
not manage alone, or might get hurt. Controlling Fathers were also afraid that their 
offspring might reflect badly on them. Both Controlling Mothers and Controlling Fathers 
were concerned about being good enough. These features suggest that their need for 
control arose out of anxiety, particularly anxiety in relation to their relationships with 
others. 
Such anxious behaviour appears to be similar to that found in some categories of 
Neuharth's controlling parents. He found that many of the controlling parents he studied 
had experienced early trauma (Neuharth, 1998). For example, he showed that when 
compared with the wider community, four times as many of the controlling parents, as 
children, had had a parent die, three times as many of them had grown up in households 
with a parent who was an alcoholic or suffered from mental illness, and three times as 
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many of them had been sexually abused as children (Neuharth, 1998). This could explain 
Neuharth's (1998) observation that controlling families are run to please or protect one or 
both parents, rather than to foster optimal development in their offspring. 
Each of the four parenting factors produced in Study 3 subsumed several smaller 
factors. As a result, each overall factor reflected many different themes. A number of 
these sub-factors were reminiscent of types identified by Baumrind and Neuharth. 
Similarities between the different parenting types are shown in Table 22. 
While there were a few shared characteristics between Rejecting and Controlling 
parents, Rejecting Fathers and Controlling Mothers were both characteristically negative 
and overpowering, and, as is shown later, this combination appears to have a powerful 
effect on offspring. 
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Table 22 
Parenting Types with Similar Characteristics 
YPI Parenting Types 
identified in Study 3 
Rejecting Mother 
Rejecting 
Abusive 
Cold 
Rejecting Fathers 
Unsupportive 
Exploitative 
Controlling Mothers 
Demanding 
Rigid 
Conservative 
Controlling Fathers 
Enmeshed 
Angry 
Baumrind's Parenting 
Types 
Rejecting / Neglecting 
Rejecting / Neglecting 
Authoritarian 
Permissive 
Authoritarian 
Permissive 
Neuharth's Controlling 
Parenting Types 
Depriving Parents 
Using Parents 
Depriving Parents 
Using Parents 
Abusing Parents 
Perfectionistic Parents 
Cultlike Parents 
Using Parents 
Abusing Parents 
Smothering Parents 
Chaotic parents 
The Relationships between YPI Parenting Types and Offspring Characteristics 
Having examined the results of the different parenting types, the next step was to 
consider the links between these YPI parenting types and their offspring characteristics. 
These are determined in three stages: first, the link between adverse parenting and 
offspring cognitive development; second, the link between adverse parenting and 
offspring emotions; and third, the interrelationship between parenting, offspring 
cognitions and offspring emotions. 
Associations of parenting with offspring cognitions. The links between parenting 
and offspring depended not only on the type of parenting experienced, but also on 
whether it was the mother or father who rejected or controlled the offspring. There were 
few common associations involving Rejecting Mothers and Rejecting Fathers other than 
the association with Mistrust and Abuse, while Controlling Mothers and Controlling 
Fathers were not linked to any common schemas. Subjugation seemed to be a schema 
elicited by adverse mothering, while social isolation and vulnerability was associated 
with Controlling Mothers and Rejecting Fathers. Several schemas were linked to only one 
parenting type (e.g., Entitlement and a Controlling Father; Self-sacrifice and a 
Controlling Mother), and two schemas were not associated with any type of parenting: 
Insufficient self-control and Dependency and Incompetence. Again it is not easy to 
account for such complex patterns, but the study has confirmed that parenting types, 
albeit not those nominated by Young, are related to offspring cognitions. 
Associations of parenting with offspring emotions. Young's implied model was 
examined along the lines suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). They proposed ways of 
looking at mediation in which the independent variable predicts the mediator, which, in 
turn, predicts the dependent variable. Young's model implied that parenting influences 
offspring schemas, and in turn, these influence emotion. A path analysis showed that 
there were both direct and mediated effects of parenting on offspring emotions. Three of 
the significant associations of parenting with offspring emotions were direct and not 
mediated by cognitions while the association between Rejecting Father and offspring 
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Depression and Anxiety was mediated by cognitions, most probably by the schemas of 
Social Isolation and Vulnerability, respectively. 
Figure 8 shows the relationships found in Study 3 between parenting, offspring 
schemas, and offspring trait anger, depression and anxiety. Offspring schemas are shown 
in shaded boxes, direct effects of parenting are indicated with black lines, mediated 
effects are indicated with red lines. 
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Figure 8. Relationship between Parenting, Offspring Schemas, and Emotion. 
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Inter-relationships between parenting, offspring schemas and emotions. Young, after 
noting the role of schemas in depression and personality disorders, deduced the part 
played by parenting in the development of these cognitive schemas, yet he did not 
investigate the minutiae of these relationships. Study 3 has uncovered four general 
trends: 1) that parenting can relate directly to offspring schemas; 2) that schemas can 
relate directly to offspring emotions; 3) that the relationship between parenting and 
offspring emotions can be direct and unmediated; and 4) that the relationship between 
parenting and offspring emotions can be mediated by offspring cognitions. 
The specific effects of controlling parents seems to depend on whether the parent 
is a mother or father. It is surprising to find that these effects were different because most 
of the characteristics of Controlling Mothers were shared by Controlling Fathers. These 
differences suggest that it is specifically the fact that mother was controlling, and not the 
father, that contributes to offspring anxiety. When a mother was controlling, her children 
wanted more independence and distance from their mother. Having a conservative, 
pessimistic, anxious, controlling mother was directly linked to offspring Anxiety and 
Depression. This finding is consistent with a previous study that showed that anxious 
mothers were associated with behavioural inhibition and anxiety in their children 
(Manassis, Bradley, Goldberg, Hood, & Swinson, 1995). 
Similarly, the impact of Rejecting parents appears to depend on whether it is the 
father or mother who rejects the child. While it would be expected that rejection by a 
mother would have a stronger effect on offspring than rejection by a father, this was not 
demonstrated in Study 3. Certainly, being rejected by a mother is directly related to 
offspring being mistrustful of others, having a sense of abandonment, and subjugation, 
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but rejection by a father has more wide-ranging cognitive and emotional effects. It, too, 
is associated with offspring mistrust, but it is also related to offspring feeling vulnerable, 
socially isolated, and defective. It also is linked directly to offspring Trait Anger, and 
indirectly to offspring Depression and Anxiety. It is difficult to explain why the 
relationships between fathers' rejection and offspring schemas is so much stronger than 
the relationships with mothers' rejection. 
Study 3 also illustrated that particular elements of parenting may contribute 
specific effects. For example, as Figure 8 shows, offspring Depression is not only linked 
directly to a number of different cognitive schemas, but also to Controlling Mothers, and 
Rejecting Fathers. The characteristics that are shared by these two types of parents are 
that both are critical, overpowering and negative. This seems to suggest that it is 
precisely these elements of parental behaviour that may be related to offspring 
Depression. This finding is consistent with a study by Frye and Garber (2005) which 
showed that depression was linked to having critical parents. Perhaps it is the 
overpowering nature of these parents, coupled with the powerlessness of the offspring, 
that contributes to offspring Depression. This would be consistent with research that 
showed that parental 'psychological control' was linked to offspring depression (Soenens, 
Elliot, Goossens, Vansteenkiste, Luyten, & Duriez, 2005), and with Seligman's (1975) 
study that linked learned helplessness, in the presence of unavoidable adverse stimuli, to 
depression (Seligman, 1975). 
Also, Controlling Mothers and Rejecting Fathers were both associated with 
offspring Anxiety. However, while the relationship between Rejecting Father and 
offspring Anxiety was mediated by cognitions, the relationship between Controlling 
Mothers and offspring Anxiety was direct and unmediated. From this it seems that some 
elements of Rejecting Fathers makes a child feel vulnerable or defective and this makes 
the child anxious. After studying the specific characteristics of Rejecting Fathers, 
namely, that they are unsupportive and undisciplined and exploitative, it seems likely that 
these might well contribute to offspring feeling vulnerable. 
Offspring Trait Anger was directly predicted by having had a Rejecting Father. 
Additionally, the schema associated with Controlling Fathers, namely, Entitlement, was 
also related to offspring Trait Anger, as was Insufficient Self-control. The latter was not 
associated with any parenting type. Previous studies have shown a link between 
controlling parents and anger. For example, a study by Tronick, Ricks and Cohn (1982) 
showed that mothers who were overly controlling of their infants and persistently 
engaged with them, produced stressed offspring who showed 'insecure-resistant' 
attachment patterns, and, in separation situations, were angry and rejecting of their 
mothers. 
Explaining the Links with Parenting 
Young's original model suggested that particular types of parenting are related to 
to specific offspring maladaptive schemas, and that, in turn, these are related to specific 
emotional and psychological disorders. While the details of Young's model could not be 
tested in Study 3 because the types of parenting that Young expected did not emerge, 
modified models were examined. While these models followed the intent of Young's 
model, they only explored the associations with four parenting factors, so none of the 
three proposed overall models represented a full description of the relationship between 
parenting, offspring schemas, and offspring Trait Anger, Depression or Anxiety. 
Nonetheless, they did account for reasonable proportions of the total variance in Trait 
Anger, Depression, and Anxiety. This seems to indicate that Young's model has some 
merit. It confirms that both parenting and offspring schemas may contribute to offspring 
Anger, Depression and Anxiety. Because there are so many other variables not included, 
such as the effect of temperament, or the influence of attachment, to name but two 
possible influences, it would be unlikely that his model could be the final word on the 
causes of depression, anxiety or anger. Yet, even with a restricted number of variables, 
Young's model, in the amended form, can be seen to have been supported to some extent. 
When running a path analysis, it is possible, to reveal patterns, such as that 
parenting has both direct and indirect effects on offspring emotions. However, these 
patterns do not explain how these relationships might come about. Thus, even though 
Study 3 offers support for Young's view that some of the variability in offspring emotion 
can be accounted for by cognitions, and that mere are links between parenting and 
offspring emotions, some mediated through offspring cognitions, it does not explain how 
these different effects might come about. 
The next section seeks possible explanations for these direct and indirect parental 
influences. 
Indirect effect of parenting. The indirect effect of parenting on offspring 
emotions, that is, the effects mediated through cognitive schemas, as was found between 
Rejecting father and offspring Anxiety, can be acceptably accounted for by classical 
conditioning. Because emotional reactions are highly conditionable, any cognitions that 
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occur concurrently with emotional responses, can become Conditioned Stimuli (CS). In 
this way, when a parent treats offspring in ways that induce high emotions, this 
potentially provides ideal conditions for classical conditioning to take place. Any 
cognitions paired with such adverse parenting, can become a Conditioned Stimuli (CS) 
capable of inducing emotions. For example, a child, who is threatened by an parent, 
generally feels fear. If, whilst the parent is shouting, the child thinks, "I'm in danger," 
then the thought, "I'm in danger" can become a CS, on its own capable of eliciting fear. 
This mechanism does not satisfactorily explain the direct effects of parenting however. 
Direct Effects of Parenting. Study 3 clearly indicated that parenting can be 
directly related to offspring emotion. A direct link occurred between Rejecting Fathers 
and offspring Trait Anger, and between Controlling Mothers and offspring Depression 
and Anxiety. When parenting relates directly to an offspring emotion, there is no obvious 
cognitive component mediating the relation between parenting and offspring emotions, 
and hence no CS to elicit the emotion. Explaining this direct link is more difficult. 
The direct link between Rejecting Fathers and Controlling Mothers and offspring 
Depression could simply be an indication that schemas other than those examined in 
Study 3 are operating. However, given the comprehensive nature of the YSQ, it seems 
unlikely there are critical schemas omitted from the YSQ that would mediate the 
relationship between parenting and emotion. Alternatively, it is possible that the direct 
links with parenting could be the result of preverbal conditioning, as was argued by 
Young and his colleagues (Young et al., 2003), particularly so, because one of the 
features shared by these parents that could have contributed to preverbal conditioning, 
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was that they were both overpowering. This could have meant that, in the presence of an 
overpowering father or mother (UCS), a preverbal child might feel helpless (UCR) in 
response to the powerful non-verbal elements of the parent's behaviour, such as the 
parent's tone or volume of voice, facial expressions, or other body language. These non-
verbal stimuli could become CSs, so that, in the mere presence of an overpowering 
parent, this stimulus elicits the conditioned response. In this way, helplessness, as a CR, 
becomes directly associated with stimuli like a parent's tone of voice or body language. 
This means that when the offspring subsequently encounters stimuli of these kinds, these, 
too, trigger helplessness in the offspring. 
Specific Effects of Mothers and Fathers 
When Young discussed the effects of parenting, he did not seem to have been 
aware that there would be different effects of mothers' and fathers' adverse parenting. 
Some explanation as to why offspring respond differently to similar adverse treatment by 
mothers and fathers is needed. The next section discusses some of the possible factors 
that might contribute to these different responses. 
Offspring expectancies. A possible explanation of the different responses by 
offspring to similar behaviour by fathers and mothers could be that the behaviour 
manifested by the parent runs counter to what the offspring expects of them. By the age 
of seven most children are aware of social roles, such as the 'mother role' and the 'father 
role,' either through stories, play, the media, or experience of other families. These 
different expectations probably arise as the result of socialization (Goldman & Goldman, 
1985; Wemraub, Clemens, Sachloff, Ethridge, Gracely, & Myers, 1984). Through these 
experiences, children develop expectations about mothers and fathers. That is, they are 
acculturated to expect mothers to provide nurturance, and fathers to provide control. In 
fact, even as early as four years of age, children have some understanding of these roles 
(Weinraub et al., 1984). These expectations could explain why offspring respond 
differently to similar behaviour in fathers and mothers. 
In Study 3, the cognitive schemas associated with each type of parenting could be 
used to demonstrate these specific expectancies about parents. For instance, Rejecting 
Mothers were associated with offspring Abandonment. This suggests that offspring have 
an expectation that mothers should be close to offspring, and should nurture their 
offspring. An absence of nurturance from a father seems to be less important than an 
absence from a mother. Likewise, Rejecting Fathers were associated with offspring 
Defectiveness and Failure. This suggests that offspring expect fathers to accept their 
offspring. Offspring rejected by their fathers feel defective, but not being accepted by a 
mother does not have the same effect. It seems that being accepted by a mother is less 
important than not being accepted by a father. 
Offspring rejected by the father, seemed to think this was because they, the 
offspring, were not good enough. Consequently, they blamed themselves for causing the 
rejection. Feeling defective was associated with offspring depression. When offspring 
were rejected by the mother, they simply felt abandoned, not defective. 
When mothers were overly controlling, their offspring generally felt vulnerable, 
and believed that they must submit to powerful people. Some offspring appeared to 
believe that this treatment was unfair, and as a result, they wanted to punish others. But, 
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when fathers were overly controlling, probably because they were also enmeshed with 
their offspring and so indulged their offspring as well as controlling them, their offspring 
appeared to deduce that they were entitled to special treatment and indulgence from 
others as well. So, when other people did not indulge them, these offspring felt that their 
rights were being trampled, and strongly sought to defend and extend their rights. 
That there should be these distinctive effects from mothers' and fathers' parenting 
is not surprising, because mothers have been shown to exert specific influences on their 
6-year old offspring's cognitive behaviour and school performance (Coates & Lewis, 
1984); and likewise, fathers to have specific effects on emotional and cognitive behaviour 
of offspring (Hannum, 2004). 
Retrospective hindsight and state-dependent memory. As with any retrospective 
study, there is a possibility that some of the relationships identified are the result of 
hindsight, or perhaps a product of state dependent memory. It is quite possible that how a 
person was feeling at the time, or the mood the person was in at the time they completed 
a questionnaire, could play some part in directing their attention to remember certain 
events, but not others. Or in the case of state-dependent memory, a participant's current 
emotional state can influence what memories a person accesses at a particular time 
(Weston, 1999). In this way, present mood can link a person to earlier depressing or 
anxious memories. Likewise, current adult expectations about fathers' and mothers' 
roles, could restrict what memories a person accesses while responding to a 
questionnaire. For example, "Because I am depressed now, this is evidence that my 
father did not love me as he should have." In sum, when persons are acculturated to 
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expect mothers to be nurturing, or fathers to be controlling, they will measure their 
parents against these expectations, and by how they presently feel (Carlson, 1984). In 
addition, memories are also reinterpreted in the light of new information. This means 
that our memories are seldom accurate representations of the past, but are strongly 
influenced by current expectations. 
In the light of these considerations efforts have been made in the discussion to 
reduce the stress on causal links between parenting types, schemas and emotions, though, 
as is apparent, the temptation is not always avoided. As with all models exploring the 
impact of parenting, the tacit assumption is that parental practices give rise to cognitions 
and prevailing emotional states in offspring. This assumption underlies much of the 
above discussion but as this brief consideration of memory and recall is intended to make 
clear, the evidence presented in this chapter cannot confirm this particular causal 
relationship. Only large scale longitudinal studies could achieve that aim. 
Enduring Effects of Parenting 
Laying aside the issue of the lack of clear cut evidence in the current study for the 
tacit assumption that parenting practices cause enduring offspring characteristics, it is 
interesting to speculate as to how such enduring behaviour might come about. That is, 
given that, in a lifetime, most adults have many relationships, it is interesting to ask why 
early parenting might have such lasting effects. Perhaps it is because at this stage of 
development the physiological structure of the developing brain is likely to be heavily 
influenced by experiences during this period of development (Schore, 2003; Schuengel et 
al., 1999). Perhaps it arises because, as previously outlined, high stress levels can result 
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in long-term effects with clear changes in structure which are not subsequently modified; 
changes such as panellation, when particular neurons in a child's brain are destroyed by 
stressful experiences (LeDoux, 1996). In this way, stress from rejecting and controlling 
parents could have long-term adverse effects on offspring, and angry, cruel, impatient, 
blaming, or hurtful parental behaviour, if encountered frequently by a child, could 
contribute to parcellation and so have permanent effects on a child. As mentioned 
previously, frightening parental behaviour has been shown to raise stress levels in 
offspring (Maine & Hesse, 1990). Perhaps it is because classical conditioning readily 
takes place under highly emotional conditions. 
Conclusions 
Study 3 set out to explore the psychometric qualities of the YPI, and to find out 
more about the relationships between parenting, offspring cognitions and offspring 
emotions among a normal population. When none of the specific types of parenting, as 
nominated by Young (1990), appeared as factors, the specific associations that he 
predicted between particular types of maladaptive offspring cognitive schemas and 
particular types of adverse parenting, could not be tested. Instead, two main parenting 
factors for mothers, and two for fathers, were substituted for Young's types. 
Even with such a restricted number of parenting types, some specific potential 
influences of adverse parenting on offspring were identified. Adverse parenting did 
directly predict offspring maladaptive schemas. In two cases, the relationships between 
adverse parenting and offspring Anger, Depression, and Anxiety were mediated by 
offspring maladaptive cognitions, but in other cases, the influence of parenting on 
offspring emotions was direct and unmediated. So the picture of how parenting, 
offspring schemas, and offspring emotions interrelate is more complex than envisaged by 
Young. Broadly, Study 3 confirms Young's view that adverse parenting may have 
lasting negative cognitive and emotional effects on offspring. 
As a post-script to the study, it is acknowledged that being a parent is a 
challenging experience for most people, and that most parents do try to provide for their 
offspring, and meet their needs. It is well to remember that many parents, themselves, 
had less than ideal parenting (Belunsky & Vundra, 1989), so it is not surprising that 
parenting is not always optimal. 
Limitations 
The study was limited by its scale. A larger population would have allowed a 
fuller testing of the YPI. In any stringent test-construction, there is usually a requirement 
for 10 times as many participants as items (Kline, 1986), so, ideally, with 72 items, a 
stringent examination of the YPI would have required a sample of 720 persons. A study 
of this scale was well beyond the scope of Study 3, so, only an initial testing was 
undertaken with 146 participants. 
Because of its small scale, Study 3 did not allow the YPI to be compared with 
other parenting measures, so the concurrent and other forms of validity of Young's 
measure were not tested. Had it been possible, it would have been desirable to compare 
the YPI formally with other parenting measures such as those of Baumrind and Neuharth. 
One of the methodological issues faced in Study 3 was how to assess parenting 
retrospectively. This is a perennial problem because there can be differences in what 
parents report and offspring report, particularly on the issue of whether or not parents 
used physical aggression towards their children (Jouriles, Mehta, McDonald, & Francis, 
1997). However, as in most time limited studies, where a longitudinal design is 
impractical, the main means available for exploring the legacy of parenting on offspring, 
is to rely on retrospective methods. 
Young's model assumes that parenting is the predictor, that schemas are predicted 
by parenting, and that emotions are predicted by schemas. Yet, it is possible that the 
relation may also work in the opposite direction. In other words, Depression, Anger and 
Anxiety, through some process such as state-dependent memory, trigger particular 
schemas and, in turn, these schemas link selectively to memories of particular adverse 
types of parenting. Such a possibility does not seem to have been considered by Young. 
Future Studies 
First, because the YPI appears to include some redundant items, it needs further 
development. If is intended that the YPI should reflect and provide the 17 categories that 
match the YSQ Schemas, then the scale will need to be refined. Whilst the present form 
of the YPI is no doubt valuable in a clinical setting, a future study of its concurrent 
validity, and more vigorous investigation of its validity and reliability, would increase its 
value as a research tool. 
Because the participant group in Study 3 was small and non-clinical, it permitted 
only a tentative look at relationships between adverse parenting, and offspring schemas 
and emotions. A confirmatory study with a larger group and perhaps including clinical 
participants as well, would offer a clearer view of these relationships. 
Because Young's model is a directional model, it implies that only the parent 
plays any active part in the relationship with offspring, and fails to acknowledge that 
offspring may also impact on parents. For example, previous studies have shown that 
easy temperament toddlers positively affect their mother, and difficult temperament 
toddlers negatively affect their mothers (Lee & Bates, 1985); or, that the type of 
discipline a mother uses is influenced by her infant's temperament (Kochanska, 1993). 
A future study could explore the relationship between temperament and schemas to see 
whether having a particular temperament inclines an individual to developing a particular 
set of schemas. 
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The issues of attachment and temperament are not addressed in Study 3, yet both 
of these appear to be active factors which can reflect and impact on the parenting-
offspring relationship. These features could be addressed in any more extensive study of 
this relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTEGRATION OF FINDINGS 
Overview 
This final chapter is organized into four parts. The first part looks at the 
implications of the three current studies for the Cognitive Therapy (CT) model. The 
second part assesses what new information the three studies have revealed about anger 
and, in the light of this, it proposes a new model of anger. Next, the issue of the anger-
depression relationship is addressed. The final section suggests applications of these 
findings and draws conclusions about what has been learnt, generally and specifically, 
from all three studies. 
Background 
In recent years, there has been a strong trend in clinical psychology to adopt a 
cognitive model, such as Beck's Cognitive Therapy (CT) model, when explaining 
psychological disorders, particularly, affective disorders. Beck's model rests on a series 
of assumptions. These are: that specific emotions are associated with particular 
cognitions, as articulated in Beck's Content-Specificity Hypothesis (Beck et al., 1979;, 
1985;); that cognitions give rise to emotions (Beck's Primacy Hypothesis); and third, that 
specific cognitions are associated with particular emotions. Young's model, which is an 
elaboration of Beck's, holds that underlying each personality and affective disorder is a 
specific maladaptive cognition, and that each of these maladaptive cognitions arises as a 
result of exposure to a particular type of adverse parenting. Study 1 and Study 2 set out 
to test Beck s assumptions about the relationships between cognition and anger, 
depression and anxiety. Study 3 tested Young's psychopathology model by exploring 
possible links between parenting, offspring schemas, and offspring emotions. 
Testing the Assumptions of Cognitive Therapy 
Beck assumed that there were specific associations between particular cognitions 
and particular emotions. Despite holding this view, he did not clearly indicate what 
constituted specificity. There are really two positions that can be taken on the matter of 
specificity, a strong position, and a weak position. A strong position on specificity would 
hold that specificity occurs only where there is a unique and exclusive association 
between a specific schema and a particular emotion; it would hold that each emotion is 
linked to one schema, and, conversely, that each schema is associated with only one 
emotion; and that there are no links between that schema and any another emotion. This 
strong position is illustrated in Figure 9. 
Schema 1 Schema 2 
Emotion 1 Emotion 2 
Schema 3 
i r 
Emotion 3 
Figure 9. A n illustration of the .strong position on specificity. 
Given that Study 1 showed there was often a strong degree of correlation between 
schemas, it is unlikely that a strong position on specificity could be defended. By 
contrast, a weak position on specificity would hold that specificity can be inferred where 
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a specific schema tends to be more strongly associated with a particular emotion than 
with other emotions; and that each emotion can be linked to a unique set of schemas. 
Whilst logically, it would be more consistent to favour the strong position, the 
case for specificity is not really lost if the weaker position is taken. The weaker position 
on specificity is demonstrated in Figure 10. 
Schema 2 Schema 3 Schema 4 Schema 5 
Emotion 1 Emotion 2 
Figure 10. A n illustration of the weaker position on specificity 
Study 1 revealed that there were several levels of association between cognitions 
and emotions. Some emotions related to many schemas, some to only a few. Thus, 
depression was related to many schemas; anger was related to fewer schemas than 
depression, and anxiety was related to only a few schemas. Study 1 also showed that 
some schemas are related to all three emotions, for instance, Mistrust and Abuse was 
related to Trait Anger, Depression and Anxiety; that some cognitions are related to two 
emotions, such as Social Isolation to Depression and Anxiety. In these cases, no strong 
claim could be made for specificity. Study 1 also showed that two or more schemas 
could be uniquely and exclusively related to one emotion, such as happened with 
Punitiveness, Entitlement and Anger, or that in a few cases, cognitions can be related to 
just one emotion, such as Unrelenting Standards to Anxiety. In these cases, the claim for 
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specificity was strengthened. 
An argument has been put that the whole concept of specificity is passe (Gomez, 
2002). This view would seem to be supported by the fact that a strong claim for 
specificity can only able to be made for 20% of schemas, (as with Insufficient Self-
Control and Anger; Self-Sacrifice and Depression). Yet, if one takes the weaker position 
on specificity, the fact that 20% of the schemas met the criteria for the stronger position, 
and another 60% of schemas met the weaker criteria, this could be taken as more than 
adequate evidence in support of Beck's specificity hypothesis. It seems clear from this 
that anger and depression, at least, are related to certain cognitions, but not others. 
Rather than rejecting the concept of cognitive specificity on the grounds that it is 
passe, it seems that these studies have added to the understanding of the relationship 
between cognition and emotion, so is still worth exploring. Even the weaker case for 
content specificity is still able to indicate that there is certainly a link between cognition 
and emotion, and this link can be quite specific. Even where there are a number of 
schemas associated with an emotion, this can still add to our understanding of the 
phenomenology of trait anger, depression and anxiety. 
Testing the Assumptions that Thoughts Cause Emotions 
The second assumption of CT, Beck's Primacy Hypothesis, is that cognitions lead 
to emotions. This assumption was tested in Study 2, when participants were exposed to 
the cognitions found in Study 1 to be associated with Anger, Depression, and Anxiety. 
Even though the Primacy Hypothesis is really the foundation of CT, the results of Study 2 
are modest at best. Study 2 showed that some thoughts could trigger particular emotions. 
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For instance Anxiety was induced by cognitions associated with Anxiety and Anger was 
induced by cognitions associated with Anger, but only in already angry persons, however, 
there was no evidence that Depression was induced by cognitions associated with 
Depression. 
Given that one of the strong tenets of Cognitive Theory is that thought induces 
emotion, it was surprising that the effects of cognitions on anger, depression and anxiety 
induction were not stronger. However, weak as the results were, they still offer some 
support for Beck's Primacy Hypothesis. It seems that even in a contrived situation such 
as emotion induction 'anxious thoughts' can significantly increase anxiety, and, in those 
who are already high on Trait Anger, 'angry thoughts' about past situations in which 
one's rights have been infringed can increase angry feelings. 
Depression was different. Even when a person was required to think about 
previous abuse and social isolation they had experienced, they did not become more 
depressed, even when the person was disposed towards depression. Teasdale's 
assumption that prior emotional state increases the effect of cognitions on emotion was 
not supported in the case of depression. This is perplexing because, as was found in 
Study 1, other studies have shown strong links between pessimistic cognitions and 
depression (Abrahamson, Garber, Edwards, & Seligman, 1978; Beck et al., 1985; Clark 
et al., 1994; Seligman, 1975). It seems that even though depression was linked to a 
number of schemas, something more than exposure to these cognitions was needed to 
trigger depressed feelings. 
These results offered some slight support for the primacy hypothesis, but also 
suggested that cognitions may only give rise to emotions under certain necessary 
conditions. Because Study 2 did not examine contingencies such as emotional mode, 
commitment to task, stress levels, or temperament, the search for factors mediating the 
link between cognition and emotion must continue. 
Specific Origins of Specific Cognitions and Disorders 
The next challenge to CT was taken up in Study 3. This addressed a question that 
Beck's model does not raise directly: how a particular emotion comes to be associated 
with specific cognitive material. While Beck acknowledged that a person's history 
contributed to schema development, Young claimed that particular types of negative 
parenting give rise to specific types of offspring cognitive schemas; these, in turn, give 
rise to specific affective or personality disorders. 
Study 3 showed four types of relationships between parenting, offspring 
cognitions and emotions. First, it confirmed that some schemas were consistently 
associated with particular emotions. Second, it showed that some schemas were 
associated with a number of types of adverse parenting, both mothers' and fathers.' 
Third, it showed that some offspring schemas were associated with specific types of 
parenting, regardless of whether the parent was a mother or father. Third, even though 
this was not predicted by Young, Study 3 revealed that adverse parenting could have 
direct effects on offspring emotions. Finally, the results showed that some effects of 
parenting on emotion were mediated by schemas. 
Even though the parenting types that emerged in Study 3 were different from 
Young's, the study broadly confirmed Young's claim that the effects of one's parents 
treatment of one when young, continue into adulthood. From this, it was clear that 
parenting influences h o w a child learns to see the world, and it contributes to what 
becomes the child's reality. It becomes the child's measure of him or herself and shapes 
the child's expectations about the future. These findings confirm previous studies that 
showed that the effect of parenting, whether adverse or benign, is enduring (Elliot, 1997; 
Heim & Nemeroff, 2001; Schore, 2003; van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weiseath, 1996). It 
is as if, through the development of schemas, one carries one's parent in one's head 
forever. This means that the offspring of Rejecting Fathers do not just feel hurt by their 
father's rejection, they come to know that they are not good enough, that they are alone; 
and it is this knowledge that leads on to depression. Likewise, the offspring of Rejecting 
Mothers not only feel unloved and abandoned, they know that if their mother is to accept 
them, they must subjugate themselves to others, remain mistrustful, and live with a 
constant sense of abandonment. In the same way, the offspring of Controlling Mothers 
know that the world is dangerous, that they are powerless, and that there is nothing they 
can do to improve this. This knowledge may lead to anxiety and depression. Offspring 
of Controlling Fathers know two things, that they are special, and they can do whatever 
they want. When they do not get what they want, or when their expectations are dashed, 
they become angry. 
Through such experiences, cognitive and emotional characteristics become 
engrained as traits and can they become permanent features of a person's personality. In 
this way, a person unwittingly maintains and continues the effects of the adverse 
parenting throughout their life (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001; Perry et al., 1995). 
Conclusions 
None of these findings quite fits the current cognitive model. Instead of a single 
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cognition like "I'll never be happy again" (Leahy, 2003) eliciting a particular emotion, it 
is clear that a cluster of cognitions can be associated with a specific emotion. It is clear 
that the same cognitions can be associated with a number of emotions, some strongly, 
some less strongly. It is also clear that some types of adverse parenting can affect 
offspring differently depending on whether parenting was experienced at the hands of a 
mother or father and that parenting can also have a direct effect on offspring emotions. 
All this raises questions about the current cognitive model. It seems that there is a 
need for an extended model, one which accounts for why similar treatment by mothers 
and fathers affects offspring differently, and why it is that a particular thought can be 
associated with anger, depression and anxiety. The current CT model cannot explain how 
it is that schemas like Defectiveness or Vulnerability can be associated with Anxiety and 
Depression and Anger. It cannot explain how it is that different types of adverse 
parenting can be associated with the same offspring cognitions. Nor can it account for 
the non-cognitive effects of parenting practices where parenting is directly linked to 
offspring emotions. 
Perhaps it is not just what the parent does to the child that determines the effect, 
perhaps it is also what the child brings to the relationship that contributes to these effects. 
Young and his colleagues (2003) acknowledged that temperament is a crucial element, 
and they suggested that some types of temperament can protect a child from developing 
maladaptive schemas. Some people appear to be more psychologically resilient and do 
not develop maladaptive schemas, even under conditions of considerable adversity, 
whereas other people seem more psychologically vulnerable and develop maladaptive 
schemas with relatively mild levels of mistreatment (Young et al., 2003, p. 68). 
To account for such findings, the C T model also needs to include features like resilience 
and to account for why some individuals do not get overly upset when experiencing 
adversity, but are able to regain balance. 
Any complete model has to accommodate the fact that parenting can have both 
indirect effects, mediated by offspring cognitions; and direct effects - unmediated by 
cognitions. Cognition is not always the bridge between parenting and offspring emotion, 
because parenting also has a direct effect on offspring emotion. Nor are cognitions 
necessarily implicated in emotion arousal, as Study 3 shows that there are two routes to 
anxiety; a cognitive route, and a non-cognitive route which may relate to temperament. 
PART 2 
WHAT MORE IS KNOWN ABOUT ANGER? 
Overview 
The next section examines what more we know about Anger as the result of these 
three studies. The issues explored are whether there are specific cognitions associated 
with anger, how anger relates to depression, whether particular thoughts trigger anger, 
and whether particular early experiences are associated with later Trait Anger. 
Cognitive Components of Trait Anger 
Probably because it can be a serious problem, both for the angry person, and for 
any person who is the target of anger, anger has been examined from many angles. 
Chapter 1 outlined previous studies of anger, and showed that, despite this interest, there 
had been few formal studies of any cognitions associated with anger. Whilst numerous 
earlier studies explored the cognitions associated with depression and anxiety (Beck, et 
al., 1979,1985,1990), the cognitive bases of anger were not explored as fully. So, in an 
attempt to fill this gap, this thesis took up this issue, and examined the links between 
cognition and anger. 
From Study 1 and Study 2 it became clear that Trait Anger was related to a 
number of characteristic cognitions. Some of the findings were not repeated in Study 3 
but it should also be kept in mind that the limited set of schemas and the form of analysis 
was not capable of revealing the extensive array of associations that were found in the 
earlier studies. Trait Anger, like depression and anxiety, was strongly associated with 
mistrust, vulnerability, abandonment, and concerns about adequacy and being good 
enough. In addition, there were several cognitive elements which related exclusively to 
Trait Anger, such as a strong sense of entitlement, and a lack of self-control. When the 
schemas associated with Trait Anger were examined further, it became clear that there 
were two categories of schemas. One category related to themes involving Self; and a 
second concerned relationships with others. Added to these, there appeared to be two 
response approaches, such that an individual responds either actively or passively. These 
novel elements of Trait Anger are illustrated in the Figure 11. 
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SELF 
ACTIVE 
PASSIVE 
OTHERS 
Red = Schemas significantly and exclusively associated with Trait Anger 
Blue = Schemas significantly associated with Trait Anger and Depression 
Green = Schemas significantly Associated with Trait Anger, Depression and Anxiety 
Figure 11. Elements of Trait Anger. 
Trait Anger and Cognitions that Relate to Self-Rights. 
The schemas that related to self-rights indicated that a person who displayed Trait 
Anger had a sense of Entitlement and had trouble accepting 'no' for an answer when they 
wanted something. They hated being constrained and kept from doing what they wanted 
to do. They felt they were special so should not have to accept the restrictions placed on 
other people. They did not feel they should have to follow rules and conventions like 
other people. They thought that what they had to offer was of greater value than the 
contributions of others. 
This link between Anger and Entitlement seems to support Beck's (1976) 
prediction that anger would relate to beliefs that one's rights have been infringed, or that 
one has not been accorded privileges to which one is entitled. The Entitlement schema is 
clearly about rights. Because "angry" people's bids for special rights are often seen as 
unrealistic, they are not accorded the special treatment they think they deserve. As a 
result, they feel angry. A patient of Young's demonstrated this, saying, "I have a temper 
... if I don't get what I want, I just have, like a fit (of temper)." (Young et al., 2003, p. 
283). 
The other schema that specifically related to self-rights was Insufficient Self-
Control. The link being the thought that I don't have to do anything I don't want to do. 
Angry people seem to grant themselves the right not to do routine or boring tasks. They 
give themselves the right to give up when they became frustrated, and the right not to 
have to persist if they cannot reach a goal easily. They allow themselves the right to 
sacrifice long-term goals in favour of immediate gratifications, so do not force 
themselves to do things they do not enjoy doing, even when this is for their own good. 
They are rarely able to stick to their resolutions. A patient of Young's demonstrated this 
behaviour: while he was an able student, Henry procrastinated when doing school work, 
so performed well below his ability level (Young et al., 2003). 
These two self-right schemas, Entitlement and Insufficient Self-control share, 
certain elements: angry persons not only demand more rights from others, they allow 
themselves more rights. Interestingly, these are two of the three schemas that are 
exclusively associated with Trait Anger (Study 3). 
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Anger and Self-doubts 
Another set of cognitions associated with Anger and Self, concerned self-doubt. 
These cognitions were concerned with failure, defectiveness and shame. This seems to 
confirm Beck's (1976) prediction that anger is also related to poor self-esteem. It seems 
that angry persons do not feel adequate. Perhaps this is because generally their parents 
were critical and perfectionistic. Angry people were perfectionistic and had unrelenting 
standards. There is something paradoxical about persons who are happy to sacrifice long 
term goals for purposes of instant gratification, also being perfectionists who are afraid of 
failure. Perhaps this contradiction can be explained as the tension between wanting to be 
the best, but not wanting to follow through, just in case one is shown to be a failure. 
While previously both perfectionism and procrastination have been associated with 
depression (Saddler & Sacks, 1993), the association between perfectionism and Trait 
Anger has not previously been noticed. 
Trait Anger relating to others. Beck and his colleagues found that anger was 
associated with a person perceiving that he or she was the object of deliberate physical 
attack, criticism, coercion, thwarting, rejection, deprivation or opposition (Beck et al, 
1979). The current studies showed that Trait Anger was strongly linked to the perception 
that others could not be trusted, and that they deliberately hurt, attack, or take advantage 
of one, so that one can never let one's guard down. This finding seems to be consistent 
with earlier findings that anger was linked to the perceptions of injustice (Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1995), and that anger was associated with an exaggerated sense of violation and 
being wronged (Deffenbacher, 1999). 
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Another specific characteristic found in the current studies was that angry persons 
were punitive towards others. No doubt this punitiveness was, in part, in retaliation for 
being hurt, controlled, or criticized by others. Persons high in Trait Anger believed that 
people who did not 'pull their own weight' should be punished. They did not accept the 
excuses other people gave, because they believed others were irresponsible and so should 
be made to face the consequences. Angry persons got upset when they thought someone 
had been 'let off the hook' too easily. They got angry when people made excuses or 
blamed others. This view echoes Clore et al.'s (1993) views that anger springs from the 
perception that another is to blame for an aversive act. High Trait Anger persons held 
grudges, even after someone had apologized, and they found it hard to forgive and forget 
and let go previous hurts. 
Anger and Vulnerability 
The next cognitive theme associated with Trait Anger related to feeling vulnerable 
about being abandoned and left alone. Like anxious and depressed persons, angry 
persons worried about being abandoned and losing the people they liked and felt close to. 
They clung to people because they were afraid they would leave. They felt vulnerable, 
and worried about future disasters, and felt powerless. They felt they did not fit in or 
belong, and felt alienated from other people. 
From this, it is not clear whether Anger is simply a reaction to how others have 
treated one; whether it is the result of mistrustful expectations; or is the result of an 
inability to let go of previous hurts. Perhaps, it is the result of all of the above. 
Active and Passive Anger 
From these studies, the picture that emerged of what angry individuals are like is 
that they are people who fight for survival in an untrustworthy, critical, and unsafe world. 
Their fight is actively manifested through their punitiveness, and through their 
demanding more rights for themselves. They operate in one of two modes, either they 
operate in an active attack-mode, when they demand rights, punish others, or are on the 
lookout for betrayal; or they operate in a passive or retreat-mode, when they doubt 
themselves, fear the world, and feel abandoned. 
Many of the Trait Anger attributes are shared by Depression. The link between 
anger and depression has been noticed previously (Fava, 1998; Fava, Anderson & 
Rosenbaum, 1990; Rosenbaum, Fava, & Pava, 1993) and the next section looks more 
closely at the relationship between anger and depression, in an effort to take this issue a 
step forward. 
Relationship between Anger and Depression 
There have been indications in the literature that Anger and Depression are in 
some way linked. In DSM-IV-R there is a suggestion that anger is a symptom of 
depression. To explore this relationship between anger and depression Study 1 examined 
the relationship between the cognitions that related to trait anger and depression, and 
found that there were many schemas common to both depression and anger. Both 
depression and anger related to mistrust, abandonment, vulnerability, feeling isolated, 
defective, and emotionally deprived. 
These common elements are demonstrated in Figure 12. The ones most strongly 
associated with Anger are printed in red, and incline to action and attack. The ones most 
strongly associated with Depression were shown in blue and reflected a tendency to 
passivity and retreat. 
SELF OTHERS 
A C T I V E 
PASSIVE 
Red = Schemas associated with action 
Blue = Schemas associated with passivity 
Figure 12. Schemas common to Trait Anger and Depression. 
The cognitive schemas associated with both Trait Anger and Depression present a 
bleak picture of the world as an untrustworthy, dangerous, judgmental place. In response 
to this, angry people actively look out for their own best interests and retaliate against 
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others, but depressed persons passively despair and become immobile. 
Because both anger and depression are related to many of the same cognitive 
schemas, the reason why a person manifests as either angry or depressed must arise from 
other sources. Perhaps the reason that persons with similar schemas became depressed 
not angry relates to a feature like temperament. Schore (2003) defined temperament as 
individual differences in tendencies to express primary emotions. Differences in anger 
and irritability levels have been found to relate to temperament (Magai & McFadden, 
1995). This being so, in equivalent situations, those inclined to fight become more angry; 
and those inclined to withdraw become more depressed (Ledoux, 1996). It is possible 
that temperamental tendencies are just points of a continuum. If so, this would help to 
explain why anger and depression are sometimes linked, and why anxiety and depression 
occur together. Simply, it would be because a person's temperament falls between 
temperamental types. A representation of how temperament and emotional tendency 
might be linked is suggested in Figure 13. 
TEMPERAMENTAL TENDENCY CONTINUUM 
FIGHT FREEZE FLIGHT 
ANGER ANGRY- DEPRESSION ANXIOUS- ANXIETY ANXIOUS 
DEPRESSION DEPRESSION -ANGER 
_____ , • 
EMOTIONAL TENDENCY CONTINUUM 
Figure 13. Suggested temperamental and emotional tendency continua. 
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If such links exist, this would help to explain why it is that in threat situations 
depressed persons withdraw and shut down. It would be because it is their temperament 
to freeze. It would explain why anxious persons flee when threatened and why angry 
persons fight for their rights and survival. 
At the point where fight and freeze tendencies abut, an individual would be likely 
to feel both anger and depression. With this model, it becomes a little easier to explain 
the links that have previously been noticed between Depression and Anger, reflecting the 
fact that, rather than being discrete, emotions merge at certain points. Alternatively, 
some people sharing particular schemas and temperament oscillate between anger and 
depression frequently. 
Even if temperament is included in the equation, being born with a certain 
temperament does not mean that the person is inevitably determined by this because there 
is a dynamic interaction between individual and environment. Parcellation causes some 
physiological and neurological 'emotional circuits' to be more readily activated than 
others, which can affect an offspring's maturing sympathetic and parasympathetic 
nervous systems. By these means a child's basic temperamental tendencies can be 
enhanced or reduced by caregiving and an individual's 'biologically based affective core' 
can become biased toward certain emotional responses' (Schore, 2003, p. 25 ). For 
example, Field, McCabe, and Scheiderman (1985) found that when infants experienced 
stress from emotional deprivation, this biased them towards a parasympathetic dominant 
state, so that they habitually showed decelerated heart-rate and low levels of activity. 
Infants experiencing a controlling, over-stimulating mother suffered hyperarousal. With 
this type of overload infants developed heightened emotionality and dependence (Tronick 
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et al., 1982). Experiences such as these, literally pruned an infant's lateral tegmental 
catecholaminegic system, thereby biasing the infant towards developing a sympathetic 
dominant state, so that the infant showed heightened arousal states, especially anger, and 
lost the ability to regulate anger (Schore, 2003). As Schore succinctly puts it "This 
dynamic psychoneurobiological mechanism ontogenetically sculpts the enduring 
temperamental features of the child's emerging personality" (p. 25). 
This temperament / environment model is able to suggest why trait anger and 
depression, while both related to many of the same cognitive schemas, might be 
manifested differently. When schemas develop in an individual biased towards fight, the 
person feels angry, or, when schemas develop in an individual biased towards passivity 
and shutting down, this is associated with depression. 
Whilst adding temperament to the model might seem to undermine the importance 
of schemas, it could also be argued that it serves as a reminder that, underlying schemas, 
there is the person's temperament. Thus, at the root of depression, anxiety, and trait 
anger, there is an interplay between offspring temperament, parenting history, and 
offspring schemas. There are also other possible influences that could affect an 
individual's emotions. For instance, there are other cognitions associated with depression 
and anger such as self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963), locus of control 
beliefs (Lester, 1989; Young, 1991), or hopelessness (Joiner, Steer, Abramson, Alloy, 
Metalsky & Schmidt, 2001). However, because these features were not tested in the 
present studies, they can only be matters of speculation. 
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Parenting and Offspring Anger 
Earlier studies suggested that the relationship between parenting and offspring 
plays an important part in anger socialization (Debaryshe & Fryxell, 1995; Renk et al., 
1999). Others suggested that anger is the result of earlier 'traumatization' (Magai et al., 
2000), that it is associated with a critical family climate (Magai and McFadden, 1995), 
from punishment (Magai et al., 2000), or from being abandoned (Bowlby, 1969). Some 
of these relationships between parenting and offspring anger are explored next. 
Bowlby thought that childhood anger related to children having their attachment 
needs blocked by carers (Bowlby, 1969; Cassidy, 1994). Weiss (1975) found the same 
effect in adults whose attachment needs were threatened or blocked. In these situations 
they also became angry. When, in Study 1, Young's Abandonment Schema was used as 
an indicator measure of participants' abandonment, a strong link was found between adult 
Trait Anger and Abandonment, however, an even stronger link was found between 
Abandonment and Depression. While Bowlby thought that anger in early abandonment 
situations can be functional because it brings parents' attention back to the child, it is less 
easy to see the functionality of having trait anger as a fixed feature in an adult's affective 
repertoire. It could be that anger is more functional than depression, because it demands 
a response from another person. Usually a person's anger affects others, even when 
anger is only expressed as fuming or sulking. This involvement of others offers some 
chance of resolution, in a way that being depressed does not. In depression, the 
depressed individual withdraws, so only she or he feels the effects of his or her depressed 
mood. In this respect, adult anger can be seen to be more functional than depression. 
Yet, anger is also dysfunctional. It has disruptive social effects, it often prompts others to 
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counterattack, withdraw, or reject the angry person, all of which can serve to increase the 
angry person's feelings of social isolation, vulnerability and abandonment (Deffenbacher, 
Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 1996). In addition to the social and legal consequences of 
anger, there are negative health consequences associated with the individual who 
experiences chronic anger (Suarez & Williams, 1988), consequences which can hardly be 
construed as functional. 
Previous studies have pointed to a relationship between punishment and Trait 
Anger, particularly where punishment was severe (McFadden, Loehlin, Breedlove, Lippa, 
& Manning, 1995). Harsh discipline was associated with maladaptive social information 
processing in offspring. Even mild punishment, like withdrawal of parental love, was 
associated with preoccupied attachment, angry feelings, and depressed affect (Magai et 
al., 2000). Whilst the YPI has a Punitiveness category, the items did not allow a deep 
exploration of the issue of punishment. In fact, only one item directly explored the issue 
of parental punishment, and there was none that examined the intensity or frequency of 
punishment In this respect, the is not an entirely satisfactory measure of punishment. 
Nonetheless, responses to this item did give some indication that when fathers' 
punishment was significantly related to offspring Trait Anger, mothers' punishment 
related to offspring Anxiety. 
Offspring anger has previously been associated with a critical family climate 
(Magai & McFadden, 1995). Anger can be socialized directly through contact with an 
angry model, after exposure, children express anger, either through imitation, through 
identification with the angry model, or through social imitation (Renk et al., 1999). 
Perhaps this explains why, in Study 3, offspring of cruel and judgmental Rejecting 
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Fathers were also angry. 
Conclusions 
Trait Anger is not a unitary concept, but rather, incorporates a number of themes, 
and relates to different types of parenting. Trait Anger has clear cognitive components: 
entitlement, punitive to others, vulnerability, feeling alone, unloved, and defective. It 
also relates to adverse parenting, particularly to Rejecting Fathers. It is associated with 
the cognitive schemas that are related to Controlling Mothers and Controlling Fathers. It 
appears that anger as a personality trait can develop along different routes, an indirect 
cognitive route and a direct, or temperamental, one. 
Future Studies 
There are three main directions that would be valuable to explore in future studies 
of anger. Ones that explore the other features of anger, such as how a person usually 
handles situations that annoy him or her, those that distinguish between different types of 
anger, such as differences in anger that relates to ones own rights, as opposed to anger 
associated with seeing others having their rights abused, and those that explore the roots 
of anger. 
Another future study that would be valuable would be one that examined the 
larger picture of the parenting/offspring relationship and seeks to discover whether there 
are intergenerational patterns. A two or three generation study which repeated the 
questions asked in Study 3 about of the relationships between parenting, cognitions and 
emotions (and perhaps, also included brief measures of temperament and attachment) 
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would show whether there are cross-generational patterns for emotions. For example, are 
there patterns relating to parental Depression, Anxiety and Trait Anger and the emotions 
in the next generation? That is, do offspring repeat behaviour modelled by parents, or do 
they react to parent's patterns, or is similar temperament the key? 
While Study 3 showed parenting directly predicted offspring schema 
development, that parenting directly predicted some offspring emotions, the mediating 
role of offspring schemas was clear only between Rejecting Fathers and anxious and 
depressed offspring. Nonetheless, there were indications that parenting predicted 
offspring schemas, which in turn, predicted offspring emotions. There were hints that the 
schemas mediated the effects of controlling parents. This parenting / offspring schemas / 
offspring emotion nexus of Young's model requires further rigorous testing. 
Study 3 showed that mothers are directly linked to offspring Anxiety and 
Depression, and fathers to offspring Anger. It would be fruitful to make a deeper 
examination of the different roles of mothers or fathers in relation to offspring mental 
health. From this, more could be learnt about the specific effects of mothering and 
fathering, and how these affect the mental health of offspring. 
Because the current Study 3 only focused on adverse parenting, it could not 
indicate whether there are also protective features of parenting as Baumrind found from 
having Authoritative Parents. It would be valuable if a future study could explore the 
positive effects of responsive, respectful parenting, particularly on how this impacts on an 
offspring's self-schemas. It would also be valuable if a future study were to explore what 
parenting elements enhance children's resilience. Such a study would add to previous 
studies that showed that some children cope despite experiencing adverse experiences, 
such as their parents' divorce (Strohschein, 2005), or living with a critical, or angry 
parent. What are the elements that protect these children? 
How these Findings Could Be Applied 
The findings of the three current studies could be applied in a range of possible 
settings. For instance, they have applications in clinical and research settings, in theory 
development, and in applied welfare practice. 
In a clinical setting it could be useful to understand how a client's specific 
schemas relate to particular emotions, and how specific types of parenting relate to 
offspring schemas and emotions. Such information could offer some pointers of what to 
look for when trying to understand a patient's anger, or depression. It could also suggest 
directions when planning a treatment programme. For example, the cognitive schemas 
that mediate between parenting and emotions could be used as the basis for Eye 
Movement Desensitization Reprocessing (Shapiro, 1995) to see whether this active link 
between past and present can be removed. 
In relation to theory development, the model of emotions proposed earlier (Table 
21) could be a base from which to develop Cognitive Therapy further. At present the CT 
model is two dimensional, including only thoughts/cognitions and emotions. The current 
studies suggest that this model is restricted and oversimplified. There are additional 
features that touch on this cognition/emotion relationship, which need to be included in 
the model. For example, some other active ingredients are parenting history, 
temperament, and attachment history. 
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There are also applications in welfare. These studies have clearly shown that 
adverse parenting has direct and indirect effects on offspring emotions. It seems clear 
that parents who use such adverse parenting approaches are likely to have unfortunate 
effects on their offspring. From this, it seems self-evident that when welfare agencies 
come in contact with such parents, they should encourage these parents to develop more 
effective parenting approaches. For example, if such parents were encouraged to 
undertake programmes such as the Triple P programme - the Positive Parenting 
Programme (Sanders, 1994), which helps increase parent skills, understanding, and 
competence, these parents could be helped to become more involved in their children's 
lives, to be more encouraging, and to be less angry, critical, and punitive. This, in rum, 
would promote the development and growth and mental health of their offspring 
(Sanders, 1994). In all likelihood, such interventions would probably also prevent the 
development of offspring maladaptive schemas, and reduce the destructive cognitive and 
emotional legacies that adverse parenting has on children. 
There could be a further application of these present studies. It seems clear that 
wider community education about parenting would be beneficial to parents and children 
and society. Instead of focusing only on preparing for birth, ante-natal programmes could 
include an introduction to Triple P programmes for expectant parents, to help them 
become more aware of the effects of adverse parenting, and the type of skills they can use 
to avoid such effects on their baby. This might introduce parents to the fact that these 
programmes are not only for troubled parents, but that all parents can benefit by using 
effective approaches. 
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Concluding Statement 
This series of studies has attempted to explore some of the assumptions on which 
Cognitive Therapy is based. Study 1, in an attempt to fill a gap in what is known about 
how cognitions relate to emotions, explored the question of cognitive content specificity 
in relation to Anger, that is whether there are specific thoughts that relate to Anger and 
distinguish it from Depression and Anxiety. Study 1 found, as Beck predicted, that Trait 
Anger is specifically related to certain schemas concerned with rights, abuse and 
punitiveness. The second study, investigated Beck's Primacy hypothesis that thoughts 
'cause' emotions, by investigating whether thoughts alone elicit emotions. It found only 
modest support for this, which suggested that there are other active elements in emotion 
induction. The third study, which tested Young's model of psychopathology, sought to 
discover whether particular types of adverse parenting are implicated in the development 
of offspring maladaptive schema and whether these maladaptive cognitions mediate the 
effect of parenting on offspring anger, depression and anxiety. Study three confirmed, as 
Young predicted, that parenting has a strong influence on offspring schema development 
but failed to demonstrate the importance of schemas as mediating constructs. 
As a result of these studies, there is now a fuller picture of these relationships. As 
well, there is a clearer picture about the cognitive complexities of anger, and some 
understanding of possible roots of anger, depression and emotion. 
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Appendix A 
Effects of Anger on Health 
Whilst anger is the emotion most often seen as a legal issue, anger also firmly fits 
in the health system. Research on health and anger has shown anger sometimes has 
positive effects on health. For example, Wilcox, King, Vitaliano, and Brassington (2000) 
found that the immune system's natural killer cell activity increased when anger was 
expressed rather than held in. In general though, chronic anger is seen as a health hazard. 
Many adverse health effects have been linked to anger (Spielberger, Johnson, Russel, 
Crane, & Worden, 1985; Friedman, & Rosenman, 1959; Chesney, 1985; Chesney, 
Rosenthal, 1985; Spielberger, Krasner, & Soloman, 1988) and these are discussed below. 
A cluster of distinctive behaviours or 'personality' characteristics were strongly 
associated with coronary heart disease (CHD), elevated blood pressure, and premature 
death (Spielberger et al., 1985). These were 'Type A behaviours and involved 
individuals being 'driven,' being irritable or angry, and being competitive. More recent 
studies confirm the adverse effects of anger on health, linking anger to coronary artery 
disease, and hypertension (Frasure-Smith, Lesperance, & Talajic, 1995). Being angry 
activates the sympathetic-adrenal-medullary, and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical 
systems, which results in increased blood pressure, heart rate, and in the constriction of 
the peripheral blood vessels associated with coronary artery disease. McDermott, 
Ramsey, and Bray (2001) found anger and hostility were strong risk factors in coronary 
artery disease. Labott, Sanjabi, Jenkins and Iannuzzi (2001) found a relationship between 
anger and increased chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Jacobs (2003) found that 
when anger became chronic, particularly when in the form of hostility, such persons 
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'lived with a permanently 'short fuse,'' had an 'overreactive amygdala,' increased blood 
pressure, increased heart rate, increased blood fat and cholesterol, which resulted in blood 
platelets becoming 'stickier,' which blocked artery walls, constricted blood vessels, and 
decreased oxygen flow to the heart. In all, hostile and angry people were found to be at 
greater risk for heart attacks and heart disease. Chronic anger and hostility also served to 
weaken the immune system (Jacobs, 2003). For these reasons, Jacobs concluded anger 
was 'the toxic emotion.' However, Jacobs also noted that where individuals learnt to 
reduce their anger, their hostility diminished, and their risk of heart attack was 
commensurately reduced. 
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Appendix B 
Reasons for Selecting Non-clinical Participants 
Because Study 1 was concerned with anger, depression and anxiety, this might be 
thought to suggest that a clinical group should have been approached. It was decided not 
to use a clinical sample, in part because of privacy concerns, but also because clinicians 
would have had to approach patients, which could have brought additional problems, 
such as clinicians forgetting to distribute questionnaires. In addition, it is not always 
possible to find sufficient numbers of patients of a particular type to provide a viable 
sample. For these reasons, it was decided to follow previous researchers and involve a 
nonclinical group. 
The use of a nonclinical population can also be justified by noting that numbers of 
previous 'clinical' investigations have employed nonclinical populations. For instance, 
Burns and Eidelson (1998) deemed a non-clinical population more suitable than a clinical 
one when exploring the specific cognitive content associated with depression and anxiety. 
Osman, Gutierrez, Jiandani, Kopper, Barrios, Linden, and Truelove (2003) selected a 
non-clinical sample of high-school youths when evaluating the factor structure, reliability 
and validity of the Positive and Negative Suicidal Ideation scale (PANSI). Watson, and 
Sinha (1998) explored the issue of comorbidity in personality disorders using a 
nonclinical population sample of university students. Mazure, Maciejewski (2003) used a 
nonclinical sample to explore the risk for depression arising from adverse life events. 
Endler, Rutherford, and Denisoff (1999) explored the dimensionality of the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) using a nonclinical group. 
The choice of nonclinical participants was also recommended by Garber and 
Hollon (1991) w h o noted, that when undertaking specificity studies that require 
heterogeneous control, the best compromise is often to involve nonclinical participants, 
particularly where it is not practical to obtain samples of diagnostically homogeneous 
controls. Based on these considerations, it was decided that a 'nonclinical' population 
would provide a sufficiently large range of people for studies exploring the cognitive 
specificity in relation to anger, depression and anxiety. 
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Appendix C 
Informed consent information for Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3. 
EMOTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Plain Language Statement 
My name is Monica Maud and I am a student in the Professional Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of Ballarat. This research is designed to address some of the 
unanswered questions about emotions: what thoughts accompany different emotions and 
what may trigger these thoughts. If w e can understand these things w e may be able to 
stop the damage caused when people are extremely emotional. Because there has not 
been a great deal of research in this area, your involvement will make an important 
contribution to our understanding of emotion. 
What you will be asked to do 
If you agree to participate, you 
between 10 to 15 minutes. 
will be 
You will be asked questions about your 
other people? 
given a questionnaire to 
emotions (e.g., When do 
complete. It will take 
you feel distant from 
Informed Consent 
If you decide to complete and return the questionnaire, this will be taken as an indication 
of your informed consent. You are, of course, free to cease your participation at any time 
before handing in your questionnaire, should you so wish. After that, you cannot 
withdraw because all questionnaires are anonymous. 
Your Wellbeing 
It is not very likely that you will find any aspects of the study upsetting, but if you do, 
you might wish to speak to a counsellor. A list of useful contacts has been included at the 
end of the questionnaire for you to retain. Some additional strategies to relieve mild 
distress have also been included. ______ 
Your responses will be treated confidentialby. 
In order to protect your confidentiality: 
1) At no stage will you be required to identity yourself on the questionnaire. 
2) This means that there is no way that your responses will be able to identify you or be 
linked to you. 
3) Only group data will be reported. 
4) As is required by the University, all data will be securely retained for 5 years and 
then destroyed. 
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Any questions or concerns, 
Please feel able to contact the Principal Researcher, Dr Angus McLachlan, Department 
of Psychology, Ballarat University, M t Helen, Victoria 3350, Phone, (03-35279666). 
Should you have concerns about the conduct of this research project, please contact the 
Executive Officer, H u m a n Research Ethics Committee, Office of Research, University 
of Ballarat, P.O. 663, Victoria, 3353. Telephone (03) 53279765. 
Interested In The Results O f Study? 
If you would like to find out the outcome of this research, please send m e a separate 
letter with your name and address and I will send out a brief summary when I complete 
the study in 2004. 
Monica Maud, Department of Psychology, University of Ballarat, Gear Avenue, M t 
Helen, Victoria, 3350. 
Emotions Questionnaire 
1. If you decide to participate please answer all questions. 
2. Please return the completed white pages to me at the session (or, if not 
completed at group session, place in the envelope supplied and post to me) 
3. Please read and keep the Wellbeing Statement on the yellow page. 
4. Please keep and dispose of the blue sheet. 
HOW TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
Please read the instructions at the start of each set of questions. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. 
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Appendix D 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Please complete all questions. Your answers are confidential so please 
make sure that you do not put your name on any piece of paper. 
1. Tick one. Are you? 
1. LJ Male 2. I I Female 
2. What is your age? years 
3. Have you ever been treated for (or attended groups) for any of the following? If 
'YES,' tick those which apply. 
Anxiety 
Anger Management 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
Attention Deficit Disorder 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Other 
1. I I Depression 2. I—I 
3. LJ Stress 4. U 
5. LJ Panic 6. L-J 
7. I I Schizophrenia 8. I—I 
9. El Phobias 10- "-J 
11. [—I Post Natal Depression 12. I—I 
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Appendix E. 
Young Schema Questionnaire 
WHAT YOU FEEL 
Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or herself. Please 
read each statement and decide how well it describes you. 
When you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel, not on what you 
are thinking to be true. Choose the highest rating from 1-6 that describes you, and write 
the number in the space before the statement. 
Rating Scale 
1 = Completely untrue of m e 2 = Mostly untrue of m e 
3 = Slightly more true than untrue 4 = Moderately true of me 
5 = Mostly true of m e 6 = Describes m e perfectly 
Most of the time, I haven't had someone to nurture me, share him/herself 
1. with me, or care deeply about everything that happens to me 
In general, people have not been there to give me warmth, holding, and 
2. affection. 
3. For much of m y life, I haven't felt that I am special to someone. 
For the most part, I have not had someone who really listens to me, 
4. understands me, or is tuned into m y true needs and feelings. 
I have rarely had a strong person to give me sound advice or affection when 
5. I'm not sure what to do. 
I find myself clinging to people I'm close to, because I'm afraid they'll leave 
me. 
7. I need other people so much that I worry about losing them. 
8. I worry that people I feel close to will leave or abandon me. 
9. When I feel someone I care for pulling away from me, I get desperate. 
10. Sometimes I am so worried about people leaving me that I drive them away. 
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11 • I feel that people will take advantage of me. 
I feel that I cannot let my guard down in the presence of other people, or else 
12. they will intentionally hurt me. 
13. It is only a matter of time before someone betrays me. 
14. I am quite suspicious of other people's motives. 
15. I am usually on the lookout for people's ulterior motives. 
16. I don't fit in. 
17. I'm fundamentally different from other people. 
18. I don't belong. 
19. I feel alienated from other people. 
20. I always feel on the outside of groups. 
21. No man/woman I desire could love me once he/she saw my faults. 
22. No one would want to stay close tome if he/she knew the real me. 
23. I'm unworthy of the love, attention, and respect of others. 
24. I feel that I'm not lovable. 
25. I am too unacceptable in very basic ways to reveal myself to other people. 
26. Almost nothing I do at work (at school) is as good as other people can do. 
27. I'm incompetent when it comes to achievement. 
Most other people are more capable than I am in areas of work and 
28. achievement. 
29. I'm not as talented as most people are at their work. 
30. I'm not as intelligent as most people when it comes to work (school). 
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I do not feel capable of getting by on m y own in everyday life. 
I think of myself as a dependent person, when it comes to everyday 
functioning. 
I lack common sense. 
My judgment cannot be relied upon in everyday situations. 
I don't feel confident about my ability to solve everyday problems that come 
up. 
I can't seem to escape the feeling that something bad is about to happen. 
I feel that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could strike at 
any moment. 
I worry about being attacked. 
I worry that I'll lose all my money and become destitute. 
I worry that I'm developing a serious illness, even though nothing serious 
has been diagnosed by a physician. 
I have not been able to separate myself from my parent(s), the way that other 
people m y age seem to. 
My parent(s) and I tend to be over-involved in each other's lives and 
problems. 
It is very difficult for my parent(s) and me to keep intimate details from each 
other, without feeling betrayed or guilty. 
I often feel that my parent(s) are living through me - I don't have a life of 
m y own. 
I often feel that I do not have a separate identity from my parent(s) or 
partner. 
I think that if I do what I want, I'm only asking for trouble. 
I feel that I have no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else 
they will retaliate or reject m e in some way. 
249 
48. In relationships, I let the other person have the upper hand. 
I've always let others make choices for me, so I don't really know what I 
49. want for myself. 
I have a lot of trouble demanding that my rights be respected and that my 
50. feelings be taken into account. 
51. I'm the one who usually ends up taking care of the people I'm close to. 
52. I am a good person because 1 think of others more than myself. 
I'm so busy doing things for the people I care about that I have little time for 
53. myself. 
54. I've always been the one who listens to everyone else's problems. 
55. Other people see me as doing too much for others and not enough for myself. 
I am too self-conscious to show positive feelings to others (e.g., affection, 
56. showing I care). 
57. I find it embarrassing to express my feelings to others. 
58. I find it hard to be warm and generous. 
59. I control myself so much that people think I am unemotional. 
60. People see me as uptight emotionally. 
61. I must be the best at most of what I do, I can't accept second best. 
62. I try to do my best, I can't settle for ' good enough.' 
63. I must meet my responsibilities. 
64. I feel there is constant pressure for me to achieve and get things done. 
65. I can't let myself off the hook easily or make excuses for my mistakes. 
I have a lot of trouble accepting 'no' for an answer when I want something 
66. from other people. 
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I'm special and shouldn't have to accept many of the restrictions placed on 
67. other people. 
68. I hate to be constrained or kept from doing what I want. 
1 feel that I shouldn't have to follow the normal rules and conventions other 
69. people do. 
I feel that what I have to offer is of greater value than the contributions of 
70. others. 
71. I can't seem to discipline myself to complete routine or boring tasks. 
72. If I can't reach a goal, I become easily frustrated and give up. 
I have a very difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a 
73. long-range goal. 
I can't force myself to do things I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for m y 
74. own good. 
75. I have rarely been able to stick to my resolutions. 
76. If I make a mistake, I deserve to be punished. 
77. If I don't try my hardest, I should expect to lose out. 
78. There is no excuse if I make a mistake. 
79. People who don't 'pull their own weight' should get punished in some way. 
Most of the time, I don't accept the excuses other people make. They're just 
80. not willing to accept responsibility and pay the consequences. 
81. If I don't do the job, I should suffer the consequences. 
82. I often think about mistakes I've made and feel angry with myself. 
When people do something bad, I have trouble applying the phrase, 'Forgive 
83. and forget.' 
84. I hold grudges, even after someone has apologized. 
85. I get upset when I think someone has been 'let off the hook' too easily. 
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I get angry when people make excuses for themselves, or blame other people 
for their problems. 
It doesn't matter why I made a mistake; when I do something wrong, I 
should pay the price. 
I give myself a really hard time when I mess things up. 
I'm a bad person who deserves to be punished. 
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Appendix F 
State Trait Anger Scale (STAS) 
HOW DO YOU FEEL NOW? 
A number of statements that people have used to describe how they feel are given below. 
Read the statements below and indicate how you feel at the moment by placing the 
appropriate number next to each item. 
Rating Scale 
1= Not at all 2 = Somewhat 3 = Moderately 4 = Very much so 
1. I a m mad. 
2. I feel angry. 
3. I am burned up. 
4. I feel irritated. 
5. I feel frustrated. 
6. I feel aggravated. 
7. I feel like I'm about to explode. 
8. I feel like banging on the table. 
9. I feel like yelling at somebody. 
10. I feel like swearing. 
11. I am furious. 
12. I feel like hitting someone. 
13. I feel like breaking things. 
14. I am annoyed. 
15. I am resentful. 
Trait Anger Items of STAS 
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HOW DO YOU GENERALLY FEEL? 
A number of statements that people have used to describe themselves are 
given below. Read the statements below and indicate how you generally 
feel by placing the appropriate number next to each item. 
Rating Scale 
1= Almost never 2 = Somewhat 3 = Often 4 = Almost always 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I have a fiery temper. 
I am quick tempered. 
I am a hot headed person. 
I get annoyed when I am singled out for correction. 
It makes m e furious when I am criticized in front of others. 
I get angry when I'm slowed down by others' mistakes. 
I feel infuriated when I do a good job and get a poor evaluation. 
I fly off the handle. 
I feel annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work. 
People who think they are always right irritate me. 
W h e n I get mad, I say nasty things. 
I generally feel irritated. 
I generally feel angry. 
When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone. 
It makes m y blood boil when I am pressured. 
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Appendix G 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale 
HOW DID YOU FEEL OVER THE PAST WEEK? 
Please read each statement and write the number 0,1,2, or 3 to indicate how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. 
There are no right or wrong answers. D o not spend too much time on any statement. 
Rating Scale 0 = Did not apply to me at all. 
1 = Applied to m e to some degree, or some of the time 
2 = Applied to m e a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3 = Applied to m e very much, or most of the time 
1. I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all. 
I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, 
2. breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion). 
3. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things. 
4. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands). 
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of 
5. myself. 
6. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to. 
7. I felt down-hearted and blue. 
8. I felt close to panic. 
9. I was unable to become unenthusiastic about anything. 
10. I felt I wasn't worth much as a person. 
I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion 
11. (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing) a beat). 
12. I felt scared without any good reason. 
13. I felt life was meaningless. 
14. I found it hard to wind down. 
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Appendix H 
Wellbeing Statement 
IMPORTANT 
'WELLBEING STATEMENT 
Please keep and read this blue sheet. 
Your Wellbeing 
Even though this was not the intention of the research, I am aware that on some occasions 
a person comp eting a questionnaire such as one of these, may feel some discomfort or 
become upset by the content of some items. Your wellbeing is important so if this 
applies to you, you should make an appointment to see a counsellor or psychologist. 
1 If you are a student, you could contact the Student Counselling Service 
(Mt Helen Campus on 53279470, S M B on 53278000). 
2 If you are not a student, you could contact the Community Health Centre and ask to 
speak to a counsellor (53331635). 
3 Or you could ring LIFELINE, which offers a 24-hour personal service on 
13 1114 
You could try some of these suggestions: 
Remember, our emotions can be related to our thoughts. So dwelling on things that upset 
you can make the situation even more upsetting. 
If you are feeling upset NOW as a result of completing the questionnaire, you could try 
one/some of the following strategies: 
4 Tell yourself that the upset comes from the past, it's like looking at an old photo, and 
if you put the photo away your mood will lift. 
5 Tell yourself that what upset you is not happening now. 
6 Do something to distract yourself (like go for a walk, do some dishes, listen to some 
cheerful music). 
7 Phone a friend. 
8 Talk to a family member. 
If you feel the need for further help, make an appointment to see a counsellor or a 
psychologist 
Any questions? Please feel able to contact the Principal Researcher, Dr Angus 
McLachlan, Department of Psychology, Ballarat University, Mt Helen, Victoria 3350, 
Phone, (03-53279666). 
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Appendix I 
Anger Induction YSQ items 
Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or 
herself. Please read each statement and decide how well it describes you. 
When you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel. Not 
on what you are thinking to be true. Choose the highest rating from 1-6 
that describes you, and write the number in the space before the statement. 
Rating Scale 
1 = Completely untrue of m e 2 = Mostly untrue of m e 
3 = Slightly more true than untrue 4 = Moderately true of m e 
5 = Mostly true of m e 6 = Describes m e perfectby 
1. I feel that people will take advantage of me. 
I feel that I cannot let my guard down in the presence of other people. Or else 
they will intentionally hurt me. 
3. It is only a matter of time before someone betrays me. 
4. I am quite suspicious of other people's motives. 
5. i'm usually on the lookout for people's ulterior motives. 
6. I can't seem to discipline myself to complete routine or boring tasks. 
7. if I can't reach a goal. I become easily frustrated and give up. 
I have a difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a long-
range goal 
I can't force myself to do things I don't enjoy, even when I know it's for my 
own good. 
1 o. I have rarely been able to stick to my resolutions. 
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Appendix J 
Depression Induction YSQ items 
Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or 
herself. Please read each statement and decide how well it describes you. 
When you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel. Not 
on what you are thinking to be true. Choose the highest rating from 1-6 
that describes you, and write the number in the space before the statement. 
Rating Scale 
1 = Completely untrue of m e 2 = Mostly untrue of m e 
3 = Slightly more true than untrue 4 = Moderately true of m e 
5 = Mostly true of m e 6 = Describes m e perfectly 
1. I feel that people will take advantage of me. 
I feel that I cannot let my guard down in the presence of other people, or else they 
will intentionally hurt me. 
3. It is only a matter of time before someone betrays me. 
4. I am quite suspicious of other people's motives. 
5. I am usually on the lookout for people's ulterior motives. 
6. I don't fit in. 
7. I'm fundamentally different from other people. 
8. I don't belong: I'm a loner. 
9. I feel alienated from other people. 
10. I always feel on the outside of groups. 
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Appendix K 
Anxiety Induction YSQ Items 
Listed below are statements that a person might use to describe himself or 
herself. Please read each statement and decide how well it describes you. 
When you are not sure, base your answer on what you emotionally feel. Not 
on what you are thinking to be true. Choose the highest rating from 1-6 
that describes you, and write the number in the space before the statement. 
Rating Scale 
1 = Completely untrue of m e 2 = Mostly untrue of m e 
3 = Slightly more true than untrue 4 = Moderately true of m e 
5 = Mostly true of m e 6 = Describes m e perfectly 
1. I can't seem to escape the feeling that something bad is about to happen. 
I feel that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could strike at 
2. any moment. 
3. I worry about being attacked. 
4. I worry that I'll lose my money ad become destitute. 
I worry that I'm developing a serious illness, even though nothing serious 
5. has been diagnosed by a physician. 
6. I think that if I do what I want, I'm only asking for trouble. 
I feel that I have not choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else 
7. they will retaliate or reject m e in some way. 
8. In relationships, I let the other person have the upper hand. 
I've always let others make choices for me, so I really don't know what I 
9. want for myself. 
I have a lot of trouble demanding that my rights be respected and that my 
1 o. feelings be taken into account. 
Appendix L 
Feelings Indicator. 
FEELING INDICATOR 
Please indicate how you are feeling now by circling the number that fits your feeling/s at 
this moment. 
Circle a number to indicate the level of that feeling: 
1 = Strongly agree, 
2 = Agree, 
3 = Neither agree or disagree, 
4 = Disagree, 
5 = Strongly disagree 
1. Right now I feel calm 1 2 
2. Right now I feel satisfied 1 2 
3. Right now I feel angry 1 2 
4. Right now I feel depressed 1 2 
5. Right now I feel anxious 1 2 
6. Right now I feel amused 1 2 
7. Right now I feel stressed 1 2 
8. Right now I feel pleased 1 2 
9. Right now I feel helpless 1 2 
10. Right now I feel happy 1 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Thank you, for your participation. 
Please either had the white paper to me or if envelope provided, place it in 
the envelope provided and place in a post box. 
Please remember to read and retain the blue and yellow sheets. 
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Appendix M 
Activity for Anger Induction. 
Please read through the items again and think about each item that you have just rated, 
and write down an example of a time or an incident when this thought occurred to you. 
You may use the same episode for more than one statement. In fact it is possible that 
the one episode will do for all the items but think about each one anyway in case it gets 
you thinking about another time or incident. 
Think of a time when you have felt that people will take advantage of me. 
Think of a time when you felt that you couldn't let your guard down in the presence of other 
people. 
Think of a time whey you thought that it was only a matter of time before someone betrayed 
you. 
Think of a time when you were suspicious of other people's motives. 
261 
Think of a time when you were on the lookout for people's ulterior motives. 
Think of a time that you felt that you didn't fit in. 
Think of a time that you felt you were fundamentally different from other people. 
Think about a time that you felt that you didn't belong. 
Think about a time when you felt alienated from other people. 
Think about a time that you felt that you were on the outside of a group. 
Please turn to Part D which is on the white sheet 
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Appendix N 
Activity for Depression Induction. 
Please read through the items again and think about each item that you have just rated 
and write down an example of a time or an incident when this thought occurred to you 
You m a y use the same episode for more than one statement. In facfit is possible t h T 
the one episode will do for all the items but think about each one anywayTn^ ase if gets 
vou thinking about annthw tim» ™- ;n-;,i_«+ J J u a s c u S c ^ y other e or incident. 
Think about a time when you felt that something bad was about to happen. 
Think about a time that you felt that a disaster (natural, criminal, financial, or medical) could 
strike at any moment. 
Think about a time when you were worried about being attacked. 
Think about a time that you were worried that you'd lose all your money and become destitute. 
Think about a time when you were worried that you were developing a serious illness, even 
though nothing serious had been diagnosed by a physician. 
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Think about a time that you thought that if you did what you wanted, you'd only asking for 
trouble. 
Think about a time that you felt that you had no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, 
or else they would retaliate or reject you in some way. 
Think about a time that you had a difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve a 
long-range goal 
Think about a time that in a relationship, you let the other person have the upper hand. 
Think about a time that you had a lot of trouble demanding that your rights be respected and 
that your feelings be taken into account. 
Please turn to Part D which is on the white sheet 
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Appendix O 
Activity for Anxiety Induction. 
Please read through the items again and think about each item that you have just rated, 
and write down an example of a time or an incident when this thought occurred to you. 
You may use the same episode for more than one statement. In fact it is possible that 
the one episode will do for all the items but think about each one anyway in case it gets 
you thinking about another time or incident. 
Think of a time when you have felt that people will take advantage of me. 
Think of a time when you felt that you couldn't let your guard down in the presence of other 
people. 
Think of a time whey you thought that it was only a matter of time before someone betrayed 
you. 
Think of a time when you were suspicious of other people's motives. 
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Think of a time when you were on the lookout for people's ulterior motives. 
Think of a time when you couldn't seem to discipline yourself to do routine or boring tasks. 
Think about a time when you became easily frustrated and gave up on doing something which 
would have helped you to reach a goal. 
Think about a time when you had a difficult time sacrificing immediate gratification to achieve 
a long-range goal. 
Think about a time when you couldn't force yourself to do something you didn't enjoy, even 
though you knew it was for your own good. 
Think about a time when you didn't stick to one of your resolutions 
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Appendix P 
Neuharth Parenting Types 
Neuharth (1998) studied the effects of controlling parents on their adult offspring and 
discerned eight subtypes of controlling parents. These are shown in Table 23. 
Table 23 
Neuharth's Parenting Types, their characteristic behaviours and their Effects on Offspring 
Parenting Type Characteristic Behaviour Effect on Offspring 
Depriving Parents . 
Perfectionistic Parents 
Cultlike Parents 
Chaotic Parents 
Smothering Parents 
Using Parents 
Abusing 
Childlike Parents 
Disapproving 
Emotionally unreachable 
Use love as a commodity to be 
withheld 
Driven 
Compulsive 
Emphasize status 
Had to have everything perfect 
Fearful of dissent 
Seek control through 'ironclad 
beliefs' 
Feared being questioned about 
their beliefs 
Had difficulties with limits 
Were inconsistent 
Used double-binds so that their 
offspring received ambiguous 
messages 
Overbearingly scrutinized their 
offspring, 
Feared being alone 
Discouraged their child's 
individuality 
Had difficulty distinguishing 
between their wants and those of 
their children 
Demanded loyalty and admiration 
Were emotionally immature 
Were insensitive to others' needs 
Used brute force 
'Blamed-the-victim' 
Felt they had a right to abuse their 
children 
Had poor impulse control 
Were incapable of behaving like 
adults 
Wanted others to look after them 
Induced guilt in their offspring 
Suffer self-doubt 
Lack confidence 
Feel unlovable 
Experience depression 
Emotionally 'bottled up' 
Compulsive 
Self-doubting 
Depressed 
Distrustful 
Gullible 
Feel socially isolated 
Show reduced initiative 
Confused about emotion 
Hypervigilant 
Had little trust in others 
Lacked healthy interpersonal 
boundaries 
Had difficulty with commitment 
and intimacy 
Were extremely dependent 
Showed reduced initiative 
Felt used, 
Had poor self-images 
Had difficulties with emotion 
Were unclear about love 
Were depressed 
Had addictions 
Could not trust others 
Believed that they deserved to be 
treated in this way 
Tended to put others first 
Had difficulty in expressing anger 
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Appendix Q 
Young's Parenting Inventory 
PARENT RATINGS 
Listed below are statements that you might use to describe your parents. 
Please read each statement and decide how well it describes your parents. 
Choose the highest rating from 1 to 6 that describes your mother, then your 
father, when you were a child and write the number in the spaces beside 
each statement 
If someone substituted as your mother or father, please rate the scale for that 
person. If you did not have a mother or father, leave the appropriate column 
blank. 
Rating Scale 
1= Completely untrue 
3 = Slightly more true than untrue 
5 = Mostly true 
2 = Mostly untrue 
4 = Moderately true 
6 = Describes him/her perfectly 
Mother Father 
1. 1. Loved me, treated me as someone special. 
2. 2. Spent time with me and paid attention to me. 
3. .3 Gave me helpful guidance and direction. 
4. 4. Listened to me, understood me, shared feelings with me. 
5. 5. Was warm and physically affectionate. 
6. 6. Died or left the house permanently when I was a child. 
7 7. Was moody, unpredictable, or an alcoholic. 
g. 8. Preferred my brothers) or sister(s) to me. 
9 9. Withdrew or left me alone for extended periods. 
10. 10. Lied to me, deceived me or betrayed me. 
11 11. Abused me physically, emotionally, or sexually. 
12. 12. Use me to satisfy his/her needs. 
13 13. Seemed to get pleasure from hurting me. 
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Worried excessively that I would get hurt. 
Was fearful that I would get sick. 
Was a fearful or phobic person. 
Overprotected me. 
Made me feel I couldn't rely on my decisions or judgments. 
Did too many things for me instead of letting me do things on my own. 
Treated me as if I were younger than I really was. 
Criticized me a lot. 
Made me feel unloved or rejected. 
Treated me as if there was something wrong with me. 
Made me ashamed of myself in important details. 
Never taught me the discipline necessary to succeed in school. 
Treated me as if I was stupid or untalented. 
Didn't really want me to succeed. 
Expected me to be a failure in life. 
Treated me as if my opinions or desires didn't count. 
Did what he/she wanted, regardless of my needs. 
Controlled my life so that I had little freedom of choice. 
Everything had to be on his/her terms. 
Sacrificed his/own needs for the sake of the family. 
Was unable to handle many daily responsibilities, so I had to do more 
than my fair share. 
Was unhappy a lot and relied on me for support and understanding. 
Made me feel that I was strong, and should take care of other people. 
Had very high expectations for him/herself. 
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Expected m e to do m y best at all times. 
Was a perfectionist in many areas; things had to be 'just so.' 
Made me feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
Had strict, rigid rules of right and wrong. 
Became impatient if things weren't done properly or quickly enough. 
Placed more importance on doing things well than on having fun or relaxing. 
Spoiled me, or was overindulgent, in many areas. 
Made me feel I was special, better than most other people. 
Was demanding, expected to get things his/her way. 
Didn't teach me that I had responsibilities to other people. 
Provided very little discipline or structure for me. 
Set few rules or responsibilities for me. 
Allowed me to get very angry or lose control 
Was an undisciplined person. 
We were so close that we understood each other almost perfectly. 
I felt that I didn't have enough individuality or sense of self separate 
from him/her. 
I felt that I didn't have my own sense of direction while I was 
growing up because he/she was such a strong person. 
I felt that we would hurt each other if each of us went away from the other. 
Worried a lot about the family's financial problems. 
Made me feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad 
might happen. 
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Father 
58. Had a pessimistic outiook, expected the worst outcome. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
——60. Had to have everything under control. 
61. Was uncomfortable expressing affection or vulnerability. 
62. Was structured and organized; preferred the familiar over change. 
63. Rarely expressed anger. 
64. Was private; rarely discussed his/his feelings. 
65. Would become angry or harshly critical when I did something wrong. 
66. Would punish me when I did something wrong. 
67. Would call me names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
68. Blamed people when things went wrong. 
69. Was concerned with social status and appearance. 
70. Placed strong emphasis on success and competition. 
71. Was concerned with how my behaviour would reflect on him/her in the 
eyes of others. 
72. Seemed to love me more or pay attention to me when I excelled 
Appendix R 
Details of YPI Factors for Mother and Father Parenting 
This is presented in three sections: first, the component items of Mother factors; 
second the component items associated with Father's factors; third, comparisons of 
Rejecting Father and Mother factors; comparison of Controlling Mother and Father 
factors; and comparison of Rejecting Father and Controlling Mother factors. 
Before the components analysis was undertaken, the following items were 
removed: 
Mother Items Deleted before Factor Analysis 
6. Died or left the house permanently when I was a child. 
10. Lied to me, deceived m e or betrayed me. 
12. Use m e to satisfy his/her needs. 
14. Worried excessively that I would get hurt. 
15. W a s fearful that I would get sick. 
26. Treated m e as if I was stupid or untalenfed. 
33. Sacrificed his/own needs for the sake of the family. 
34. W a s unable to handle many daily responsibilities, so I had to do more than m y fair 
share. 
35. W a s unhappy a lot and relied on m e for support and understanding. 
36. Made m e feel that I was strong, and should take care of other people. 
37. Had very high expectations for him/herself. 
38. Expected m e to do m y best at all times. 
44. Spoiled me, or was overindulgent, in many areas. 
45. Made m e feel I was special, better than most other people. 
47. Didn't teach m e that I had responsibilities to other people. 
48. Provided very little discipline or structure for me. 
49. Set few rules or responsibilities for me. 
50. Allowed m e to get very angry or lose control 
51. W a s an undisciplined person. 
55. I felt that w e would hurt each other if each of us went away from the other. 
56. Worried a lot about the family's financial problems. 
61. W a s uncomfortable expressing affection or vulnerability. 
63. Rarely expressed anger. 
64. W a s private; rarely discussed his/his feelings. 
66. Would punish m e when I did something wrong. 
72. Seemed to love m e more or pay attention to m e when I excelled. 
MOTHER FACTORS 
Rejecting Mother (24 items) 
22. Made me feel unloved or rejected. 
24. Made me ashamed of myself in important details. 
1. (DID NOT) Loved me, treated me as someone special. 
23. Treated me as if there was something wrong with me. 
28. Expected me to be a failure in life. 
11. Abused me physically, emotionally, or sexually. 
67 Would call me names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
2. (DID NOT) Spent time with me and paid attention to me. 
27. Didn't really want me to succeed. 
9. Withdrew or left me alone for extended periods. 
3. Gave me helpful guidance and direction. 
13. Seemed to get pleasure from hurting me. 
4. Listened to me, understood me, shared feelings with me. 
29. Treated me as if my opinions or desires didn't count. 
30. Did what he/she wanted, regardless of my needs. 
12. Criticized me a lot. 
25. Never taught me the discipline necessary to succeed in school. 
5. Was (NOT)warm and physically affectionate. 
8. Preferred my brother(s) or sister(s) to me. 
68. Blamed people when things went wrong. 
52. We were so close that we understood each other almost perfectly. 
7. Was moody, unpredictable, or an alcoholic. 
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Controlling Mother (24 items) 
60. Had to have everything under control. 
43. Placed more importance on doing things well than on having fun or relaxing. 
39. Was a perfectionist in many areas; things had to be 'just so.' 
54. I felt that I didn't have m y own sense of direction while I was growing up because 
he/she was such a strong person. 
42. Became impatient if things weren't done properly or quickly enough. 
71. W a s concerned with how m y behaviour would reflect on him/her in the eyes of 
others. 
46. W a s demanding, expected to get things his/her way. 
20. Treated m e as if I were younger than I really was. 
41. Had strict, rigid rules of right and wrong. 
53. I felt that I didn't have enough individuality or sense of self separate from 
him/her. 
18. Made m e feel I couldn't rely on m y decisions or judgments. 
17. Overprotected me. 
57. Made m e feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad might happen. 
19. Did too many things for m e instead of letting m e do things on m y own. 
31. Controlled m y life so that I had little freedom of choice. 
32. Everything had to be on his/her terms. 
40. Made m e feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
65. Would become angry or harshly critical when I did something wrong. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
62. W a s structured and organized; preferred the familiar over change. 
70. Placed strong emphasis on success and competition. 
58. Had a pessimistic outlook, expected the worst outcome. 
69. W a s concerned with social status and appearance. 
16. W a s a fearful or phobic person. 
Section B 
FATHER FACTORS 
As with the mother items, a number of items were removed before component analysis. 
The following items were removed before Principal Components Analysis: 
Father Items Deleted 
6. Died or left the house permanently when I was a child. 
16. W a s a fearful or phobic person. 
33. Sacrificed his/own needs for the sake of the family. 
34. W a s unable to handle many daily responsibilities, so I had to do more than m y 
fair share. 
35. W a s unhappy a lot and relied on m e for support and understanding. 
36. Made m e feel that I was strong, and should take care of other people. 
37. Had very high expectations for him/herself. 
44. Spoiled me, or was overindulgent, in many areas. 
45. Made m e feel I was special, better than most other people. 
50. Allowed m e to get very angry or lose control 
55. I felt that w e would hurt each other if each of us went away from the other. 
56. Worried a lot about the family's financial problems. 
58. Had a pessimistic outlook, expected the worst outcome. 
61. W a s uncomfortable expressing affection or vulnerability. 
62. W a s structured and organized; preferred the familiar over change. 
63. Rarely expressed anger. 
64. W a s private; rarely discussed his/his feelings. 
Father Factors 
Rejecting Father (33 Items) 
22. Made me feel unloved or rejected. 
1. (DID N O T ) Loved me, treated m e as someone special. 
3. (DID N O T ) Gave m e helpful guidance and direction. 
30. Did what he/she wanted, regardless of m y needs. 
4. (DID N O T ) Listened to me, understood me, shared feelings with me. 
2. (DID N O T ) Spent time with m e and paid attention to me. 
29. Treated m e as if m y opinions or desires didn't count. 
28. Expected m e to be a failure in life. 
67. Would call m e names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
25. Never taught m e the discipline necessary to succeed in school. 
9. Withdrew or left m e alone for extended periods. 
26. Treated m e as if I was stupid or untalented. 
23. Treated m e as if there was something wrong with me. 
21. Criticized m e a lot. 
48. Provided very little discipline or structure for me. 
24. Made m e ashamed of myself in important details. 
5. Was warm and physically affectionate. 
7. Was moody, unpredictable, or an alcoholic. 
47. Didn't teach m e that I had responsibilities to other people. 
27. Didn't really want m e to succeed. 
11. Abused m e physically, emotionally, or sexually. 
68. Blamed people when things went wrong. 
57. Made m e feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad might happen. 
10. Lied to me, deceived m e or betrayed me. 
49. Set few rules or responsibilities for me. 
52. W e were so close that w e understood each other almost perfectly. 
40. Made m e feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
51. Was an undisciplined person. 
13. Seemed to get pleasure from hurting me. 
8. Preferred m y brothers) or sister(s) to me. 
12. Use m e to satisfy his/her needs. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
38. Expected m e to do m y best at all times. 
54. I felt that I didn't have m y own sense of direction while I was growing up because 
he was such a strong person. 
Controlling Father (21 Items) 
41. Had strict, rigid rules of right and wrong. 
60. Had to have everything under control. 
43. Placed more importance on doing things well than oh having fun or relaxing. 
39. Was a perfectionist in many areas; things had to be 'just so.' 
31. Controlled m y life so that I had little freedom of choice. 
42. Became impatient if things weren't done properly or quickly enough.. 
18. Made m e feel I couldn't rely on m y decisions or judgments. 
17. Overprotected me. 
65. Would become angry or harshly critical when I did something wrong. 
32. Everything had to be on his/her terms. 
20. Treated m e as if I were younger than I really was. 
46. Was demanding, expected to get things his/her way. 
71. Was concerned with how m y behaviour would reflect on him/her in the eyes of 
others. 
70. Placed strong emphasis on success and competition. 
15. Was fearful that I would get sick. 
66. Would punish m e when I did something wrong. 
69. Was concerned with social status and appearance. 
19. Did too many things for m e instead of letting m e do things on m y own. 
14. Worried excessively that I would get hurt. 
72. Seemed to love m e more or pay attention to m e when I excelled 
53. I felt that I didn't have enough individuality or sense of self separate from him. 
67. Would call m e names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
Section C 
COMPARISON OF REJECTING MOTHER AND FATHER COMPONENTS 
Common Items for Rejecting Mothers and Rejecting Fathers 24 items) 
22. Made me feel unloved or rejected. 
24. Made me ashamed of myself in important details. 
1. (DID NOT) Loved me, treated me as someone special. 
23. Treated me as if there was something wrong with me. 
28. Expected me to be a failure in life. 
11. Abused me physically, emotionally, or sexually. 
67 Would call me names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
2. (DID NOT) Spent time with me and paid attention to me. 
9. Withdrew or left me alone for extended periods. 
3. Gave me helpful guidance and direction. 
13. Seemed to get pleasure from hurting me. 
4. Listened to me, understood me, shared feelings with me. 
29. Treated me as if my opinions or desires didn't count. 
30. Did what he/she wanted, regardless of my needs. 
5. Was (NOT)warm and physically affectionate. 
8. Preferred my brother(s) or sister(s) to me. 
68. Blamed people when things went wrong. 
52. We were so close that we understood each other almost perfectly. 
7. Was moody, unpredictable, or an alcoholic. 
27. Didn't really want me to succeed. 
25. Never taught me the discipline necessary to succeed in school. 
21. Criticized me a lot. 
Rejecting Father Items not shared with rejecting Mothers (13 Items) 
26. Treated me as if I was stupid or untalented. 
21. Criticized me a lot. 
48. Provided very little discipline or structure for me. 
47. Didn't teach me that I had responsibilities to other people. 
57. Made me feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad might happen. 
10. Lied to me, deceived me or betrayed me. 
49. Set few rules or responsibilities for me. 
40. Made me feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
51. Was an undisciplined person. 
12. Use me to satisfy his/her needs. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
38. Expected me to do my best at all times. 
54. I felt that I didn't have my own sense of direction while I was growing up because 
he was such a strong person. 
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Items Specific to Rejecting Mothers (NONE) 
COMPARISON OF REJECTING MOTHER AND FATHER COMPONENTS 
Common Items For Controlling Mothers And Father (16 Items) 
41. Had strict, rigid rules of right and wrong. 
60 Had to have everything under control. 
43. Placed more importance on doing things well than on having fun or relaxing. 
39. Was a perfectionist in many areas; things had to be 'just so.' 
31. Controlled my life so that I had little freedom of choice. 
42. Became impatient if things weren't done properly or quickly enough. 
18. Made me feel I couldn't rely on my decisions or judgments. 
17. Overprotected me. 
65. Would become angry or harshly critical when I did something wrong. 
32. Everything had to be on his/her terms. 
20. Treated me as if I were younger than I really was. 
46. Was demanding, expected to get things his/her way. 
71. Was concerned with how my behaviour would reflect on him/her in the eyes of 
others. 
70. Placed strong emphasis on success and competition. 
69. Was concerned with social status and appearance. 
53. I felt that I didn't have enough individuality or sense of self separate from him. 
Controlling Father Items not shared with Controlling Mothers (6 Items) 
15. Was fearful that I would get sick. 
66. Would punish me when I did something wrong. 
19. Did too many things for me instead of letting me do things on my own. 
14. Worried excessively that I would get hurt. 
72. Seemed to love me more or pay attention to me when I excelled 
67. Would call me names (like 'stupid' or 'idiot') when I made mistakes. 
Controlling Mother items not shared with Controlling fathers (8 items) 
54. I felt that I didn't have my own sense of direction while I was growing up 
because he/she was such a strong person. 
57. Made me feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad might happen. 
19. Did too many things for me instead of letting me do things on my own. 
40. Made me feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
62. Was structured and organized; preferred the familiar over change. 
58. Had a pessimistic outlook, expected the worst outcome. 
16. Was a fearful or phobic person. 
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COMPARISON OF REJECTING FATHERS AND CONTROLLING MOTHERS 
Items Shared By Rejecting Fathers And Controlling Mothers (4 Items) 
57. Made me feel that if I made even a small mistake, something bad might 
happen. 
40. Made me feel that almost nothing I did was quite good enough. 
59. Focused on the negative aspects of life or things going wrong. 
54. I felt that I didn't have m y own sense of direction while 1 was growing up 
because he was such a strong person. 
Rejecting Father Items Not Shared With Controlling Or Rejecting Mothers (9 Items) 
26. Treated me as if I was stupid or untalented. 
21. Criticized me a lot. 
48. Provided very little discipline or structure for me. 
47. Didn't teach me that I had responsibilities to other people. 
10. Lied to me, deceived me or betrayed me. 
49. Set few rules or responsibilities for me. 
51. Was an undisciplined person. 
12. Use me to satisfy his/her needs. 
38. Expected me to do m y best at all times. 
Controlling Mother Items Not Shared With Controlling Fathers Or Rejecting Fathers (4 
Items) 
19. Did too many things for me instead of letting me do things on my own. 
62. Was structured and organized; preferred the familiar over change. 
58. Had a pessimistic outlook, expected the worst outcome. 
16. Was a fearful or phobic person. 
